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ABSTRACT
Portability, or the right of a terminating employee 
to transfer pension assets to a succeeding pension plan, 
has been offered as a means of enabling the mobile employee 
to participate in the private pension system. Extension 
of the private pension system to include coverage of mobile 
workers would permit achievement of two economically 
desirable goalss (1) labor mobility with pension preser­
vation and (2) provision of an adequate and secure retire­
ment income for the United States labor force.
Although the portability concept has been a popular 
and controversial pension reform issue during the past 
decade, it has not been widely understood by legislators 
and pension experts and has been criticized as excessively 
costly and complex as well as being unnecessary. The 
purpose of this study is to develop a clear definition of 
portability and to examine the implications, desirability 
and feasibility of establishing a national system for the 
transfer of pension credits. In addition, other pension 
reform issues (including vesting, funding, insurance of 
unfunded liabilities, disclosure and fiduciary responsi­
bility), their relationship to portability, pending 
portability legislation and limited and full portability 
systems are examined. The methodology includes a review
viii
of pertinent literature, interviews with staff members 
of Congressional Committees working in the area of pension 
reform, interviews with representatives of the private 
pension industry, an examination of Congressional hearings 
to determine the position on pension reform of unions and 
private industry lobbyists and the calculation of fund and 
annuity simulations and sample transfer values.
Several major conclusions were forthcoming from 
this study. First, portability is a desirable option for 
a limited group of mobile employees and can be implemented 
on a voluntary basis, preferably through the provision of 
the direct tax free transfer of funds. Second, portability 
is unnecessary and too costly and complicated for the 
majority of the working population. Major hindering com­
plications include the prevalent practice of underfunding, 
possible benefit level fluctuations and the nonforfeitability 
status of transferred pension assets. Finally, requiring 
universal portability immediately would impose excessive 
restrictions on the private pension system, possibly re­
ducing that system's flexibility and growth potential. The 
intricate technical and mechanical problems cannot be 
solved instantaneously. Rather, the portability concept 
must be developed slowly with a long period of maturation 
in order to achieve portability's full potential as a 
valuable management tool for the provision of a secure, 
adequate retirement income for the United States labor force.
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INTRODUCTION
Need for the Study of the 
Portability Concept
The private pension industry in the United States 
achieved its major growth during the past two and one- 
half decades as a result of the general public's increased 
need for retirement income. The American labor force, 
no longer provided for during old age by the family unit, 
has become increasingly independent and self-subsistent 
in terms of financial capacity after retirement. The 
demise of extended family groups, combined with high-cost 
urban living and a constantly increasing standard of 
living have compounded the economic problems of retire­
ment, Old age income typically is derived from Social 
Security benefits (or other government-sponsored programs), 
personal savings and private pensions. In the past, the 
mobile worker has had to rely on Social Security benefits 
and personal savings as the primary source of retirement 
income. Recent developments in the private pension 
industry and in the area of federal legislative actions 
may allow even the mobile worker to realize benefits from 
private pension plans.
Portability, or the right of a terminating 
employee to transfer pension assets to a succeeding pension
pension plan, has been suggested as one means of enabling 
the mobile employee to participate in the private pension 
system. Preservation of pension benefits is widely 
accepted as an employee's right, i.e., private pensions 
are a form of deferred wages. Recognition of this concept 
is evident not only within the ranks of the pension 
industry, but also among the nation's employers. In 
addition, the need for increased pension coverage as 
an expression of corporate social responsibility has moti­
vated pension reform advocates to seek a way of providing 
all workers, including the mobile and transient, with an 
adequate retirement income. Such attitudes and objectives 
as these may entail the implementation of a portability 
system.
Increased Public Interest
As dependence on the private pension industry for 
adequate retirement income has increased, so has public 
interest in pension reform. Widely publicized incidents 
such as unfulfilled pension expectations and pension fund 
abuses and frauds have stimulated considerable concern 
that there is a need for enactment of pension reform 
legislation. Specifically, proponents contend that reform 
is required to prevent benefit losses arising from unfair 
eligibility requirements, fund inadequacy and misuse, plan 
terminations, incomplete disclosure of employee benefit 
accruals and inappropriate or imprudent management of 
pension funds. Moreover, support for reform is extensive.
3
It is no longer a few college professors and 
radical extremists who are pointing out short-comings 
in the private pension system. Leaders of government 
across the political spectrum are talking about the 
problems. Journalists are writing about them in 
our daily newspapers. And the man on the street 
is concerned.
Lack of Understanding of the Portability Concent
Various government reports indicate that Congressional 
interest in the portability concept has been evident since 
1965 when a special private pension fund study committee 
reported to President Lyndon B. Johnson that portability 
was "worthy of serious study to help fulfill the long 
range promise of the private pension system." Although 
the portability concept achieved prominence as a pension 
reform issue in 1965» 'fĉie mechanics of the system have 
not been "widely understood" by legislators. J Hearings 
on pension reform held during the 92d Congress by the 
Senate Labor Subcommittee support the conclusion that 
the transfer concept is not sufficiently developed to
ADonald S. Grubbs, "An Adequate Retirement Income 
for Every American," Address presented at the Society 
of Actuaries Regional Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
March 20, 1972, p. 1. (Mimeographed)
2President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds 
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, Public 
Policy and Private Pension Programs. A Report to the 
President on Private Employee Retirement Plans (Wash­
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), P* vii,
forward,
-^Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub­
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9, 1972.
permit legislation of full portability:
The hearings demonstrated that although the right 
of an employee to carry his pension credits is 
another aspect of the private pension plan system in 
the U.S. which must be closely examined, it is a 
complex area and one which requires further and 
exhaustive consideration before solutions become 
feasible.
Understanding of the portability concept has not 
improved to date in the 93d Congress. Early in 1973* and 
in recognition of the complexity of portability, Rep.
Tom Railsback (R— 111.) introduced legislation which 
"directs that a portability study be undertaken."-^ In 
addition, the Hearings conducted by the House General 
Subcommittee on Labor on pension reform further demonstrate 
the need for an examination of the portability concept: 
"there appears to be considerable confusion among Congress­
men as to what is to be 'ported*— service credits or vested 
benefits,"^ Finally, to facilitate development of the 
portability concept, the U.S. House of Representatives 
appropriated funds for the House Pension Study Task Force 
of the House General Committee on Education and Labor
h,U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities of the Private 
Welfare and Pension Plan Study, by the Subcommittee on 
Labor, S. Rept. 92-634, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1971» p. 84-.
-%.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Rep.
Tom Railsback speaking for pension reform, H.R. 934, 935» 
93d Cong., 1st sess., January 9* 1973* Congressional 
Record, CXIX, Elll.
^"Dent Opens Hearings on H.R. 2 andH.R, 462— > 
Pension Reform Legislation," Employee Benefit Plan Review 
Research Reports. Weekly News Digest. XXI. No. 8 (February 
23, 1973), 3.
to conduct a study of portability and reinsurance during 
the 93d Congress. In short, there has not been sufficient 
examination and analysis of the portability concept to 
permit the drafting of a workable legislative proposal 
for the adoption of a portable pension system.
In addition to the misconceptions, associated with 
portability on the legislative front, the system is mis­
construed in equal measure by the pension industry. In 
referring to these confused interpretations of portability, 
several experts have commented:
It is also much used by all persons actually 
involved in private pension plans, such as pension 
consultants, insurance companies, banks, employers, 
employees and officials of labor unions. To each 
of these various persons'portability' seems to 
mean something different.
It's catghy, but it's been used to describe too 
many things.
Scope of the Study of the 
Portability Concept
The purpose of this study is to develop a clear 
definition of portability and to examine the implications 
of establishing a national system for the transfer of 
pension credits. In addition, the desirability and 
feasibility of a transfer system will be explored. Porta­
bility is only one solution to the problem of private
^Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension Benefits, 
Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, LXXII,
No. 11 (March, 1972), 22.
OJay Kobler,"Pension Reform and the Life Insurance 
Industry," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance 
Edition, LXXII, No. 5 (September, 1971). 72.
pension preservation for a mobile U.S. labor force and may 
not, in fact, be the most appropriate alternative. Finally, 
the future of pending portability legislation and both 
limited and full portability systems will be examined.
Part I: Development of the Portability Concept
Part I of this study includes the theoretical and 
historical justification of the portability concept. 
Particular emphasis is given to the debate within the 
pension industry regarding the proper categorization of 
pension fund contributions as either a gratuity or a form 
of deferred wages. Next, the advantages and disadvan­
tages of the portability concept as presented in financial 
and business journals and Congressional hearings are 
separated from other pension reform issues for discussion 
purposes. Then, since portability usually is referred 
to as in integral part of a legislative reform package, 
the relationship between the transfer concept and other 
pension reform proposals is delineated. The final 
chapter in Part I analyzes the changing political environ­
ment for pension reform. Although portability has been a 
prominent part of comprehensive pension reform efforts 
since the 89th Congress, there has been little Congressional 
action in the area of general pension reform. Pressure is 
building., however, for passage of some form of private 
pension regulation in the 93d Congress.
Part II: Growth of the Portability Concept
Although a national portability system has not 
been legislated in the United States, the portability 
technique is utilized in varying degrees in Europe,
Canada and, as a more limited form, in the U.S. The 
adaptability of these existing prototypes for use in the 
U.S. as well as other suggested portability mechanisms 
are discussed and assessed in Part II of this study in 
terms of feasibility of implementation.
Since the mechanical and technical workability 
of a national transfer system has been subject to such 
wide criticism, the problems encountered in implementing 
a portability system are evaluated by means of sample 
simulations in a separate chapter in Part II. Particular 
emphasis is given to the problems of funding, annuity level 
fluctuation and benefit status.
Finally, Part II includes an analysis of the 
portability segments of the three major pension reform 
bills before the 93d Congress. As indicated by the review, 
the portability portions of the bills represent completely 
contrasting philosophies of implementation.
Methodology
The methodology of this study includes (1) a review 
of pertinent literature, (2) interviews with staff mem­
bers of Congressional Committees working in the area of 
pension reform, (3) interviews with representatives of the 
private pension industry, (^) an examination of Congres-
sional hearings to determine the position of unions and 
private industry lobbyists and (5) the calculation of 
fund and annuity simulations and sample transfer values.
Intent of the Study of the 
Portability Concept
An intensive and comprehensive study of the porta­
bility concept, its implications and problems of mechanical 
implementation, should provide the basis for furthering 
a broader understanding of portable pensions. The problem 
of the complexity of the portability technique, as well 
as the question of whether a transfer system actually is 
needed for pension preservation, must be resolved before 
legislators can draft a workable proposal for portable 
pensions. Accordingly, delineation of the technical 
problems involved in transferring pension assets from 
one fund to a subsequent fund should provide a reliable 
procedural guide for future attempts to implement portable 
pension systems on both a national and limited basis.
PART I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION 
FOR PORTABLE PENSIONS
Bases of Confusion Related to Portability
The concept of portable pensions has received wide 
attention in the past decade from legislators, the private 
pension industry, unions, the press and the general 
public. The focus of this interest is the evaluation of 
the portability concept as the solution to the problem of 
providing an adequate and secure retirement income for 
a mobile American labor force.
The definition of portability generally accepted 
by pension experts and legislators is stated as the 
right of a terminating employee to transfer the assets 
supporting his pension credits to a succeeding pension 
plan.* Despite the universality of this definition, there 
is still confusion with respect to the inherent nature 
of the portable pension concept.
■^Similar definitions may be found in Jay Kobler, 
'Tension Reform and the Life Insurance Industry," Best*s 
Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, LXXII, No. 5 
(September, 1971)» 72, and U.S., Congress, House, Com­
mittee on Ways and Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private 
Pension Plans. Hearings, before the Committee on Ways and 
Means, House of Representatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 
2d sess., 1972, p. 580.
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Two bases of confusion about portability arise from,
first, attempts to assess the implications of portability 
and, second, misconceptions about the means by which the 
transfer can be effected. This lack of understanding of 
portable pensions is clearly stated by Mrs. Jozetta Srb 
in her analysis of portable pensions:
Portability has become a key issue but there may 
be confusion about what is meant by the term. Over 
the past few years, it has become popular to refer to 
any pensions in which rights are retained by employees 
changing jobs before retirement as 'portable' re­
gardless of whether credits are actually carried to 
another plan, left in 'cold storage,' or simply 
result from participation in a plan concerning the 
employees of two or more financially unrelated em­
ployers. Semantically, the British term 'pension 
preservation' describes the general grouping more 
accurately; but portable pension and portability 
are well-established in American journals and despite 
the more careful use of terms in the current debate 
over pension reform, they remain ambiguous.
Misinterpretations
The confusion about the implications and mode 
of portability has been further inflated by disagreements 
as to what exactly does constitute portability. A number 
of alternative pension arrangements have erroneously been 
called portable pensions. The term portability frequently 
is used either to describe restricted forms of pension 
credit transferrability or mistakenly equated with other 
private pension concepts. Such inaccurate usage of pension
pJozetta H. Srb, Portable Pensions; A Review of the 
Issues, Industrial and Labor Relations Library, Key Issue 
Series— No. 4 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Public Information Center,
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 
1969), p. 2.
terminology in areas such as multiemployer plans, reci­
procal agreements, vested benefits and preservation of 
pension benefits has created considerable misunderstanding 
in connection with portable pensions.
Multiemployer Plans.— Limited portability is 
found in multiemployer plans. In a multiemployer plan, 
two or more employers (often financially unrelated) act 
as one employer for pension plan purposes; i.e., one master
t
pension plan serves several employers. The benefits provi­
ded by such a plan either can be insured or managed under 
a trust agreement, with trustees representing all the 
employers. Uniform benefits and plan financing among 
participating employers are implicit in this form of 
pension arrangement. If an employee changes jobs 
within the participating employer group, maintenance of 
his pension benefits is guaranteed. In the strictest 
sense, portability does not exist in a multiemployer 
plan since a transfer does not take place. Nevertheless, 
since the goal of benefit security for a mobile labor 
force is accomplished through the multiemployer plan, 
partial portability can be said to be achieved, limited 
only by the number of participating employers. In fact, 
early conceptions of portability largely were within the 
sphere of multiemployer plans.
A . . . means of overcoming the obstacle to labor 
mobility is the adoption of 'portable* pension
13
credits within the scope of a multiemployer pension 
program.
Reciprocal Agreements.— Another means by which 
portability can be accomplished on a limited basis is 
through the reciprocity agreement, an arrangement between 
nonuniform plans by which employees are allowed to move 
from one plan to another without losing pension credits. 
Reciprocal arrangements are frequently made under col­
lective bargaining agreements. An employee who changes 
jobs within the participating employer group generally 
enters the succeeding pension plan with some accrued credit 
for prior year's service. This accrued credit can be based 
on the formula of the pension plan of either the first 
employer or the second employer, depending on the terms 
of the reciprocal agreement. There exist many variations 
of credit transfer, but the important feature of all 
reciprocal agreements is that at least some credit in the 
succeeding plan is allowed for an employee's prior ser­
vice with a preceding participating employer.
There is an infinite variety of methods through which 
this limited form of portability can be accomplished. For 
example, an actual fund transfer can be made at the time of 
employee termination. Or, the fund transfer can be de­
ferred for a specified waiting period (e.g., five years). 
Alternatively, the transfer can be delayed until the employee
•^Robert C. Miljus and Alton C. Johnson, "Multi- 
Employer Pensions and Labor Mobility," Harvard Business 
Review^(September-October, 1963), p. 1^7*
retires under the final plan. At that time, complete 
settlement among participating employers is made on behalf 
of the retiree, with the last employer acting as the admin­
istrator of the total retirement benefit. As still 
another illustration, some reciprocity agreements require 
that there be no actual fund transfer upon the termination 
of any particular employee. Rather, a bookkeeping 
transfer records individual terminations and actual net 
fund transfers are made only periodically. Again, as in 
the case of multiemployer plans, mobility of labor 
with benefit preservation is limited by the number of 
participating employers.
Broadening of portability of pension rights through 
reciprocity agreements probably accomplishes a great 
deal for the workers governed by them. In industries 
and occupations where a high proportion of the labor 
force is likely to spend their entire working career 
within their industry or occupation, workers stand 
to benefit most. . . .
The strongest attraction of reciprocity for 
strengthening pension plan protection lies in the 
fact that it permits the integration of coverage 
despite wide diversity iri plan provisions.
Vesting.— In addition to the confusion centering 
around limited portability as provided by multiemployer 
plans and reciprocity arrangements is the misconception 
created when portability is used interchangeably with the 
concept of vesting. Vesting is the right of an employee 
to the benefit attributable to his employer's contributions
^Walter W. Kolodrubetz, "Reciprocity and Pension 
Portability," Monthly Labor Review, XCI, No. 9 (September, 
1968), 28.
under a pension plan in the event of his termination of 
employment prior to retirement. The assets supporting the 
vested right remain in the original employer's fund and there 
is no transfer of funds to a succeeding employer. Retire­
ment checks are issued from the fund of the employer 
whose contributions have become vested. An employee who 
has accrued vested benefits from several employers will 
receive upon retirement a separate check from each employer 
involved. Vesting therefdre differs from portability in 
two ways: (1) there is no transfer of funds between
previous and succeeding employers and (2) there is no 
combination of all earlier employers' pension credits by 
the final employer for the dispensation of retirement 
benefits by one check.
Despite these differences, vesting and portability 
are frequently used interchangeably as is indicated in 
testimony at recent Congressional hearings:
Portability is nothing but a way of implementing 
a vesting provision. It is not something that is 
separate and apart from vesting.
Pension Preservation.— Some pension experts view 
portability in a much broader perspective than that of the 
right of a terminating employee to transfer the assets 
supporting his pension credits to a succeeding pension 
plan. Rather, portability is viewed as the maintenance
'’U.S. , Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Private Pension Bills, Hearings before 
a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598, S. 302^, S. 3012 and 
Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 195*
of pension benefits or as the prevention of "loss of 
accrued benefits."^ The primary proponent of a liberal 
interpretation of the concept of portability is Norman 
H. Tarver, a Canadian pension expert employed by The 
Manufacturers Life Insurance Company in connection with 
the administration of predominantly U.S. pension plans.
I suggest that portability means the preservation 
of pension benefits that have become vested in an 
employee at the time he terminates-participation in 
a qualified plan. . . •
Where and how the preservation of vested benefits 
takes place is irrelevant to the definition; the 
vested benefits may be preserved where they have 
accumulated or they may be transferred and preserved 
elsewhere. 'Portability' is thus nothing more^or 
less than the preservation of vested benefits.
General Definition of Portability 
Although the goal of benefit security for the 
mobile worker possibly may be attained through sound vesting 
practices, it is generally agreed that portability trans­
cends the theory of vesting because portable pensions 
involve the transfer of asset values.
Achievement of 'portability' means in pension termin­
ology, the development of arrangements by which a 
worker could accumulate private pension credits from 
job to job and eventually combine them into a quali­
fication for a single pension.
^"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News, 
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), 63 .
"^Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension 
Benefits," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance 
Edition, LXXII, No. 11 (March, 1972), 22.
OAmerican Enterprise Institute, Issues Affecting 
Pensions (Washington, D.C.i American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1971)f P» 17*
The term E portability or portable pensions 3 is 
appropriately used to describe an employee's right 
to transfergpension credits from one pension plan 
to another.
Implications of Definition of Portability
In contrast to the general definitional acquiescence
of portable pensions, the implications of portability are
more difficult to resolve. Three such major problem areas
include (1) implementation of the transfer of funds,
(2) creation of tax liabilities and (3) determination of
transfer values.
There are two general ways by which a fund transfer
can be implemented: (1) a direct transfer can take place
10from one qualified pension plan to a succeeding quali­
fied pension plan, (2) the transfer can be indirect 
through a central clearinghouse. A central clearinghouse 
would act as a depository for the assets supporting the 
pension credits of a terminating employee. When a 
succeeding employer is found by the terminated employee 
and any specified waiting period requirement is met, 
the pension assets with any accrued interest are then 
transferred to the succeeding employer's plan. If no 
succeeding employer is involved, the clearinghouse can be
oSrb, Portable Pensions, p. 2.
*0A pension plan is accorded a "qualified" status 
by the Internal Revenue Service under Section *K)1 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 195^ when certain standards of 
contract formality, nondiscrimination and benefit determina­
tion are met. The purpose of "qualification" is to allow 
an employer to deduct pension contributions within speci­
fied limits as ordinary business expenses for federal income 
tax purposes.
used as the final administrator of pension benefits; i.e., 
the clearinghouse would secondarily serve as a private 
pension plan. The form of a central clearinghouse could 
be wholly private, governmental in arrangement or some 
combination of a private and public agency.
The necessity of working out a means of transferring 
funds as one of the perplexing implications of portability 
brings out a second problem involved with portability.
In a direct transfer of funds from one employer to another 
employer, there may be a lapse of time during which the 
terminating employee involved gains "constructive receipt 
of the funds." Under the present federal income tax laws, 
such access to the pension assets would require that the 
fund assets be taxed as ordinary income. Since pension 
assets for even an individual can involve rather large 
amounts, it probably would be difficult for the terminating 
employee to meet the tax obligation, especially since the 
assets being taxed would eventually be going into another 
fund and therefore not be available as a means of satisfying 
the tax liability. A federal income tax revision would 
be necessary to realistically allow direct pension fund 
transfers; i.e., the direct transfer being allowed as a 
nontaxable negotiation.
A third implication of the portability concept, 
and one which is often considered the most difficult, 
is the definition of the transfer value. The benefit pro­
visions of the numerous private pension plans are extremely
varied since each plan is usually individually tailored 
to meet a particular employer's needs. In addition to 
the lack of benefits and option uniformity, each plan is 
subject to a variety of financing levels and actuarial 
assumptions** which may make an equitable transfer of 
benefits complicated.
Having established a definition of portability, it 
is to these complex implications of portability that this 
paper is directed. Realistic feasibility of portable 
pensions and the facilitation of asset transfer must be 
addressed. It is necessary, however, to first establish 
the relationship of portability to the entire private 
pension movement through both the historical and theore­
tical framework.
Historical and Theoretical Perspective
Growth of the Private Pension Industry
The private pension industry has enjoyed incom­
parable growth since World War II. In the past decade 
alone, pension assets have tripled in size, growing from 
$52.0 billion in 1961 to $152.8 billion in 1972.*2 More
11Actuarial assumptions include the mortality rate, 
interest, retirement rate, disability rate, withdrawal 
rate, new entrant rate, salary scales, marital status and 
expense loading. These assumptions are chosen on the basis 
of individual experience of the plan to facilitate plan 
financing,
12 "Tighter Rules for Private Pensions--The Out­
look Mow," U.S. Mews and World Report, October 2, 1972,
p. 60.
than 32 million workers representing 55 percent of the
work force are covered by private pension plans . ^
The causes for this rapid growth are possibly as
numerous as the number of plans in existence. Individual
employers are motivated to provide a pension plan to meet
varying needs and the pension industry has responded
by allowing wide latitude in tailoring individual plans.
In general terms, however, the commonly cited causes for
the establishment of a pension plan include the tax benefits
of a qualified plan, flexibility in financing plan benefits
and the ability to provide fringe benefits. The pension
system "provides a very large leverage on the basic pension 
1 ju,dollar" in four wayss (1) tax exemption of employer
pension contributions, (2) accrual of interest and capital
gains on those contributions, (3) tax exemption of the
earnings and capital gains of the pension fund and (4) par-
tial deferment of total funding. J The ability to defer
payment for pension benefit credits granted for past ser-
16vice allows a "quick startup" of the plan with equitable
^"BLS Survey Indicates 55% of Private Workforce 
Covered Under Pension Plans," Recent Developments in 
Pension Benefits, Employee Benefit Plan Review Research 
Reports, October 10. 1971* p. 1*
1 h James A. Curtis, "How Should the Pension Pie 
Be Sliced?" Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 9 
(September, 1971)* 32.
^ T o  maintain a qualified status, an employer need 
only pay the interest on the initial unfunded liability, 
i.e., the cost of benefits granted employees for service 
prior to the inception of the plan.
^Curtis, "Pension Pie," p. 32.
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"benefits for long-service employees close to retirement 
by requiring the employer to fund only future service bene­
fits on a current basis and allowing a gradual amortization 
of the past service liability created by the plan's instal­
lation. From a social welfare point of view, if the same 
level of employer contributions were made to a savings 
plan instead of a pension plan, the social benefit of 
providing retirement income would be deferred a generation.
It is this distinctive feature of the private pension 
system, which allows deferment of funding for pension 
credits for service prior to the effective date of the plan, 
along with the tax relief feature, that has motivated 
employers to choose the private pension form as a desirable 
means of providing fringe benefits.
The provisions of pension plans have consistently 
been liberalized from year to year. Employers have sought 
to broaden the scope of existing benefits by adding such 
features as increased vesting, death benefits, disability
17benefits, spouse benefits and increased retirement benefits. '
There also has been a trend either to reduce or eliminate
employee contributions to pension funds with the result
1 8that plans are becoming largely noncontributory. In 
addition, the eligibility requirements for both partici-
"*■ "^Bankers Trust Company, 1970 Study of Industrial 
Retirement Plans (New Yorks Bankers Trust Company, New 
York, 1970), pp. 12-29.
18Ibid., p. 10.
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pating and receiving benefits have been liberalized by
19lowering the age and service requirements. If the trend 
of liberalizing fringe benefits continues, future ex­
pansions could lead to provision of portable pensions as 
the ultimate fringe benefit. This especially would be 
applicable to mature pension plans, with sound benefit, 
vesting and financing practices, that might attempt 
to increase employee benefits through the portability 
concept.
The Deferred Wage-Gratuity Debate
Both the portability concept and the practice of 
vesting are related irrevocably to the controversy of 
whether pension fund contributions are a form of deferred 
wages or are a gratuity from employers. Pension benefits 
prior to World War II largely were viewed as a reward 
for an employee's long and faithful service and even were 
used as a means of compelling the long service and faith­
fulness of employees. If pensions are viewed as a gratuity, 
there is little support theoretically for the provision 
of pension benefits to terminated employees through either 
vesting or portability. If, on the other hand, pension 
contributions are considered to be a form of wages 
for service rendered, then forfeiture of these rights by 
an employee upon termination prior to retirement is illogi­
cal. Under the Deferred Wage Theory, the employee has
19Ibid., p. 9.
a right to the pension benefits he has earned. Preservation
of these rights can be accomplished either through the
vested pension or the portable pension.
Although the deferred wage-gratuity controversy
is predominantly settled within the ranks of employers
and the private pension industry, who have accorded
pension contributions the status of earned wages, there
are a few remaining who feel that pensions are a gift made
by the employer. The views of this minority typify the
arguments presented by earlier pension experts who supported
20this "non-deferred compensation concept." For example, 
Kenneth Anderson of the Bank of America in a television in­
terview pointed out that pensions are and have been volun­
tary on the part of the employer and are of the nature
of a gift and, as such, private pensions are not subject
21to legislation. The concept of pensions as deferred 
wages is weakened by the fact that many employers make 
pension plan contributions in addition to paying fully 
competitive wages. Taking a somewhat more middle position, 
Richard C. Keating, president of A.S. Hansen, a well-known 
pension consulting firm, feels that although the gratuity
po Charles D. Spencer, "One Answer to Bernstein's 
Proposals to Transform Private Pension System," Recent 
Developments in Pension Benefits, Employee Benefit Plan 
Review Research Reports, M a r c h 6 , 1970, pp. 1-2.
21"NBC Reports," N.B.C. Telecast, September 12,
19721 "Pensions* The Broken Promise," Narrator,
Edwin Newman.
2k
22concept is "repugnant," the wage position is "untenable."
Every pension plan also has an insurance element, 
the spreading of risk. Just as life insurance protects 
against the hazard of premature death, so a pension 
plan protects against the hazard of too long life.
So long as some retirees die at age 66 and some 
others die at age 105» complete equity in 'return 
of wages' cannot be achieved. . . .
In connection with a pension plan or any other 
form of insurance, the 'part of wages' concept is 
a metaphor. Contributions to the plan are part 2o 
of wages to the group but not to the individual. ^
Mr. Keating urges that the idea of viewing the
entire benefit package as a whole should be considered.
To support this argument, he gave an example of an employer
contribution to a pension plan and a group insurance plan.
The pension plan contribution is more important to the
sixty year old employee than to the thirty year old employee.
On the other hand, the group insurance contribution is
more important to the thirty year old employee than to
2kthe sixty year old employee. When viewing the entire 
fringe benefit package as a whole, it would be difficult 
to separate pension contributions as deferred wages.
Direct Support for the Deferred Wage Theory.— In 
spite of the cogent arguments of part of the private pension 
industry, there are both direct and indirect indications that 
pensions now are being considered a part of deferred wages. The
22 Richard C. Keating, "Employee Expectations in 
Private Pension Plans," Pension and Welfare News, VII,
No, 11 (November, 1971)*
23Ibid., p. 5 1.
2^Ibid.
following statements from varying sources signify the 
sidespread support for the Deferred Wage Theory:
These E private pension 3 plans are2collective 
arrangements for redistributing income. ^
I.W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers 
of America, sees it differently. Said Mr. Abelt 
'When a worker is deprived of his deferred com­
pensation each time he loses his job, he has been 
unfairly and unjustly deprived of part of his 
earnings.*
Pension accumulation should be considered as de­
ferred compensation, and therefore, regular employer 
contributions to a retirement fund are, in fact, 
a normal charge against cost of production rather 
than a charge against fringe benefits. '
Herbert Denenberg, Pennsylvania State Insurance 
Commissioner: 'It is the employee's money.'
There is almost universal agreement that pensions 
are not regarded as gifts or rewards from the 
employer. At hearings of the Subcommittee on Labor 
in July, 1971» several witnesses emphatically 
reiterated that they and their employers regarded 
the pension contribution by the employer as remuner­
ation due the workers for services performed in the 
same category as wages earned. ^
^"Joint Economic Committee Staff Report on
Pensions Indicts System as Thoroughly Irrational and Inef­
ficient," Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports, 
December, 19o£, p. 1«
26"New Pressures to Safeguard Pensions: Are Many
Retirement Plans a 'Cruel Hoax?*" U.S. News and World 
Report, LXXI (October 11, 1971)* ^2.
271 Arthur H. Hale, Pensions for Professionals,
Inc., Unpublished description of portable pension plan 
in the process of being established, Washington, D.C.,
August 15* 1972, p. 7. (Mimeographed)
^®"NBC Reports," September 12, 1972.
297U.S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities of the Private 
Welfare and Pension Plan Study, by the Subcommittee on 
Labor, S. Rept. 92-634, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1971* p. 13*
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For many it's self-evident that pension costs are 
a form of wages. They're subject to union bargaining 
as are wages; and they're received by employees as 
are wages.
Pension fund contributions were first accorded 
collective bargaining status in 19^8 with the historic 
Inland Steel Ruling in which the National Labor Relations 
Board defined wages as "emoluments of value, like pension 
and insurance benefits which may accrue to employees out 
of their employment relationship."-^1 Since that time, 
pension fund contributions have been widely accepted as 
part of the wage package. Speaking before the Association 
of Private Pension and Welfare Plans in Detroit, Rep.
Martha W. Griffith (D— Mich.) commented, "As for the funds 
belonging to the employee, I would hate to see what the 
wage settlements would have been in the absence of such 
'fringe benefits.'
A final indication that contributions made to a 
pension fund are a form of wages is provided in Phase II, 
the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971» 
which places a ceiling of 5*5 percent on wage increases, 
which includes contributions made by an employer to 
pension and welfare plans. In order that new plan for-
J Peter M. Flanigan, "A View of Pensions from the 
White House," Financial Executive.February, 1972, p. 18.
31U.S., Congress, Joint Committee of Labor 
Management Relations, "Report of the Joint Committee of 
Labor Management Relations," 80th Cong., 2d sess., 19^8, 
pp. 9^-95."
•^Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, 
Inc., Capitol Report, September, 1971» P» 5*
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mations would not be inhibited by this restriction, a special 
exception had to be included in the Act--Section 302.-^
Indirect Support for the Deferred Wage Theory.— In 
addition to the statements of direct support for the 
Deferred Wage Theory, there are several indirect indica­
tions that pension fund contributions are being considered 
as deferred wages not only in theory, but also in practice. 
For example, the fact that formal contracts have been 
developed for pension plans reflects the idea that pensions 
have changed from a gift to a right. Second, pensions as 
deferred wages are being supported in courts on the 
principle of promissory estoppel, the concept that justi­
fiable expectations cannot be denied if the employee 
under question acted upon those expectations. A third 
indication of the increasing support for pension fund 
contributions as deferred wages is found in the form of 
the broad liberalization of benefit provisions. Increased 
vesting, preretirement and postretirement death benefits, 
addition of early retirement and disability benefits as 
well as salary-based benefit increases all support the 
contention that pension fund contributions are in practice 
considered deferred wages, and thus nonforfeitable. If 
the liberalization had been strictly a basic benefit
-^Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals for the Improvement 
of the Private Pension Plan System," Unpublished study 
prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor for Hearings 
on S. 3598, Toronto, Canada, 1972, p. 21.
expansion, forfeitable upon termination, there would be 
no indication that acceptance of pensions as deferred 
wages has been gained.
Conclusion
Although there are a few persons who would still 
like to consider pensions as a gratuity, the evidence is 
overwhelmingly in support of pension fund contributions as 
deferred wages. The legal environment has moved its 
support from pensions as gifts to redefining wages as 
including pension contributions. The private pension 
industry and employers have added their assent to the 
change verbally as well as tacitly through extended plan 
formalization and coverage. With the deferred wage-gratuity 
conflict now largely seen as an historical debate, the 
irrevocable right of employees to their pensions is well 
established. As a solution to the problems of how this 
right can best be effected, the portable pension concept 
has been developed. Whether or not portable pensions 
are the best solution is yet to be determined. Toward 
this end, the traditional arguments both for and against 
portability will be presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER II




The arguments against portability are quite per­
suasive i generally concentrating on the complexity and 
cost of implementing a portability system. But perhaps 
one of the most difficult arguments to counter realisti­
cally is the contention that portability really may be 
unnecessary. If the ultimate goals of the private pension 
system are wide employee coverage and benefit security, then 
these goals may be met just as effectively by sound funding 
and vesting provisions. This position was stated suscinctly 
during recent House hearings by the representatives of the
iTreasury Department.
We find difficulty in a portability solution that 
would be feasible for many plans. We thought that 
the greatest problem was that of assuring the retire­
ment income to a person who might otherwise lose it. 
Whether he gets that retirement income from two
•̂ The Treasury Department has been active in drafting 




employers or one employer is not as important as 
whether he is assured of getting it.
The belief that the only advantage to portability 
is that the ultimate retirement income would come from one 
rather than several sources is widely supported. Even leg­
islative representatives who have sponsored portability legis­
lation in the past have admitted that portability may not 
be necessary. Michael Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate 
Subcommittee on Labor which currently is sponsoring a volun­
tary clearinghouse (as part of S. *<•), said that the porta­
bility provisions of legislation are the weakest part of their 
pension reform bill. He pointed out that the main intent of 
legislation is to provide minimum standards to prevent major 
abuses and if vesting standards are provided, then major 
abuses will be eliminated. Even the very mobile worker is 
at least partially protected. Vance Anderson, Special Coun­
sel to the House General Subcommittee on Labor, who currently 
is working with the House Special Task Force on Pensions, up­
held the contention that there is no valid need for portabil-
l±ity if sound vesting and funding exist. Both of these 
specialists in pension legislation implied that portability
OU.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans. Hearings. 
before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Repre­
sentatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 102.
-^Michael Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate 
Subcommittee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
^Vance Anderson, Special Counsel, House General 
Subcommittee on Labor, private interview, Washington,
D.C.* August 10, 1972.
could be a very future reality, but presently it simply 
is not feasible because the private pension system is not 
ready for portability.
It is clear, therefore, that before portability 
can be accepted as an integral part of the private pension 
system, effective, strong levels of vesting and funding 
must be achieved. By definition, when an employee ter­
minates, the only pension cre'dits which he can claim 
are those which are vested. The only pension credits, 
therefore that a terminated employee could "port" to a 
succeeding employer are those benefits which are rightfully 
his, that is, his vested benefits. In addition, if the 
vested benefits are not funded; i.e., there are no assets 
to support the liabilities created by the benefit promise, 
there would be no assets to transfer. Alternatively, 
if any portion of the total liabilities under the plan are 
unfunded and an asset transfer is made on behalf of a 
terminating employee, the financial sufficiency of the 
plan with regard to earned benefits payable in the future 
may be in a precarious position.
Portability also is alleged to be unnecessary for 
additional reasons. First, if an employer desires to 
provide a terminating employee with a portable pension, 
the employer can always purchase a deferred annuity from 
a qualified life insurer. Although the assets are not 
further transferrable to a third carrier, pension preser­
vation with economic growth participation is accomplished.
Future employers could purchase additional deferred 
annuities for the employee from the same insurance company 
so that benefit consolidation is achieved. Second, "oppo­
nents T of portability 1  argued that both Social Security 
and personal savings were completely portable and that 
private plans were designed to supplement, not duplicate 
t h e m , T h i r d ,  the increased prevalence of multiemployer 
plans and reciprocity arrangements should meet the needs of 
particularly mobile groups of employees who are unable to 
obtain pension security through vesting and funding.
Concentration of Funds in a Central Clearinghouse
If a central clearinghouse is implemented to facili­
tate the transfer of pension assets, it is argued that the 
resulting concentration of funds in one agency could be 
detrimental. If this agency is federally administered, 
only low-yield U.S. Government securities would be purchased 
for investment income, the results of which would be a 
substantial loss of income and no protection from inflation. 
Moreover, since private pension funds are heavily invested 
in private industry (68 percent in common stocks and 21 
percent in corporate bonds^), even a partial shift of 
pension funds from the private equity market to the public
-’"Private Pension Plans* Congress Considers 
Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXX,
No. 16 (April 15, 1972), 649.
^"Tighter Rules for Private Pensions— The Outlook 
Now," U.S. News and World Report, October 2, 1972, p. 60.
sector could have serious implications in the capital mar­
kets. Private pension funds presently represent $153 
billion and are projected to represent $250 billion by the
end of the decade; "no one knows what would happen if the
7system were changed drastically."
Possible Loss of Viability of the Private Pension System
Many pension experts see portability as a threat to 
the private pension system. Government intervention possibly 
could force "pension plans into a rigid mold as to make im-
Opossible their continued growth and proper performance."
Even if actuarial assumptions and benefit formulas are not de 
fined legislatively within a portability system there would 
be a natural movement toward uniform assumptions and benefits 
Such a trend is seen as a threat to the flexibility, inde­
pendence and competition within the private system.
It seems to us that the natural direction of a 
portability system would inevitably be towards uni­
formity among all pension plans. The administration of 
this kind of a uniform scheme inevitably would limit the 
freedom to devise alternative versions of plans to 
fit the particular conditions of employer and employees. 
It would limit the competition among the employers trying 
to hire employees based on better pension benefits. . . . 
Portability, therefore, is essentially a movement 
towards converting the private pension system into a 
uniform nationalized social security system.
"NBC Reports," N.B.C. Telecast, September 12, 
1972; "Pensions; The Broken Promise," Narrator,
Edwin Newman.
OAmerican Enterprise Institute, Issues Affecting 
Pensions (Washington, D.C.; American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 18.
a7Peter M. Flanigan, "A View of Pensions from the 
White House," Financial Executive, February, 1972, p. 20.
Since pension plan formations have long been 
motivated by both management and union desire to attract 
and maintain competent, long-service employees, a change 
in philosophy could reverse the increasing trend of new 
plan formation. Pension plans generally are voluntary 
on the part of the employer and increased complexity of pen­
sion plan regulation as well as increased cost could make 
a wary employer turn to the profit sharing mechanism 
and away from the private pension plan as a means of 
providing retirement income.
Complexity of the Portability Concept
For a number of reasons, portable pensions have 
been cited as being too complex for realistic implemen­
tation. Private pension plans vary widely in actuarial 
assumptions and experience, wage patterns and benefit 
structure. From an administrative point of view, it 
would be very difficult to transfer equitably the benefit 
structure of a plan to successive pensions. The following 
examples illustrate three such problems.
(1) Suppose an employee transfers from a plan with a 
flat benefit formula of $200 per month beginning at age 
sixty-five to a plan guaranteeing only $100 per month at 
age sixty-five. Which benefit should the employee receive? 
If the larger benefit is paid, other employees partici­
pating in the second plan may feel slighted. If the 
smaller benefit is paid, then the employee who has trans­
ferred his credits may feel unjustly treated. Since
obviously a $200 benefit costs more to fund than a $100 
benefit, and if the lower benefit is eventually paid, the 
second employer could feasibly use the higher funded asset 
level transferred in to offset the future cost of pro­
viding the lower benefit.3-0
(2) Although any benefit can be translated into an 
actuarial present value for the purposes of stating the 
cash transfer value, from the point of view of the 
employee's utility, it may not be possible to express 
such options as benefits for spouse, children, and early 
retirement and disability benefits available under one 
plan in a cash value. The employee simply may not be in­
different between the early retirement option under one 
plan and a large benefit under a succeeding plan which has 
no early retirement provision.
(3) Suppose an employee transfers from a plan providing 
a vested career average salary benefit; e.g., 2 percent
of annual salary for each year of service. Suppose further 
that the next pension plan the employee participates in 
has a benefit of 50 percent of final average salary, 
and the employee receives a considerable salary increase 
with his second employer. The assets transferred from 
the first fund clearly would not be sufficient to fund 
even a prorated portion of the accrued benefit under the
10This example was taken from the testimony of 
Kenneth L. Houck, Counsel for Bethlehem Steel; U.S., 
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on 
H.R. 12272, p. 582.
final average salary plan. Would the second employer be 
responsible for making the necessary additional contri­
butions to fund the benefit? It is highly unlikely that 
the original employer or even the employee would make 
such contributions, but the second employer is also 
unlikely to want to assume such heavy retirement costs 
for a new employee when that money could be spent on 
additional benefits for all employees.
Cost of a Portability System
Critics of portability point to the increased cost 
related to the provision of portable pensions and the fact 
that if costs are increased, future benefit expansions for 
remaining employees may be reduced. If a particular fund 
has large turnover experience, the fund may be endangered 
as assets are siphoned off to comply with portability 
guarantees.
Clearly, portability would favor younger em­
ployees at the expense of older employees. It 
would benefit those least interested in retirement 
benefits at the expense of those who are most 
dependent on their pensions.
To be meaningful, portable pensions must be fully 
vested and fully funded, a requirement which can be quite 
expensive if a plan has no vesting and only minimal 
funding. The contention that portability is too expensive
1 1U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Private Pension Bills, Hearings before 
a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598, S. 302*1-, S. 3012 and 
Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 13^3*
37
must be examined quite separately from the vesting and 
funding issues. The incremental costs of portability (i.e., 
over and above the cost of vesting and funding) come from 
three sources? (1) the administrative cost of calculating 
the transfer value and effecting the transfer; (2) loss 
of investment income due to increased liquidity requirements; 
and (3) no funding "forgiveness" (relief) because of 
employee termination. With respect to the third cost 
source, funding forgiveness occurs in nonvested plans 
when turnover is anticipated actuarially to reduce costs 
in the funding of benefits. Since under the portability 
concept terminated employees will receive benefits, none 
of the assets supporting the liability created on behalf 
of these vested benefits will be released to offset funding 
costs when an employee terminates.
Legislative Problems
If portability were to be implemented by legis­
lation, it is possible, as with any imposed regulation, that 
distortions could occur which would not be intended or 
anticipated by the legislative body.
Portability is subject to certain anti-selection.
For example, if you want to provide portability with 
respect to vested pension credits and vested death 
benefits, presumably many employers who have employees 
in poor health would terminate their employment and 
transfer liabilities to the portability scheme 




Former Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson has
recognized that portability may involve many intricate
technical problems and even unintended distortions and,
therefore, may best be "left to the parties themselves,"
either at the bargaining table or between the individual
13employer and employee.
Problems Regarding the "Frozen" Benefit Arguments which 
Support the Portability Concept
Some of the support for portability comes from 
the concept of the inadequacy of vested benefits that 
are frozen at the time of termination and not permitted 
to participate in economic growth or later improvement 
by the employer. This argument is rather easily countered. 
First, it is unlikely that an employer would improve 
the benefits of terminated employees. Second, "there is 
no reason to believe . . . T the second employer 3  
would make benefit increases applicable to a period of 
service rendered for another employer." Finally, the 
assets transferred into a successor fund would be inter­
mingled with other fund assets and would enjoy the same 
investment experience as the other fund assets; i.e., the 
assets are allowed to benefit from economic growth. If, 
on the other hand, the funds were transferred to a federal 
clearinghouse, then only the limited investment income
13Ibid.. pp. 130-131. 
14Ibid.. p. 217.
of government securities would be possible. In neither 
case, however, are the assets definitely frozen. Future 
service benefits (and thus total retirement benefits) 




Initial support for any portability scheme 
necessarily must come from the fact that the transfer 
system can be devised. That is, it technically is pos­
sible to transfer assets from one plan to another and 
to determine from those asset values the employee’s 
benefit level under the succeeding plan. The ability to 
calculate transfer values has been demonstrated by the 
prevalence of reciprocal agreements in which transfer 
arrangements are worked out between plans which are quite 
dissimilar in funding level, benefit structure and act­
uarial assumptions.
Portability Deemed Necessary for Certain Groups
Perhaps one of the most potent arguments for 
portability is that only portable pensions can meet the 
retirement security needs of certain groups. The first 
of these groups is the nation's law enforcement officers. 
In the aggregate, these workers currently are employed by 
more than 1^,000 separate agencies, each of which has its
own separate authority network, pay scale, fringe benefits 
and promotional opportunities.
A law enforcement officer, wishing to advance his 
position by transfer from one agency to another, is 
faced with serious handicaps. Firstly, the agency 
to which he is interested in moving may not permit 
lateral entry, that is employment (above the most 
junior level) of a man having experience with a dif­
ferent law enforcement agency. Secondly, he faces in 
many cases the loss of his accrued pension rights by 
reason of transfer to the other agency.
On the assumption that freer mobility would promote a more 
efficient law enforcement agency and better talent 
utilization, a study on this subject was conducted by 
Geoffrey N. Calvert of Alexander and Alexander, a New 
York-based firm, and the College of Insurance of New York 
under the auspices of the Justice Department's Law Enforce­
ment Assistance Administration, the National Institute 
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The conclusion 
of the study was that each state should have a state 
pension plan encompassing all law enforcement officers
with a multilevel benefit structure or tapered benefit
17formula with a flexible retirement age so that the various 
community needs could be met. In addition, the study 
recommended that there should be reciprocal agreements
16U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assis 
tance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement 
and Criminal Justice, Portable Police Pensions— Improving 
Interagency Transfers, Prepared by Geoffrey N. Calvert of 
Alexander and Alexander, New York, New York 10007.(Washing­
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971)» P* 1»
17Reduced benefits were allowed for earlier retire­
ment; the earlier the retirement, the lower the benefit 
level.
between the states as well as federal assistance to facili­
tate interstate transfers. State legislatures would set 
up the fifty plans.
The second major group which would benefit greatly 
by portable pensions is professional people, which 
broadly includes engineers, chemists, accountants, 
actuaries, economists, lawyers, educators and scientists. 
These people often are called upon to change locality so 
that their technical skills can be used wherever most 
needed. Their intensive education and training may produce 
individuals with highly specialized capabilities, making 
it difficult to adapt to the more varied needs of a 
single employer. Increased mobility is the only answer 
to the need for maximum utilization of these highly 
specialized talents. The peculiarities of the mobile 
professional worker with regard to retirement needs were 
brought out at recent Senate hearings on pensions by the 
National Society of Professional Engineers.
Seldom is it possible, the engineer discovered to 
change jobs T only 3 several times during a working 
lifetime. Even where interests in fact become 
vested, the total accumulation of credits is very 
rarely adequate in these circumstances.
A third group of employees often cited as in need 
of a portable pension system is that of skilled craftsmen.
1 RU.S. Department of Justice, Portable Police 
Pensions, pp. 63-64.
197U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598, and Other Bills,
1972, p. 4.
Although there is a recent trend to set up trade asso­
ciation or union pension plans which provide limited 
20portability, the organizations themselves may not 
be strong enough to gain wide acceptance for employer 
support. In addition, employers with established plans may 
not want to participate in these peripheral plans, 
especially if they have a benefit structure and funding 
level quite different from the employer*s original plan.
The problem of employee discrimination may occur if the 
two plans are different. Even without potential employer 
reluctance to participate in trade association or union 
plans, the employee does not obtain full retirement 
security protection under the limited portability provided 
in these plans. Craftsmen are always subject to a "sub­
stantial change or decline in the sector of the industry
21in which he is employed."
A final group which may become increasingly in 
need of a portable pension system generally includes 
business executives. Although the business executive may 
be subject to may of the same pressures as the professional 
person, Dr. William M. Evans, Professor of Sociology and
20The most recent examples of efforts to establish 
such plans involve carpenters and chemical workers.
21U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis' 
tics, Labor Mobility and Private Pension Plans; A Study 
of Vesting. Early Retirement, and Portability Provisions, 
sponsored by Office of Manpower, Automation^and Training, 
(Washington, D.C.* Government Printing Office, BLS 
Bulletin No. 1407, 1964), p. 39.
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Industry at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 
has pointed out that the executive particularly is exposed 
to the uncertainties connected with mergers and conglomerate 
acquisitions as well as the frustrations of becoming the
22"bottle-necked executive" in many of today's organizations.
Labor Mobility
Many of the arguments in support of portability
are related to the larger question of labor mobility. The
issue of whether pensions deter or simply have no effect
of labor mobility is far from answered, nor is any available
evidence conclusive. Increased labor mobility historically
has been one of the major reasons cited for general
pension legislation.2-̂ Apart from the effect of pensions
on labor mobility, however, it is clear that even people
outside of particularly mobile groups commonly change
oLjobs every six or seven years. It is possible with the 
continuous service requirements usually associated with 
vesting eligibility that even the normal worker will not 
qualify for a secure pension. Concern for a remedy to this 
social problem has caused some legislators to view porta­
bility as a public issue. An early dedication to portability
22"Pension Portability— What Are Its Chances?"
Modern Manufacturing, March, 1970, p. 15*
2^The debate over whether or not pension plans 
impede labor mobility will be presented in Appendix C since 
it is related to the question of comprehensive pension 
legislation and is related to the subject matter of both 
this and the next chapter.
Oji "Congress Readies Pension Control," Business 
Week, March 18, 1972, p. 66.
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as a public concern is seen in the final report to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson of a special committee appointed by 
President John P. Kennedy to study private pensions.
Many workers who participate in a plan or plans 
will never receive adequate retirement benefits 
through no fault of their own, of their employers, 
or of the individual plans. Rather, these will be 
workers employed by several different employers 
during their working life, leaving these jobs 
either without having acquired vested rights or with 
rights to only very limited benefit.
These conditions, in the judgment of the Com­
mittee, pose difficult and intricate problems, 
but not ones that are unsolvable. Rather, they 
appear to be susceptible to solution, at least 
in part, through the development of appropriate 
institutional arrangements.
If private pensions are deemed to be a public issue, 
the question arises exactly who should be responsible 
for the financing of the public portion of pensions. That 
is, if portability (and perhaps vesting) is a public 
responsibility because increased labor mobility and secure 
retirement benefits are socially desirable, the question 
arises as to who is to bear the cost of the added benefits. 
The business community generally is felt to be more finan­
cially able to support portable pensions than the individual 
or the governmental mechanism. The wide acceptance of the 
Deferred Wage Theory supports the contention that the en- 
ployer is financially able and indeed responsible for the 
provision of private pensions.
^President*s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds 
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, Public 
Policy and Private Pension Programs: A Report to the 
President on Private Employee Retirement Plans, (Wash­
ington, D.C.s Government Printing Office, 1965)» P« 55*
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Plan Terminations
Much of the hasis for legislative support for port­
able pensions is the inequitable treatment of employees with 
regard to pension provision when either the plan terminates
p  Z
or a plan in a multiplant operation closes down. If there 
existed a portability system, under the circumstances of plan 
termination or partial plan termination, an employee could 
transfer his pension assets to another employer's plan (or 
to a clearinghouse) and actively participate in the asset 
and even benefit growth made available through the investment 
mechanism of the private pension system.
Unique Advantages of the Clearinghouse Concent
The concept of a national clearinghouse has been 
greatly popularized by Professor Merton C. Bernstein.^
His concept of a clearinghouse as a depository has peculiar 
advantages which additionally render vesting as adequate 
pension protection impossible. Even if an employee is able 
to qualify for benefits under several plans, he may find 
the fragments of retirement income and options available so 
small that they are hardly worth filing for or electing.
Also, "without one control record of all vested pension
2 6U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills, 1972, 
p. 299» and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study,
1972— Report of Hearings on Pension Plan Terminations,
92d Cong., 2d sess., September, 1972.
27rThe clearinghouse concept was first rigorously 
explained in his book* Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of 
Private Pensions (New York* The Free Press of Glencoe,
1 9 6 k ) , pp. 256-259.
credits, an employee and his dependents simply may lose
28track of his entitlements." From the employer's point 
of view, there could be reduced administrative costs since 
records of the vested pensions of terminated employees would 
no longer have to be maintained nor would retirement checks 
have to be issued. In addition, the employer would not 
be faced with raising benefits of terminated employees due 
to potential union or legislative pressure. Other advantages 
which easily could be provided in the implementation of a 
clearinghouse include availability of assets to the 
employee upon disability, a "locking-in" feature (elimina­
tion of the employee's usual right to a cash withdrawal 
of assets upon termination) and increased coverage by
allowing small employers to participate on a money pur- 
29chase basis. Small companies which cannot afford the 
installation costs nor the regular funding requirements of 
a formal plan could contribute whatever they can afford to 
the clearinghouse. These contributions would purchase 
immediately vested benefits and be credited with any 
investment income available through the clearinghouse.
Portable Pensions Superior to Vested Benefits
On a more theoretical basis, portable pensions 
are superior to vested pensions which are "frozen" at the
^'•'Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News.
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), Z T ,
29Ibid.
^7
point of termination. In explaining the concept of 
frozen pensions at Senate hearings on pension reform,
¥r* Bernstein explained what happens to an employee age 
forty-five who terminates with a vested benefit, payment 
to begin at age sixty-five.
He C  the employee H  does not participate in any 
of the plan improvements for those years of service 
in which he has a vested credit. Those credits are 
subject to all of the erosion of inflation during 
the period of time and it E sic 1 does not participate 
in the growth of the economy, although the very same 
credits given to coemployees who stay on the job 
will undoubtedly have appreciated significantly 
in value . ^
In short, a portable pension, with assets trans­
ferred either to a succeeding employer or to a clearinghouse 
could participate in economic growth; i.e., be credited 
with more than just the minimal interest guaranteed 
in the actuarial assumptions used to calculate the transfer 
value. In addition, the succeeding employer could, at a 
later point in time, increase benefits for both past 
service and accrued future service, in which case the em­
ployee possibly would qualify for the higher benefits, having 
transferred in pension credits for service with the preceding 
employer. Former Rep. Seymour Halpern (R— N.Y.), who has 
consistently supported portability in Congress, explained in 
his testimony before a House hearing another way in which 
portability is more advantageous to an employee changing
■^°U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills, 
1972, p. 299.
jobs than a frozen vested benefit.
In many cases this E job IE change results in a 
higher salary for . . . r the employee 3, which 
entitles him to a higher level of benefits under the 
new pension plan he joins. If this person were able 
to apply the value of former pension credits to the new 
plan, he would be vested for that much more of his 
higher benefits. Therefore, the lack of portability 
arrangements could deprive a person of substantial 
retirement benefit increases.5
Liquidity Requirements
One of the major criticisms of the portability 
concept has been the increased liquidity requirements on a 
plan. Fund managers, faced with potential asset withdrawals 
because of terminating employees, must limit the investment 
portfolio by maintaining enough liquid assets to meet the 
potential asset drain. This argument can be countered, 
however, by the fact that liquid assets should be created 
by additions to the fund from employer contributions and 
new employees transferring assets into the plan. Normal 
asset turnover also should help to provide sufficient cash 
flow to meet the drain of both termination withdrawals and 
normal retirement disbursals.
Conclusions
The arguments both in support of and against 
portability make it quite clear that portability cannot be 
approved nor condemned on the basis of logical reasoning.
31U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Hearings on K.R. 12272, p. 727.
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Opponents of portability believe that vesting and funding 
meet the goals of adequate benefit security for a mobile 
population. Since portability is too complex and costly, 
and since there might be system distortions when the transfer 
apparatus is imposed, portable pensions are deemed unde­
sirable. When the opponents of portability wish to streng­
then their position, they point to the dangers of portability. 
First, there is the alleged demise of the private pension 
system, brought about by forcing plan uniformity and the 
resulting prevention of new plan formations. Second, the 
implications.of disrupting the private equity market by 
regulating pension funds frequently are emphasized. Finally, 
the restrictions imposed by increased liquidity requirements 
on pension fund performance and the resulting jeopardizing 
of benefit security for covered employees are stressed.
The supporters of portability center their argu­
ments around the irrevocable right of an employee to a 
pension and present portability as the only means of imple­
menting this right for certain groups of highly mobile 
workers. Vesting as a form of pension preservation for 
the mobile employee is deemed inadequate because of the 
age and service eligibility requirements, the "frozen" 
and fragmented nature of vested benefits, individual 
record-keeping requirements, and inaccessability for 
disability purposes.
Each position seems convincing, especially when 
the counter-arguments are considered, but the validity
of the portability concept is impossible to determine 
solely by examination of the traditional viewpoints. It 
is clear, however, that "portability is not going to go 
away, particularly in labor markets with high mobility."-̂ 2 
It is necessary to take a broader view of portability, 
its relation to other pension issues and the effects 
of pension reform legislation on the desirability of 
portability, before a conclusion can be reached regarding 
a proper position on the portability concept.
32Robert W. Gardner, "Will Private Pensions Be 
Retired?" Industry Week, March 13» 1972, p.
CHAPTER III
LEGISLATIVE CONCERN REGARDING THE 
PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
Introduction
Since the closing of the Studebaker plant in 1964-, 
which resulted in the termination of the pension plan and 
extensive loss of expected benefits for thousands of 
workers, there has been considerable interest in various 
forms of pension reform both in the Congress and the 
executive branch. Numerous bills have been sponsored 
during the past decade covering such aspects of the private 
pension system as vesting, funding, insurance of unfunded 
liabilities, portability, disclosure and fiduciary respon­
sibility. The legislative proposals vary widely with 
regard to the specific pension issues included in a given 
bill as well as the particular provisions pertaining to 
the general reform issue. For example, some bills are 
designed to deal only with reinsurance or disclosure and 
fiduciary responsibility. Alternatively, other bills 
are designed to initiate complete pension reform, but 
may differ in the vesting formula or the required funding 
level. Despite variations in the comprehensiveness of 
the proposed pension bills, each of the current issues in
51
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in pension reform is related to the other. That is, it 
is difficult to consider insurance of unfunded liabilities 
without considering funding. In like manner, portability 
is related to vesting, funding, insurance, disclosure and 
fiduciary responsibility. The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the relationship of portability to the other 
pension reform issues. An examination of this relationship 
will provide a basis for determining the growth and future 
direction of the portability concept should legislation 
in any area of private pension reform be passed.
The Vesting Concept 
Vesting is one of the most well known and popular 
of the pension reform issues and generally is thought 
to be one of the most necessary pension reforms. In fact, 
arguments presented in support of portability often are 
made simply to insure that vesting is implemented since 
portability is a more extreme and expensive means than 
vesting of assuring benefit security. Thus, "'portability* 
is an indirect or 'back door* way to promote more liberal 
vesting provisions."*
The theoretical relationship of vesting to portabi­
lity has been discussed in previous chapters. It is, 
therefore, necessary to discuss only the various types of 
vesting and the vesting formulas. An understanding of
1Charles D. Spencer, "Editorial Analysis of JEC 
Staff Report," Employee Benefit Plan Review Research 
Reports, December, 1966, p. 6,
these formulas will clarify the relationship between 
vesting and portability.
Types of Vesting
There are several types of vesting which will be 
referred to throughout any discussion of legislative 
reform of vesting practices. First, the term "deferred 
full vesting” implies that the right to pension credits 
is deferred until all vesting requirements are met. When 
the requirements (e.g., ten years of service) are fulfilled, 
all pension rights are vested. A second form of vesting, 
"immediate full vesting," provides 100 percent vesting of 
benefits as they are accrued by the plan participant#
A third type of vesting is "deferred graded vesting" and 
is based on a system such as 50 percent vesting of accrued 
benefits after ten years of service with an additional 
10 percent of accrued benefits for each year of service 
thereafter, so that 100 percent vesting can be achieved 
after fifteen years of service. Deferred graded vesting 
can be achieved through numerous combinations of different 
service requirements and various percentages of vesting 
of accrued benefit rights. Although the goal of the 
deferred graded vesting system is usually 100 percent, full 
vesting may not be achieved until just prior to retirement. 
For example, the deferred graded vesting system may pro­
vide for 50 percent of accrued benefits after ten years 
of service with an additional 1 percent of accrued benefits
for each year of service thereafter* subject to a minimum 
vesting provision of 100 percent vesting after the later 
of thirty years of service or attainment of age 6 5. Such 
a provision could mean a sudden increase in vested rights 
just prior to retirement.
These three types of vesting generally are con­
ditional, and the conditional terms of vested rights are 
specifically stated in the pension contract.
Conditional vesting permits the participant to 
exercise his rights only under certain circumstances, 
usually only in the event of withdrawal. This is the 
more common usage of vesting and is one means by which 
the survivors of a plan participant are prevented from 
exercising the participant's right in the event of 
his death before retirement, and in the absence of a 
specific provision for survivors' benefits.
A vesting provision in the pension plan is a direct 
means of assuring this form of benefit security. Vesting 
can be provided, however, in an indirect manner through 
an early retirement provision at the employee's election.-^ 
When an employee elects early retirement, the pension 
benefit usually is actuarially reduced to reflect the 
experience losses predominantly in interest and mortality 
due to the shortened working period of the employee.
Since an employee effectively can secure his pension bene­
fits by retiring early, which is a form of withdrawal,
oU.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities on the Private 
Welfare and Pension Plan Study, by the Subcommittee on 
Labor, S. Rept. 92-^3^» 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1971* PP» 1^-15*
^Bankers Trust Company, 1970 Study of Industrial Re­
tirement Plans (New Yorki Bankers Trust Company, 1970),
pp. 10-1 1.
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an indirect form of vesting is achieved through the early 
retirement option.
One of the prime reasons vesting is deemed so 
important is the preservation of benefit rights upon plan 
termination. When a plan terminates or the employer 
discontinues contributions, the benefits accrued to date 
are vested to the extent of the fund. The benefits which 
vest at plan termination are not necessarily the same as 
the contractual vested benefits when the plan is operating 
under ’'going concern" provisions. That is, a separate 
vesting procedure is agreed upon contractually in the 
event of plan termination and a priority list of employee 
classes is made. Usually long-service and older employees 
are given highest priority in the disbursement of a ter­
minated fund's assets. "This difference in vesting pro­
visions has come as a great shock to many members of termi­
nated plans with long service and has naturally led to a
great deal of unhappiness and feelings of having been 
ccheated.
Vesting Formulas
The various vesting formulas which have been sug­
gested to date are presented in Table 1. The incorporation
^Internal Revenue Code of 195^ t sec. 401(a)(7), 
Amended, 19&2, (See Appendix B for additional Internal 
Revenue Service requirements for qualification.)
-’Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals for the Improvement 
of the Private Pension Plan System," Unpublished Study 
prepared for the Senate labor Subcommittee Hearings on




























100% vesting of benefits as 
contributions made
50% vesting when age and yrs. 
of service (or participation) 
total 35# plus 10% vesting 
for each additional year of 
service (or participation)
50% vesting when years of 
service and age total -̂0 , 
plus 10% vesting for each 
additional year of service
50% vesting when age and 
years of service total ^5 
plus 10% vesting for each 
additional year of service
Same as Rule of ^5 except 
that a graduated vesting 
schedule in the four years 
prior to completion of the 
total of ^5 is provided to 
phase in the final 50% 
vesting
50% vesting when age and yrs. 
of service (or participation) 
total 50* plus 10% vesting 
for each additional year of 
service (or participation)
Same as Rule of 50 except 
full vesting must be 
achieved for;
(1) Persons who entered at 






Formula Name (If applicable) Provision
(2) Persons older than 30 
with less than 10 years of 
service (6 months for each 
year of entry age above age 
30)
(3) Persons younger than 30 
with more than 10 years of 
service (6 months for each 
year of entry age below 
age 30)
100# vesting after n years 
of service
30# vesting after 8 years 
of service plus 10# vesting 
for each additional year 
of service
(1) If entry age is less than 
47, 1# vesting for each year 
of service up to 19 years; 
after 20 years, 100# vesting 
per year is larger (the older 
the entrant, the larger the 
percentage vesting credited). 
At normal retirement age, 
full vesting credited.
Sourcet With the exception of a and b below, the com­
plete title of the sources are listed in the 
bibliography. The full text of all legislative 
proposals are printed in related Congressional 
Committee hearings.
aNorman H. Tarver, "Mandatory Vesting Schedules," 
Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 1 (January, 1972), 27*
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Private Pension Bills, Hearings before a 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598, S. 3024, S. 3012, and other 
Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 211.
n-year 10-year Vesting
Vesting H.R. 4






of the formulas into a legislative proposal is also cited. 
It is evident from the formula descriptions that most of 
the suggestions for mandatory vesting have utilized one of 
three types of eligibility requirements: (1) age plus
service, (2) service only and (3) some combination of age
and service. These three different philosophies of
vesting requirements are supported by separate legislative 
sponsors. The Rule of 50, an age plus participation re­
quirement, is associated largely with the Nixon Administra­
tion. A ten year service requirement consistently has been 
supported by the House General Subcommittee on Labor 
whose chairman, Rep. John Dent (D— Pa.), has sponsored 
bills in the House. Future bills emanating from the 
Pension Task Force of that House Committee probably 
will be centered around a ten year service requirement.^
The Senate Labor Subcommittee, on the other hand, largely 
dominated by Senator Jacob K. Javits (R— N.Y.), seems
to be committed to a deferred graded vesting system, with
7full vesting achieved after fifteen years.
The vesting formulas presented in Table 1 have 
various implications for portability. In general,
£Vance Anderson, Special Counsel, House General 
Subcommittee on Labor, private interview, Washington,
D.C. , August 10, 1972.
7rSee Appendix A for S. 2, sponsored by Senator 
Jacob K. Javits and more recently S. 3598 sponsored by 
both Senator Javits and Senator Harrison A. Williams 
(D— N.J.). The vesting provisions are very similar in both 
bills indicating continuing support for a deferred graded 
vesting system by that Committee.
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however, the earlier vesting is achieved, the greater 
the opportunity for the mobile worker to accumulate 
pension credits. Restrictive eligibility requirements 
(e.g., fifteen years of service) could mean that even 
a moderately mobile worker would never have any vested 
credits to port to a succeeding pension fund.
Vesting Coverage
Much of the concern over vesting as a prerequisite 
to portability systems has centered around the question of 
current vesting coverage. The results of several recent 
studies of vesting coverage are presented in Table 2. 
Although the studies vary widely in comprehension and form, 
it is clear that, with the exception of the pension plans 
included in the A.S. Hansen study, a high incidence of 
some type of vesting is indicated. At least 90 percent of 
all plans, and in most studies a comparably high percentage 
of employees, are covered by some form of vesting. The 
authors of the A.S. Hansen study emphasized that young 
employees who were not yet eligible for vested benefits 
could expect to be covered in the future (under either 
the current or a succeeding employer's plan). It therefore 
is possible that coverage statistics for this study may 
be understated. In addition, the Senate study result, 
which concluded that 76 percent of the vested employees 
were covered under a deferred full vesting system, implies 
not only a high incidence of vesting, but also an extensive 




























1970 Study Bankers Trust




(1) Immediate Benefits on ter­
mination of employment
($ of plans)
82$— some bendfit (e.g., trans­
fer of ca&h value or life 
insurance policy)
99 5̂— after 7 years of parti­
cipation 
100%— after 10 years of parti­
cipation
(2) Full vesting on termination 
of employment ($ of plans)
22$— 0-5 yrs. participation 
38$— 0-10 yrs. participation 
82$— 10 yrs. participation 
94$— 15 yrs. participation
(1) 96$ of the combined in­
sured and uninsured pension 
plans had some form of vesting 
33*85$~”Service only require­
ment averaging 11.93 yrs.
1.52$— age only requirement 
averaging 56.25 yrs. 
64.0$— age and service re­
quirement respectively 





pletion of a 
(10-25 yrsi or more with more 
than half 10 yrs. 
or less) 42.5$
Vesting on At­
tainment of age 
(55 or 6 0) 3.22






Study Study Sponsor Summary Results
Vesting on Com­
pletion of a 
period of credited 
service ranging 
from 10-25 yrs. 
and attainment
of age 35-60 50.78 65.72
Vesting only
on layoff • 74
Partial vesting 1.75 2.48
No vesting 1.75 3.78
T o o M  100.0$
A.S. Hansen A.S. Hansen,






















(1) 56.5% of the plans have 
some kind of vesting
(2 ) 30 .6 employees currently 
vested
(3 ) 72.4$ employees age 55-65 
vested
(4) 71.7&?° employees with 
15-20 yrs. of service vested; 
with more than 20 yrs of ser­
vice, 84.6$ are vested
(5) Expected to qualify for 





(1) Requirements By By Par- 
to be eligible Plan ticipant
for vesting_______ _
Service o n l y 4 7 $ 4 4 $
Age and Service 37 43
Age only 1 1
No vesting 13 10
Vague or no
Response __ 2  2
100$ 100$
(2 ) 90$ vested by at least 
9 years of service
(3) Deferred full vesting is 
the most popular form (76$ 




Study Study Sponsor Summary Results
Industry National So- Years of Percent with Rights
Survey ciety of Pro- Service_________Accumulated
fessional less than 1 29Engineers 1-3 50
^-5 626-10 71more than 10 90
Total (average) 76
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 
Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans. Hearings 
before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Represen­
tatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 276.
y .
Vesting coverage calculated from Standard and Poor's 
Intercapital, Inc., "Second Annual Standard and Poor"s/lnter- 
capital, Inc. Pension fund Management Survey,” Unpublished 
Survey Conducted by MacGraw-Hill Publications' Depart­
ment of Economics, New York, October, 1972, Table XXII.
Calculated from Tables V and VI in Bankers Trust 
Company, 1970 Study of Industrial Retirement Plans (New 
York: Bankers Trust Company, 1970), pp. 10-12.
Calculated from Figures 1 and 2 in: Richard C.
Keating, "Employee Expectations in Private Pension Plans," 
Pension and Welfare News. VII, No. 11 (November, 1971)» ^7.
eU.S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor, Statistical Analyses 
of Major Characteristics of Private Pension Plans. 92d 
Cong., 2d sess., September, 1972, pp. 12-16.
fU.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Hearings on H.R. 12272, p. 3^5*
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of the plans with a service only vesting requirement 
provide ". . . that employees are entitled to full or 
partial vesting benefits when they complete 15 years 
of service."®
Vesting Cost
If vesting is indeed a widespread practice, then it 
is reasonable to assume that vesting costs should not 
significantly increase future annual contribution costs.
The results of various cost studies of vesting are pre­
sented in Table 3« It is difficult to compare the studies 
in Table 3 since each report is based on different samples 
and cost methods. The greatest problem in comparing such 
studies is that some consider only the cost of future 
benefits while others examine the cost of all accrued 
benefits. The authors of the Treasury Study and the 
Standard and Poor*s Industry Survey considered prospectively 
accrued benefits, and thereby estimated that the cost 
of vesting would be 1.5 - 3*2 percent higher than 
current costs. The remaining studies in Table 3 examine 
total accrued benefits and consequently assess the cost 
increase to be in the 7 - 2 0  percent range for a majority 
of existing pension plans. The extremely high cost 
estimate cited in the Dreher study is due to (1) the fact
OU.S., Congress Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor, Statistical Analyses 
of Major Characteristics of Private Pension Plans, 92d 
Cong., 2d sess., September, 1^72, p. il.
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TABLE 3
STUDIES MADE ON THE COST OP VESTING

























sion plans with no 
Vesting 
Increase of
plan costs (%) 8.0 
Increase of pay­












Howard Winkle- (1) Population Maturity Stages (%) 













Present Value of Expected Benefits 13-22 
Accrued Benefit Normal Cost 6-Zk
Projected Benefit Normal Cost 12-16
Accrued Benefit Accrued Liability 18-25 
Projected Benefit Accrued Liability 13-22
(2) Termination assumptions employed 
(light to heavy)
TABLE 3"— Continued





Present Value Expected Benefits 7-32 
Accrued Benefit Normal Cost 5-17
Projected Benefit Normal Cost 8-22
Accrued Benefit Accrued Liability 10-38 
Projected Benefit Accrued Liability 7-33
(3) Vesting cost ratios for Rule of 50»
10-year service and vesting foi 10# per year 
beginning at year 6 did not appear to be 
significantly different. Maturity stage 
and termination assumptions only signifi­
cant variables.
C.V. Schaller- Studied only cost for 10 year vesting 
Kelly—  (using UAW turnover rates)
Canadian (1) 90% of the plans with no disability
Actuary benefits would have costs increased by
8.1 - 16.0#
(2) 99# of the plans with disability bene­















Additional Cost for Vesting (%)
Vesting Formula_______ Mature Plan New Plan
50# after 15 yrs. to 
100# after 20 yrs.
100# at age 40 with 
10 yrs. service 
Rule of 50 
10# after 5 yrs. to 
100# after 14 yrs.
100# after 10 yrs.
service 
50# after 5 yrs.
service 
100# after 5 yrs. 
service
21 Industry Survey— Estimated cost of Pro­












TABLE 3—  Continued







(1) Range of Increase in Pension Plan Costs 
for Mandatory Vesting Provision
Vesting Formula_______ # Payroll # Plan Costs
30# at 8 yrs ., graded 
no PS benefits to 
be vested 
30% at 8 yrs., graded, 
including PS 
30# at 8 yrs., graded,
PS vested for mem­
bers age 45 and over 
Rule of 50, no PS 
benefits vested
(2) 77# of the plans in the U.S. will have 
only minor cost adjustments if the second 






Sourcei The complete title of each study is cited in 
the bibliography by author. Summary results 
are quoted directly— no calculations or 
adjustments have been made to the authors* 
figures.
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that the pension plan of the food chain examined currently 
provides little vesting and (2) the high rate of employee 
turnover that characterizes the retail food industry.
The most recent study in Table 3 was conducted by 
Donald S. Grubbs, Jr. for the Senate Labor Subcommittee.
The results of this report further emphasize that cost 
estimates for vesting in U.S. pension plans vary widely.
Since, however, only 23 percent of these plans will have 
major cost adjustments, the cost of vesting for most 
plans will be on the lower end of the cost scale. It 
is evident that the strength of the vesting provision will 
determine the cost of that benefit. Although an upper 
cost limit of 30 percent is suggested by the studies, it 
must be remembered that this estimate is only an average.
The Rule of 50 could result in a cost increase anywhere
gfrom " . . .  zero to 85^, depending upon the situation."7 
Since vesting costs will fluctuate depending on the indi­
vidual plan, no clear conclusion can be drawn other than 
there will be some increased cost as vesting is established.
The proponents of mandatory vesting point out that 
the cost estimates for vesting may be overstated. For 
example, vested benefits for younger persons do not add 
much to costs since there is a long period in which
^"Williams-Javits Bill Rapped at Western Pension 
Conference Meeting," Weekly News Digest. Employee Benefit 
Plan Review. June 9» 1972, p. 2.
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to earn income from the reinvestment of assets.
Great alarm has been expressed about the crippling 
cost of vesting. It is often greatly exaggerated. As 
noted, the more effective credits an employee accumu­
lates, the lower is the cost of each unit. Moreover, 
the earlier a vested credit is earned and funded, 
the lower is the yearly cost for any given level of 
benefits —  because of the double action of longer 
periods of earnings and earnings on earnings.
The increased cost of vesting is thought to be in­
significant for other reasons which may not be reflected 
in the cost studies. First, since turnover among older
employees is relatively low, the cost of vesting is
1 1not much higher than the cost of the benefit. Second, 
the cost of benefits for transient workers can be reduced 
by specifying a waiting period before benefits vest, either 
retrospectively or prospectively. Third, future costs will 
not be as high as initial costs after employees build up 
their vested credits. That is, one employer eventually 
will not have the responsibility of providing a full vested 
pension. Fourth, the increased security of a vested 
retirement income may lead to better employee morale and
10 "Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News. 
VII, No. 9 (September, 1972), 62.
11Treasury Department cost studies reveal that 
the cost of providing a 55 year old employee a $100 
annual pension to begin at age 65 is $570 while the same 
benefit on a vested basis costs only $585J from "Text of 
Fact Sheet Released by Press Secretary; The White House 
Fact Sheet Pension Reform Program," Employee Benefit Plan 
Review. Research Reports, December, 1971.
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12thus higher productivity. Finally, if mandatory vesting 
is established in a period of high turnover, the cost of 
vesting may be offset to a large degree by the recapture 
of funds due to terminations.
Future of Vesting
Most of the pension reform factions now support 
some form of minimal vesting of accrued benefits. Federal 
legislators and labor leaders traditionally have supported 
the concept of vesting; at the same time, pension adminis­
trators and the industrial community in general have been 
reluctant to endorse the vesting principle. Despite this 
historical pattern, there seems to be a change in the 
attitude of both pension administrators and business 
representatives in the form of growing support for a 
minimum mandatory vesting provision such as the Rule of 50. 
Indicative of this changing attitude is the testimony 
of the members of the American Bankers Association 
(representing bank trusteed plans) at recent House and 
Senate hearings in support of the Rule of 50. The American
Bankers Association has traditionally opposed mandatory
13vesting in the past. J 
1 2Thomas C. Edwards, "Trends in Portability and Ves­
ting of Pensions," Best*s Review; Life and Health Insurance 
Edition, LXX, No. (August, 1969)i 1^. E The validity of 
pensions as an incentive recently has been questioned, but 
the absence of vesting could cause worker unrest and a sub­
sequent decline in productivity. Thus, vesting may be 
necessary in the future to maintain current productivity. ZL
1-^Kenneth A. Kaufman, "Pension Bill; Going Back 
Into Retirement? Iron Age, CCIX, No. 20 (May 18, 1972),
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Recent defense industry layoffs as well as the 
general recession could create an environment favorable for 
instituting mandatory vesting. Moreover, further induce­
ment is found in the cost estimate studies discussed above 
which demonstrate that the initial cost may not be ex­
cessively burdensome. It thus is clear that as much 
of the opposition to vesting continues to decline, and 
some form of mandatory vesting becomes increasingly
i iiprobable, the subsequent outcome may make a portability 
system a nearer reality.
Funding
Variations of Funding
The funding (or financing) of pension benefits 
may be categorized on one of two basest (1) current 
disbursement or (2) funded. Under the current disburse­
ment approach, retirement benefits are paid as each payment 
becomes due. There is no accumulation of assets for 
interest accumulation to offset benefit costs prior to 
an employee's retirement. Such a system is actually a 
continuation of payroll since benefit payments are provided 
out of current operating income. Alternatively, under the 
funded approach, the employer irrevocably sets aside funds 
with a trustee or insurance company prior to the date each
IkThe political problems involved with the passage 
of pension legislation will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
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benefit payment is due. Such funding may be on a 
terminal or advance basis. In terminal funding, the 
employer sets aside for each employee, on the date the 
latter retires, a single premium sum sufficient to pro­
vide the monthly retirement benefit. Advance funding 
requires the employer to set aside funds on some systematic 
basis during the employee's working career so that there 
will be sufficient funds available at the time of the 
employee's retirement to pay for the retiree's pension 
credits. Because of the income earned on the earmarked 
assets, advance funding is clearly the least expensive means 
of providing a pension benefit and is the most prevalent 
means of financing retirement plans.
Current Funding Regulation
There are two sources of regulation applicable to 
the funding of pension planst (1) The Treasury Department 
and (2) The Accounting Principles Board, Opinion 8.*^
For a plan to qualify as a deductible item for fed­
eral income tax purposes, the Treasury Department requires 
a minimum annual contribution equal to the plan's normal 
cost (annual cost for benefits accrued in that year) plus 
interest on any unfunded past service (i.e., supplemental) 
liability (costs for benefits earned prior to the inception 
of the plan). The maximum amount deductible in any one
*^See Appendix B for a detailed analysis of the 
Treasury regulations and the Accounting standards.
year is the normal cost of the plan plus 10 percent of the 
unfunded supplemental liability. This limit is applied so 
that the employer will not take excessive deductions during 
profitable years to avoid paying taxes. In addition, the 
deduction maximum ensures that the plan does not become 
overfunded (if overfunding becomes prevalent, economic 
concentration in the equity markets could be adverse). It 
should be emphasized that the only punishment for noncom­
pliance with Treasury Department regulations is loss of 
pension contribution deductibility for federal income 
tax purposes. The employer thus has an incentive to comply, 
but may forego the deductions if noncompliance is deemed 
more profitable. Noncompliance may be encouraged further 
due to the inadequacy of Treasury Department regulations 
in failing to require the amortization of a plan's initial 
unfunded liability. The liability for past service benefits 
simply must not increase and even a fully qualified plan 
may be indefinitely unfunded. The risk involved with an 
unfunded plan already has been discussed* if the plan 
is terminated, there will not be sufficient assets to 
pay for accrued benefits.
The Accounting Principles Board has attempted to 
increase funding standards by requiring that the minimum 
annual cost must equal the normal cost plus a payment to 
insure a twenty year amortization of unfunded vested 
benefits. Maximum contribution limits are similar to the 
Treasury regulations. The only penalty, however, for
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noncompliance with the rules of the Accounting Principles 
Board is denial of accounting certification. It is hoped 
that this denial as well as disclosure of a plan’s 
funding level will provide employers with the incentive 
to move towards a fully funded position.
Current Level of Funding
The studies which have been conducted to date on the 
current level of pension plan funding are presented in 
Table 4. The results of these studies are contradictory 
and largely incomplete. The Griffin-Trowbridge study of 
1966 found a high degree of funding; 98 percent of vested , 
benefits were 100 percent funded when past service funding 
had been in effect fifteen or more years. The Senate 
Labor Subcommittee, on the other hand, found that only 
81 percent of vested benefits were 76 - 100 percent funded 
when past service funding had been in effect twelve or 
more years.
Both of these studies are limited by the narrow 
scope of the analysis. The Griffin-Trowbridge study 
included only those plans that had been in existence ten 
or more years and whose administrators were willing to 
participate in the project. In addition, this study did 
not include an adequate representation of "collectively
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Statistical Analyses, p. 22. (Calculated 
from figures in Table 4-2A)
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STUDIES OF FUNDING LEVEL









(25% of the 
universe at 
that time)
(1) Definition of terms
a) BSR— Benefit Security Ratio, the ratio 
of market asset value to present value of 
accrued benefits
b) VBSR— Vested Benefit Security Ratio, 
the ratio of market asset value to pre­
sent value of accrued vested benefits




Based on Ad- on Unadjusted 
.iusted Ratios* Ratios **Effective Period
of Past Funding BSR VBSR BSR VBSR
Less than 10 Yrs. 62.4% 68 . 3% 63.2% 72.4%
10-14 Yrs. 86,6 94.1 108.7 135.5
15-19 Yrs. 95-9 98.2 115.6 143.720-24 Yrs. 94.8 99.2 114.5 143.4
25-29 Yrs. 97.4 99.2 112.9 135.8
30 Yrs. or More 89.6 99.2 103.5 144.4
All Periods
Combined 84.9% 90.2% 99.9%° 123.3%*Individual plan ratios limited to 100% 
**Individual plan ratios not limited to 100%
(3) Summary Conclusions; 94.4% of all accrued 
benefits funded under plans whose effective 
funding periods were 15 years or more.
Senate Pen­ (1) Assets at Market Value as a percentage of
sion Plan Present Value of
Study; Accrued Bene­ Accrued Vested
Senate fits (Total) Benefits
Labor Sub­ Parti­ Parti­
committee ; Plan cipant Plan cipant
1972, 469 25% or less: 7% 8% 2% 2%
plans 26-50% 25 25 9 5
covering 51-75% 22 30 14 24
7,100,205 76-100% 25 17 21 23
employees 101-125% 12 13 17 19
126-150% 4 2 8 12
151-175 2 1 8 6
Over 175% — 2 4 21 __2100% 100% 100% 100%
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TABLE— Continued
Study, Date, Sample Summary Results
(2) Summary results of study:
a) 27$ of the participants have accrued 
benefits 76$ or greater funded
b) Almost 70$ participants have vested 
benefits 76$ or greater funded
c) The more mature the plan, the greater 




















(1) Study of terminations in first 7 months of 
1972
a) Terminated plans— 683
b) Number of claimants— 20,731
c) Plans with losses— 293; affecting 10,469 
participants of which 8,357 experienced losses 
due to unfunded liabilities amounting to $20 
million (net present value of benefits lost)
d) Average losses perclaimant were $2,400 
overall and $3|600 for retired, eligible for 
retirement and vested employees
e) Amount distributed as $ o f  present value 
of benefits
Retirees 58$
Eligible to retire 41
Eligible to retire early 43
Vested participants 35




f) 70$ lost at least 50$ of Present Value 
of benefits
g) 34$ lost all benefits
(2) Study of multiemployer plans— 1965-71
a) 674 participants of 571690 participants 
(or 1.2$) in the 64 plans studied lost 
benefits
b) Benefit losses were 100?? or close to 100$
Source: The complete title of each study is cited in
the bibliography by author. Summary results 
have been quoted directly— no calculations 
or adjustments have been made to the authors' 
figures.
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bargained multi-employer plans and the smaller (fewer 
than 100 participants) single-employer p l a n s . T h e  
results of the Senate study possibly may be questionable 
for two reasons* (1) the limited sample size and (2) the 
use of a complicated and lengthy questionnaire. Plan 
administrators filling out the form may not have been 
willing or able to supply the information required.
The Interim Report on the study being jointly con­
ducted by the Departments of Labor and the Treasury indicate 
that when plans are terminated, claimants with benefit 
losses (40 percent of all claimants in the plans studied) 
receive only 42 percent of the present value of their 
benefits and 34 percent of these claimants experienced 
loss of all benefits. Like the Griffin-Trowbridge and 
Senate inquiries, this study is severely limited in scope 
and, in addition, may overstate the funding problem 
since only terminated plans were examined. Continuing 
pension plans may be more soundly funded.
Future of Funding
To date, legislative proposals for funding reform 
have been hindered because of the indeterminateness of 
the need for and costs of such proposals. Since the 
Labor and Treasury Departments* Interim Report is limited 
to the analysis of terminated plans, little insight is
*^Frank L. Griffin, Jr. and Charles L. Trowbridge, 
Status of Funding under Private Pension Plans (Homewood,
111.* Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 19^9), p. 25.
gained about the extent of funding of existing plans and 
the cost of additional funding requirements. Despite 
these deficiencies, the concept of mandatory funding was 
given new support when a funding requirement was added to 
the Nixon Administration's pension reform bill for the 
93d Congress (H.R. 7157)• Passage of some form of re­
quired amortization of the unfunded liability over a 
period of twenty to forty years means that portability 
will be feasible. That is, a transfer system can be 
reasonably implemented since fund assets would be suf­
ficient for a terminating employee to port credits to a 
succeeding fund,
1 8Reinsurance or Insurance of Unfunded Liabilities
The Guaranty Fund Concept
The insurance of unfunded liabilities of a pension
plan has been deemed the "most controversial of all the
19pension issues." 7 Any proposal to insure the unfunded
liabilities of a pension plan includes some type of
insurance pool or guaranty fund.
As of any given time, the assets of a pension 
plan may be less than the actuarial value of the 
accrued benefits because of inaccurate estimates 
of cost, failure of the employer to undertake a
1 RThese two terms are used interchangeably in the 
pension literature even though, technically, the latter 
may be more correct.
*^Jay Kobler, "Pension Reform and the Life Insurance 
Industry," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, 
LXXII, No. 5 (September, 1971). 72.
funding program that would ultimately meet all costs, 
lack of time for the completion of a realistic funding 
objective, or loss of asset values through realized 
or unrealized capital losses. A pension guaranty 
fund would be designed to deal with an insufficiency 
of assets, as respects covered benefits, at the time 
of plan termination, or under other specified 
circumstances.
Participating pension plans would pay premiums, 
the amount of which would be determined by the level of 
the unfunded liability. When a participating plan does 
terminate, the guaranty fund then would fund all unfunded 
liabilities so that all accrued benefits can be realized.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities generally is 
felt to be supplementary to a sound funding system. Even 
a plan which is considered to be soundly funded on an 
actuarial basis may not have adequate assets to fund all 
accrued benefits should the plan be terminated. If the 
plan provides for amortization of the unfunded liabilities 
over a reasonable period (e.g., twenty to thirty years) and 
if the unfunded liability is insured until full funding 
is achieved, then accrued benefit security is assured even 
if the plan is terminated. Sufficient assets would always 
be available should an employee want to transfer his 
credits to a succeeding plan in the event of his job change 
or the termination of the plan. Portability thus could be 
achieved without the fund adequacy being endangered by 
adverse turnover experience.
20Dan M. McGill, Guaranty Fund for Private Pension 




Although most of the support for some sort of
insurance of unfunded liabilities centers around the
inequitable treatment of employees who are participants
in a terminating plan, there are two other arguments
often presented by legislative proponents of the insurance
concept. First, the cost of the insurance would be spread
among all participating plans so that maximum protection
for any one plan could be obtained at minimum cost (e.g.,
the premium could be two percent of the value of the
21unfunded liability ). Second, the guaranty fund is 
viewed as being comparable to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (F.D.I.C.), the insurance pool for commercial 
bank deposits. The success of the F.D.I.C. is used as 
a measure of the probable success of a pension insurance 
pool for unfunded liabilities.
Op-posing Arguments
The opponents of a guaranty fund question " . . .  whe 
ther the contingency of plan termination is an insurable 
risk. . . . Employees, as part of their employment respon­
sibilities, assume the risk of continued plant operations
22until the pension plan is fully funded.” In addition, 
the F.D.I.C. analogy may be misleading since the purpose
21This figure was incorporated in Rep. Dent's bill 
(H.R. 1269) and has been used in several similar bills.
22U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Interim Report, p. 22.
of bank deposit insurance is to protect depositors against 
loss of money which was there at one time. Unfunded 
pension liabilities, on the other hand, have not been 
supported by assets at any time in the past.
There are a number of other arguments against 
the guaranty fund concept. First, the cost may be too 
high for marginal plans which have a large unfunded 
liability. Second, the amount of the premium may be 
difficult to calculate. A uniform assumption regarding 
the probability of termination must be made and, realis­
tically, this probability would not be uniform among 
various plans. The problem of premium calculation leads 
to the third, and perhaps most potent, argument against 
insuring unfunded liabilities! why should well-established, 
sound pension funds support marginal funds by paying 
premiums to a pool from which only the terminating plans 
derive any benefit? Finally, the guaranty pool concept 
may lead to plan uniformity and be used as a substitute 
for funding.
Future of the Guaranty Fund Concept
Implementation of an insurance pool for unfunded 
liability protection is dependent on the proven need for 
such a mechanism. The major studies conducted in this 
area to date are presented in Table 5» Although it is 
very difficult to draw conclusions from the data, the 
studies seem to indicate that only .04 - 2.0 percent of 
all covered employees are affected by pension plan
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TABLE 5
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN TERMINATION STUDIES







(1) Since the IRS has been keeping records 
on qualification, 19*989 plans have ter­
minated to the end of 1971 (representing 
6*95% of all the plans).
(2) Total number of employees involved in 
terminated plans— 80 0,00 0.
(3) In 1971 alone, 3*335 plans terminated, 
affecting 125*000 employees.
Emerson H. (1) Age of Plan at Termination
Plans
Terminations in Years Number ..Y Number wfrom 1955-65 1 or less 284 6 .7 13 5.8Joint Study 2 468 11 .9 12 5 .3by IRS and 3 495 11 .6 19 8.4BLS 4 380 8 .9 8 3.6
5 339 8 .0 13 5.86 286 6 .7 14 6.2
7 278 6 .5 16 7.18 211 5.0 17 7.6
9 168 3 .9 16 7.110 193 4 .5 12 5.311 164 3 .9 12 5.312 152 3.6 12 5.3
13 126 3 .0 10 4.414 108 2 .5 8 3.615 or more 478 11.2 36 16.0
Unknown , 129 3.0 ___Z4,259 100.0 225 100.0(2) Reason for Termination
Plans Participants
Reason No. No. *
Merger or Sale 
Financial
1,276 30.0 73 32.4
Difficulties 1,087 25 .5 38 16.9Business Dissolved 
Change to Profit
771 18.1 43 19.1
Sharing 214 5.0 14 6.2
Agreement with Union 180 4.2 11 4.9
Transfer to Other Plan 175 
Lack of Employee
4.1 11 4.9








Study, Author Summary Results
(3) Number of Participants per Plan Terminated
Plans Part i c i pant s
No. -1 ft No.Under 10 1,691 44.4 9 4 .010-24 1,093 25 .7 17 7.6
25-49 499 11.7 18 8.0
50-99 367 8.6 26 11.6
100-249 253 5.9 40 17.8
250-499 90 2.1 31 13.8






(1) Incidence of terminations is increasing, 
especially where foreign imports have cut in.
(2) Insufficient funding implies the need for 
mandated funding and reinsurance.
(3) If the company voluntarily closes down, 
then that company should bear part of the 
termination cost, but if the closure is in­
voluntary (bankruptcy, etc.), then reinsurance 
would cover the termination.
(4) Communication to employees was very 
shallow and needed to be improved.
(5) Terminations are often preceded by an 
increase in benefits, so funding cannot be 







(1) Study of terminations in first 7 months 
of 1972
a) Terminated plans
b) Terminated plans— num­
ber of claimants
c) Plans with losses
d) Claimants in loss plans




29310,469 5196 of (b) 
8,357 40# of (b)











No. # of ()
Claimants with lossest
Retirees and bene­
ficiaries 658 7.8 7#
Eligible for Ret. 391 4.67Vested 2,027 24.2?Active 5,192 62.30
Unclassified 89 1.06
8,357 0•00Amount distributed as #
of present value of
benefits for (e) 42#
Claimants losing all
benefits 2,847 34# of (e)Claimants in terminated
plans with lossest 
With superseding plan 1,469 17.6#Other new plan (e.g.,
progit sharing plan) 992 11.9No superseding plan -.5.1-8,96 70 .6
Type of plan (by 8,357
0•00H
claimant with losses)s




k) Reason for termination 
(by claimant)
Sale or transfer of
ownership 904 11#
Merger 181 2
New superseding plan 1,209 14
Lack-employee parti­
cipation
Adverse business earnings 
Liquidation or dissolu­
tion of company 1
Sale or transfer of
ownership and either ad­
verse earnings or 
liquidation 
Merger and either adverse 











Study, Author Summary Results
No. * of ()
Closure of plant, di­
vision or subsidairy
but not entire firm 2,038 2k
6,357 100$
(2) Present value of total benefits lost—
$20 million
(3) Study of Multiemployer plans— 1965-71
a) Number of plans— 6k
b) Number of participants— 57,690
c) Median number of participants per plan—  
355d) 68$ terminated prior to 1969 with smallest 
number terminated in 1971
e) 97$ terminated because of pending merger 
into a succeeding plan
f) 78$ of the plans were at least 5 years old
g) 67$ of the plans were in manufacturing
and 21$ in wholesale and retail
h) 61$ of the plans were self-insured»
38$ were insured (Deposit Administration)
Source* The complete title of each study is cited
in the bibliography, by author. Summary results 
have been quoted directly— no calculations or 
adjustments have been made to the authors* 
figures.
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terminations! and the Interim Report of the joint Treasury-
Labor Departments' study indicates that 70 percent of the
claimants with benefit losses are not covered immediately
under a superseding plan. The total cost of insuring
unfunded liabilities for the first seven months of 1972 would
have been $20 milliont the present value of all benefits 
23lost. J The partial results of the joint agency study do
not permit at present a well-defined estimate of the
future of the guaranty fund concept. On the one handf
the relatively low cost of insurance of unfunded liabilities
($20 million) may encourage legislators to pass regulation
in this area of pension reform. Converselyt the element
of low cost combined with the fact that few (.04 percent)
employees are affected by the plan terminations! lends
credence to the position that insurance of unfunded
liabilities is not necessary. In addition, there is
considerable opposition to legislation in this area by
pension and business leaders so that successful passage
24is unlikely even if the need is determined. Possible 
alternatives to insurance of the unfunded liability 
include (1) the extension of Opinion 8 of the Accounting 
Principles Board and (2) legislation of plan termination 
priorities.
2^U.S., Department of the Treasury and Department 
of Labor, Study of Pension Plan Terminations. 1972 ̂ Interim 
Report (Washington, D.C.« Government Printing Office, 
February, 1973)* P* 2.
24Anderson, private interview, August 10, 1972.
86
Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsibility
Interrelationship of Two Pension Issues
Although disclosure and fiduciary responsibility 
often are referred to in a joint context, the two issues 
may be considered on an individual —  rather than 
collective —  basis. Fiduciary responsibility as a current 
issue in pension reform literature refers to the estab­
lishment of performance standards for persons having 
authority over the control and disposition of pension 
funds. Such standards may include investment practices, 
rules of conduct, degree of personal liability and regular­
ity of outside audits. Disclosure refers to keeping 
employees adequately informed about pension benefits as 
well as the circumstances under which employees would be 
disqualified for coverage. Since disclosure standards 
could easily be included within increased fiduciary 
responsibility provisions, the close association of the 
two issues is natural.
The relationship between disclosure and fiduciary 
responsibility has been strengthened further by the fact 
that legislative proposals for pension reform generally 
have dealt with both issues as a single entity. For
^See Appendix A for examples of legislative pro­
posals. The original Nixon Administration proposal, H.R. 
3272, is an example of the close association between 
disclosure and fiduciary responsibility. This bill was 
introduced much earlier than the Administration’s pension 
reform proposals on vesting and tax reforms, H.R. 12272.
8?
example, the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act 
(see Appendix B) imposes such standards in the areas 
of both disclosure and fiduciary responsibility.
Supporting Arguments
Proponents of pension reform feel that the Welfare 
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act is inadequate. Individual 
occurences of abuse such as the following often are cited 
as reasons for extending legislation in the area of 
disclosure and fiduciary responsibility! (1) benefits 
forfeited by employees who do not know they are eligible 
recipients, (2) plan descriptions distributed to employees 
that often are complicated and vague, (3) unsound invest­
ment practices and (**•) misuse of pension funds.
Opposing Arguments
Persons who oppose legislation for broader dis*-
closure and fiduciary standards contend that employees pro?
bably would not be interested in reading additional
2 6descriptive material on pension plans. Moreover, the 
increased paperwork involved would be expensive and possibly 
unnecessary. In addition, since the Labor Department 
is not able to handle the work it now has responsibility 
for under the Pension and Welfare Plans Disclosure Act, 
opponents allege that further requirements for that agency 
to enforce may be useless.^ A final objection to increased
2^Dan M. McGill, Fulfilling Pension Expectations 
(Homewood, 111.i Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), pp. 2^9-52.
2^Anderson, private interview, August 10, 1972.
disclosure standards is the possible adverse effects 
in the equity market if all pension fund investment
potransactions are disclosed.
Conclusions
Legislation in the areas of disclosure and fiduciary 
responsibility has been successful in the past and will 
probably be strengthened in the future. Since few legis­
lators or even members of the pension and business sectors 
oppose this type regulation, additional disclosure and 
fiduciary responsibility regulations may be enacted. By 
synchronizing these regulations with other pension reform 
legislation (including portability), employees will be 
adequately informed of their rights and assured of the 
receipt of all accrued benefits.
Miscellaneous Pension Issues 
In addition to the pension reform issues discussed 
above, there are a number of relatively minor pension 
problem areas being considered by legislators.
Investment of Pension Funds
The increasing concentration of pension fund assets 
invested in the equity markets is of concern to legislators 
for several reasons. First, pension fund managers can 
engage in the transaction of large block trades, thus
Jay Kobler, "Employers, Pension Plans, and 
Insurers," Best*s Review; Life and Health Edition, LXXII, 
No. 6 (October, 1971)» 54.
influencing the prices of common stocks. Equity market
vulnerability is feared by market analysts due to the
29economic concentration of pension funds. 7 Second, 
should there be a serious deterioration of stock market 
prices, pension fund asset values might be decreased. 
Finally, if strong portfolio restrictions are placed on 
the investment of pension funds, it is possible that a 
substantial source of equity capital could be lost.
Tax Incentives
In addition to the tax free transfer proposals and
relief for self-employed individuals included in the Nixon
Administration bill (H.R. 7157 )> there have been several
suggestions for providing other tax incentives. For
example, tax free transfers could be allowed for any part
of a benefit transferred to a succeeding fund. Such
transfers also could be allowed in the event of not only
employee termination, but also plan termination or partial
termination brought about by a plant's closing. Although
H.R. 7157 only permits tax free transfers between qualified
individual retirement accounts and qualified employer-
sponsored plans, further transfers could be allowed
30between Keogh plans and tax deferred plans.
^"Tighter Rules for Private Pensions— The 
Outlook Now," U.S. News and World Report, October 2,
1972, p. 62.
-^°Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension Bene­
fits," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, 
LXXII, No. 11 (March, 1972), 22-24.
A final tax incentive to increase pension coverage is 
the allowance of extra deductions for contributions made 
by small employers; e.g., 115 percent of contributions 
allowable as deductible expenses.
Reorganization of Regulatory Agencies
Pension reform advocates often acclaim the need 
for a reorganization of pension regulatory agencies into 
some sort of central pension bureau. The pension regula­
tory powers of such agencies as the Labor Department, the 
Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission would be involved in this reorganization and it is 
. questionable whether the various bureaucracies 
would relinquish their powers."^1 Reform advocates claim 
that if such a central agency cannot be established, then a 
central pension registry office should be created to 
record all the scattered benefit credits of a given 
employee. Other reorganization suggestions include dual 
administration under the Treasury Departmenti one office 
would protect employee interests by imposing penalties for
noncompliance and a second office would protect revenue by
32encouraging compliance through tax incentives.
-^Kobler, "Pension Reform," p. 7^»
-^Charles*D. Spencer, "Who Will Have Jurisdiction 
When Pension Legislation Finally Becomes a Reality?"
Recent Developments in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit 
Plan Review, November 17» 1972, p. 1.
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Portability for Government Contract Employees
Congress also is concerned that employees who 
frequently are affected by changes in government contracts 
(e.g., engineers in the defense industry) not be put at 
a disadvantage relative to other workers because of govern­
ment policies. Consequently, there has been interest in 
requiring portability as part of any government contract. ^
Locking-In
Many pension contracts provide that, upon termin­
ation, an employee can elect a cash settlement for his 
accrued pension credits. Proponents of pension reform 
contend that employees should be protected from themselvesj 
i.e., pension contributions should be locked in and not 
available as cash distributions.
Expansion of State Regulation
As an alternative to federal regulation, state regu­
lation of pensions could be expanded.
The application of state insurance regulation to 
private pension plans is called for. The reasons 
for this are purely pragmatic. The basic legislation 
existsj principles have been worked out a^d have been 
well testedj organizations are in being.
This proposal has not received wide attention because of
-^"Pension Legislation Gets Surprise Entry,"
Industry Week. September 11, 1972, p. 24.
-^Murray W. Latimer, "The Need for Regulation of 
Private Pension Plans," Best's Insurance News* Life 
Edition, LXVIII, No. 6 (October, 1967), 52.
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the obvious disadvantages of nonuniform state regulation 
of interstate pension plans.
Overfunding
35Overfunding-'-' is a pension reform issue' that has 
received rather wide attention in the 93d Congress due to 
the publicized abuses of the administrators of the Elgin 
Watch Company pension plan and similar cases. The Elgin 
Watch Company's pension plan which had been in existence 
since 1918, became overfunded in 1958 as the result of 
outstanding investment returns on plan assets and a 
reduction in the company's workforce. At that time, 
employer contributions were stopped. The fund currently 
has an asset value of approximately $30 million. The 
plan administrators are attempting to terminate the plan 
and purchase insured annuities for employees. The cost 
of insuring all accrued benefits amounts to about $18 
million. The remaining $12 million in the fund would revert 
to the company as a tax free gain since the revenue losses 
from manufacturing operations for Elgin amount to about
-^Overfunding occurs when the assets of the fund ex­
ceed the present value of all benefits due. This situation 
usually is prevented by the Treasury Department's quali­
fication rule that annual contributions may not exceed the 
sum of (1) the normal cost of the plan, plus (2) 10 percent 
of the unfunded supplemental liability plus (3) interest 
on the remaining unfunded supplemental liability. Should 
overfunding occur, the Internal Revenue Service has the 
authority to handle the abuse by disallowing qualification 
of the plan as a deductible expense for federal income tax 
purposes. In the event of plan termination, the Internal Re­
venue Service also has the authority to compel compliance by 
enforcing the vesting provisions under termination proceedings.
$16 million* i.e., the $12 million gain can be netted
against the $16 million loss.
Legislation has been deemed necessary to prevent
the excess assets of a terminating pension plan from
reverting to the company or succeeding corporation if
a merger or sale is involved. Opponents ;of overfunding
legislation point out that if the Internal Revenue Service
had enforced its own rules, the Elgin situation would not 
3?have occurred.^'
Summary and Conclusions 
Should pension reform legislation in the near future 
be successful, it is likely to include some form of 
minimum vesting and funding standards, tax relief for 
transfer of pension credits by terminating employees and 
increased disclosure and fiduciary responsibility standards. 
Any legislative effort in the area of insurance of 
unfunded pension liabilities probably will encounter strong 
opposition from pension administrators and business repre­
sentatives. The evidence to date in this latter area of 
pension reform indicates that reform may indeed be unneces­
sary. Moreover, mandatory guaranty fund provisions may
3^U,S.# Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees 
Act. 1973. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. k and 
S. 75. 93d Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 16, 1973»
pp. 193-202.
37Ibid.. p. 385.
may restrict pension coverage growth and benefit expansion 
and encourage the substitution of insurance for sound 
funding practices.
Pension legislation, including vesting, funding 
and tax relief for transfer of pension credits, should 
make a portability system a realistic future development. 
The vesting standard would provide a terminating employee 
with a minimum nonforfeitable pension to transfer and 
the funding standard would ensure that assets are available 
to transfer. The tax-free transfer provision is one 
means of effecting the transfer and may encourage plan 
administrators to provide portability for terminating 
employees.
Now that the various pension issues have been 
examined to determine the content of a future pension 
reform package, past legislative efforts and the reasons 
for their lack of success will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The causes of the changing climate for pension 
reform also will be explored in order to determine the 
future of pension regulation.
CHAPTER IV
PAST FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND 
CURRENT PENSION CONTROL CLIMATE
Basis of Legislative Interest in Pension Control
Private Pensions— A Public Concern
The private pension industry has become an area 
of concern to federal legislators and the focus of this 
attention has been mandated reform of private pension plans. 
One of the earliest and clearest statements of the position 
that private pensions are a public concern is found in the 
1965 Report to the President on Corporate Pension Funds by 
a special White House study committee 1
Although the development of private retirement 
plans has largely been the result of business and labor 
initiative, public policy has encouraged and protected 
these plans through tax laws, labor relations, statutes, 
standards of fiducial obligations of trustees, and more 
recently through specifically designed legislation 
requiring public disclosure of various aspects of 
retirement and welfare plans.
Financial and Cultural Environment.— Since the 
private pension industry has achieved much of its growth
President*s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds 
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, Public 
Policy and Private Pension Programs, A Report to the Presi­
dent on Private Employee Retirement Plans (Washington. D.C . 1 
Government Printing Office, 1965)* p. 1.
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through the protective federal income tax status afforded 
qualified pension plans, private pensions are felt to be a 
public concern. The favorable tax situation for private 
pension plans essentially means that employees who are not 
covered by a private system are being discriminated against. 
They enjoy no tax advantages of planning for retirement 
directly or indirectly through their employer.
In a more general perspective, the concept of 
private pensions has been accepted as part of the American 
way of life for several reasons. First, private pensions 
are viewed as supportive of the popular American work 
ethic since retirement benefits of private plans usually 
are related to years of service with an employer. In 
addition, private pensions often are associated with the 
Social Security system; i.e., private pensions supplement 
the floor of protection afforded by Social Security benefits. 
Federal legislators would like to improve the private pension 
system because "heat would be taken off the constant esca­
lation of the social security benefit because of the pres­
sures of economics, if there was a much more intelligent 
private pension plan system."-^
Protection of Individuals.— With increasing re-
2U.S., Congress, Senate, Debate regarding Pension
Reform and the Senate Finance Committee action on S. 3598,
92d Cong., 2d sess., September 27, 1972, Congressional 
Record. CXVIII, S.I6056.
3U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 
Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans, Hearings 
before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa­
tives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 210.
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liance by the American labor force on private pensions for 
retirement income, there is constant pressure for legis­
lators to extend such coverage. For example, approximately
half of the nation's workforce is not covered by private 
kpensions. For many of the employees covered under a pri* 
vate pension plan, the coverage is inadequate. Persons 
who change jobs frequently may never become eligible 
for benefits. The inadequate or nonexistent coverage of 
employees has been " . . .  obviously concentrated among 
small employee groups. Employers include proprietors, 
partnerships and small incorporated b u s i n e s s e s . I n  
particular, benefit coverage has been cited as inadequate 
in the areas of spouse benefits^ and benefits for women 
employees.^
Not only are many employees not covered under a
George B. Swick, "Report of the Legislative Panel 
of the Society of Actuaries," Address presented at the 
Society of Actuaries' Regional Meeting, New Orleans, 
Louisiana, March 20, 1972, p. 3» (Mimeographed)
-\james H. Schultz, Pension Aspects of the Economics 
of Agingi Present and Future Roles of Private Pensions,
A Working Paper in Conjunction with the overall study of 
Economics of Aging« Toward a Full Share in Abundance 
prepared for the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate 
(Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 27.
^"Nader Charges'Fraud' on Private Pension System," 
Pension and Welfare News. VIII, No. 7 (July, 1972), p. 31*
7'U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees 
Act. 1972. Hearings before the Subcommittee dn Labor of 
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on 
S. 3598, S. 302*J>, S. 3012 and other Bills, 92d Cong.,
2d sess., 1972, p. 303*
98
private plan or are inadequately covered, but there has been 
a decrease in the extension of coverage in recent years.
There has been some slowdown in the rates of growth 
since i960. This slackening indicates that, tinder the 
existing structure and operation of private pension 
plans, a large proportion of the employed labor force 
is having difficulty in securing supplemental retirement 
protection. The most accessible groups are already 
covered, and future expansion must be in industries in 
which small businesses are prevalent. Current trends 
indicate that the vast majority of newly established 
plans are in this category.
Legislators recognize that many employees do not 
participate in the establishment of pension plans (except 
in the case of negotiated plans), nor are they able to 
understand the provisions of the contracts. Many employees 
simply do not face the need for provision of retirement 
income. In these cases, the protection of such individuals 
is felt to be the responsibility of the federal government.
Most pensioners cannot be expected to read the fine 
print, nor to understand it. What is at work is the 
fundamental notion of fairness— the kind that invar­
iably ends up in legislation, sooner or later.
Hazards of Private Pension Plans.--In addition to 
the inadequacy of benefits and benefit coverage, there are 
a number of hazards in the private pension concept from 
which employees are considered to need protection. The 
first hazard is underfunding. Should the plan terminate 
before funding is complete, there will not be sufficient
QSchultz, Economics of Aging, p. 7.
Q7Frank Cummings, "Private Pension Plans* Vesting, 
Funding, Portability," Columbia Journal of World Business. 
Ill, No. 5 (September— October, 1968), 80.
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assets to provide the benefits promised. When firms are 
caught in a profit squeeze, there is also the temptation 
to borrow from the fund or simply to renege on funding 
pension contributions. For example, "Ford Motor Company 
owes $480,000,000 to its pension fund, while Uniroyal and 
Western Union owe $450,000,000 and $364,000,000, respec­
tively."10
A second hazard which employees covered under 
private pension plans may encounter is that of inadequate 
investment performance, or even wide asset deterioration 
in the event of adverse market conditions. Even a well 
funded plan may prove inadequate if serious individual 
security or market adjustments are experienced.
A final area which could affect the pension security 
of an employee is that of changing market conditions within 
an industry. The defense industry is well known for its 
frequent layoffs and resulting loss of pension credits 
for its employees. Although not all market changes are 
experienced as suddenly as in the defense industry, manu­
facturing firms also may be required to make production 
and labor adjustments when demand changes or perhaps when 
imports drastically affect the market or product price.
In addition, any period of conglomerate activity involving 
acquisitions or spinoffs can result in pension plan
10Rep. Seymour Halpern, "Radical Departure Needed 
in Pension Legislation." Pension and Welfare News, VIII,
No. 9 (September, 1972), 67.
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terminations* the plan involved may or may not be super­
seded by another plan.
In summary, private pensions are a public concern 
due to the preferential tax status of qualified plans, the 
establishment of the private pension system as a needed 
supplement to Social Security benefits and the contention 
that employees need to be protected against inadequate 
or nonexistent benefits. Thus, pension coverage should be 
extended in order to prevent discrimination against 
employees who are not covered. In addition, those employees 
who are covered are deemed to need the protection of a 
guarantee of pension benefits. Underfunding, adverse 
investment problems and market competition fluctuations 
can create situations where even a long-service employee's 
pension is unsafe.
Private Pension Fund Abuses
Although the theoretical basis of federal legis­
lative interest in pension control has been established, 
it is quite likely that many legislators would not have 
been active in pressing for reform had not publication of 
specific pension fund abuses brought the issue to their 
attention. The inappropriate use of pension funds by 
administrators has been examined at Senate hearings.
Examples of fund misuse include (1) the loaning of pension 
funds to a trustee at low interest rates, (2) contribu­
tions mady by promissory motes which may not be collectible
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and (3) as a specific case* the depositing of tens of 
millions of dollars of assets of the United Mineworkers
Pension and Welfare Fund into a union run bank account
11which earned no interest. Ralph Nader has charged 
that management uses pension funds to perpetuate the con­
trol of corporate management, finance its own activities,
exercise control over other corporations and support
12interlocking directorates.
In addition to the misuse of pension funds, liter­
ally thousands of abuses involving individual employees0 
pension credits have been brought to legislators0 atten­
tion in Congressional hearings, by individuals contacting
their Senators and Congressmen and by the press and 
13television. J Long-service employees who are terminated 
just prior to retirement or vesting, or victims of unfunded 
terminated plans, or mobile employees who never quite 
qualify for a pension benefit are often presented in
1:*U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills,
1972, p. 373.
1^Ralph Nader, "Ralph Nader Looks at Private Pen­
sion Plans." Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 9 (Septem­
ber, 1971), 28.
1 -^Examples of the publication of unfair practices 
by employers regarding pension credits include the fol­
lowing: "The Big Pension Myth," Chicago Daily News. March
8, 1971, p. 6; "The Light and Dark Corners of Disclosure," 
Forbes, March 15, 1972, p. 3; "NBC Reports," N.B.C. tele­
cast, September 12, 1972: "Pensions: The Broken Promise,"
Narrator, Edwin Newman; "Phantom Pensions in Industry," New 
York Times. April 17, 1971; "Urged; Tighter Rules on Pen­
sion Funds," U.S. News and World Report. April 12, 1971,p.7; 
George Lardner, Jr., "Pension Plan Study Reveals Big Ma­
jority No Benefits," Washington Post. April 1, 1971, p. 2.
littelevision appeals for pension reform. The most recent
comprehensive criticism of the private pension system is
the book You and Your Pension by Ralph Nader and Kate 
1 *5Blackwell. J The authors present the plight of 500 
disappointed pensioners in a book that undoubtedly will 
be widely read by legislators and constituents alike.
History of Legislative Interest
Pension and Welfare Plans Disclosure Act
A chronology of major federal legislative acti­
vities in the area of pension reform is presented in 
Table 5» Nearly every Congress during the past twenty 
years has been concerned with pension control legislation. 
Numerous studies have been funded and conducted by Con­
gressional Committees and numerous hearings have been 
held by at least eight committees and various subcommittees 
of those committees. The only legislation resulting from 
all of this activity was the enactment in 1958 of the 
Pension and Welfare Plans Disclosure Act, and its sub­
sequent amendment in 1962. Under this act all plans
14 .Many of the publications and news presentations 
have been criticized on the grounds that both sides of the 
issue are not presented} i.e., the employer's position has 
been unfairly represented. The telecast by N.B.C.'s Edwin 
Newman on "Pensions: The Broken Promise," September 12,
1972, has been cited by the Federal Communications Commis­
sion for not complying with the agency's fair reporting 
standards. Although the program was presented the 1972 
George Foster Peabody Award for outstanding TV journalism, 
N.B.C. must present additional viewpoints. (Wall Street 
Journal. May 7» 1973* P» 5* )
^Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell, You and Your 
Pension (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973)*
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TABLE 6
CHRONOLOGY OP MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS

















Hearings by two 
separate Congres­
sional Committees
Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act
Money and Credit} 
Their Influence on 




Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act 
Amended
House Committee on 
Education and Labor
Subcommittee on Wel­
fare and Pension Funds, 
Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare
(1) House Committee on 
Education and Labor
(2) Senate Committee 




Commission on Money 
and Credit
Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Wel­
fare? Subcommittee on 
Labor
U.S. Congress
President John F, Ken- Executive Branch 
hedy established the 
President's Committee 
on Corporate Pension 
Funds and Other Pri­
vate Retirement and 
Welfare Programs
Public Policy and 
Private Pension Pro­
grams? A Report to 
the President
President's Committee 
on Corporate Pension 
Funds and Other Pri­
vate Retirement and 
Welfare Programs
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TABLE 6—  Continued















mittee Staff Report 
prepared by Nelson 
McClung
Hearings
Hearings by three 
separate Congres­
sional Committees
1971- Hearings by three 
1972 separate Congres­
sional Committees
(1) Senate Special 
Committee on Investi-fations2) Senate Finance Committee
(3) Joint Economic 
Committee ? Subcom­





Senate Special Select 
Committee on Aging
(1) House Education 
and Labor Committee; 
Subcommittee on Labor
(2) Senate Labor and 
Public Welfare Com­
mittee? Subcommittee 
on Labor (hearings on 
pension fund of the 
United Mine Workers)
(3) Senate Special Se­
lect Committee on 
Aging
(1) House Ways and 
Means Committee
(2) House General Com­
mittee on Education 
and Labor; Subcommittee 
on Labor? Hearings!
a) General Pension 
Reform
b) Teacher Portability
(3) Senate Committee 
on Labor and Public 
Welfare? Subcommittee 
























sion plan survey; 
results released in 
several Committee 
prints
Study on Funding 
and Plan Termina­





Hearings by four 
separate Congres­
sional Committees




Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public 
Welfare; Subcommittee 
on Labor
U.S. Departments of 
Labor and the 
Treasury
House Pension Task 
Force; Committee on 
Education and Labor
(1) Senate Committee 
on Labor and Public 
Welfare; Subcommittee 
on Labor
(2) House Committee on 
Ways and Means (Joint 
Committee on Income 
Tax)
(3) House Committee on 
Education and Labor
(^) Senate Committee on 
Finance; Subcommittee 
on Pensions
U.S. Departments of 
Labor and the Treasury
Source: 89th-93d Cong., Hearings before the House Com­
mittee on Ways and Means, Senate Subcommittee 
on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, House Committee on Education and Labor; 
Joint Economic Committee and Senate Special 
Select Committee on Aging; 83d-87th Cong.,
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities 
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, 
by the Subcommittee on Labor, S. Rept. $2-634, 
9*2d Cong., 2d sess., 1971, PP* ^-5» 27.
covering more than twenty-five employees must file with 
the Office of Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension 
Reports (Department of Labor) a plan description within 
ninety days after establishment of the plan. In addition* 
if a plan covers 100 or more employees, the plan adminis­
trator also must submit an annual financial report within 
150 days of the end of the annual accounting period. Plan 
administrators further are required to make available for 
examination by any participant or beneficiary copies of 
the filed plan description and the latest annual report.
The Secretary of Labor may prosecute through the federal 
judiciary system to compel compliance with the provisions 
of the act.
The President's Report
The drive for pension legislation was not arrested
by the passage of this legislation. The findings of the
16Commission of Money and Credit in 1962 served as a point 
of departure for the study conducted by the President's 
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private 
Retirement and Welfare Programs which was established by 
President John F. Kennedy in 1962. Although the Commission 
on Money and Credit was mainly concerned with the fiducial 
investment practices of pension managers, the President's 
Committee encompassed a broad, in-depth study of the
1 6Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit: 
Their Influence on Jobs. Prices, and Growth (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.t Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), pp. 175-1??*
107
private pension system. The findings of this Committee 
have served as the basis for many of the bills, intro­
duced in the Congress after the study was completed in 
1965. The Committee expressed a sound commitment to the need 
for continued public support of the private pension system 
through indirect tax subsidies even though current
pension practices were viewed as inhibiting labor mo- 
17bility. The specific recommendations of the President's 
Committee included (1) minimum vesting as a condition of 
qualification for favorable federal income tax treatment,
(2) a thirty year amortization period for unfunded 
liabilities as an additional IRS qualification requirement,
(3) further study in the areas of portability and termina­
tion insurance, (4) miscellaneous tax adjustments and (5)
18increased fiduciary responsibility and disclosure standards.
Joint Economic Committee Staff Report
The staff report by the Joint Economic Committee,
prepared in large part by economist Nelson McClung, was
the first report on the entire pension field prepared by
a Congressional Committee.
Whereas the Presidential report implicitly 
accepted the economic and social justification for a 
private pension system, the JEC staff report ex-
17'See Appendix C for a summary of the more recent 
studies on labor mobility. Inhibition of labor mobility by 
private pension plans is no longer considered a valid 
concept.
18 '’Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations of 
President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds,1962,"
Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports. February,
19o5» PP. 1-2.
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plicitly calls into question that premise. In other 
words, this report is not another federal document 
calling for reform in the system— it is largely an 
indictment of thegVery existence of such a system, 
reformed or not. y
The specific conclusions of this committee included (1) re­
quiring all plans to be noncontributory, (2) minimum 
funding, (3) vesting, ( b ) extension of coverage, (5) 
reinsurance, (6) additional supervision, (7) tax relief for 
employee contributions and (8) the irrevocability of 
pension credits to be established through either plan 
merger, immediate vesting or portability.^®
The rather advanced conclusions of the Joint 
Economic Committee prompted employers and the pension 
industry to become concerned with pension reform. Although 
hearings have been held by several Congressional com­
mittees on numerous reform bills in the 89th through the 
92d Congresses, to date such legislation has been 
proposed unsuccessfully.
Obstacles to Enactment of Comprehensive 
Pension Reform Legislation
Need for Pension Control Not Urgent
Pension control has not been categorized as an 
item of urgent priority by the members of the U.S. Congress.
19 'Joint Economic Committee Staff Report on Pensions 
Indicts System as Thoroughly Irrational and Inefficient," 
Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports. December,
1 9 6 6 ,  p .  1 .
20Ibid.. pp. 5-6.
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Traditionally, such controversial measures as welfare, 
health reform, Medicare, not to mention nonrelated issues 
such as Viet Nam and international affairs, have been 
given preliminary consideration over pension reform 
proposals. The concentration by legislators on Social 
Security improvement seems to resolve the need for ad­
dressing the plight of the elderly. "Persons over age
65, of course, are well aware of one area in which Congress
21has taken action— Social Security benefits are up."
Although many disappointed pensioners have com­
plained to individual Congressmen, there is no strong 
public interest group promoting pension reform; i.e., there
is an "absence of representation of the interests of
22beneficiaries before the Congress."
In the past, there have been no powerful sponsors 
for pension reform bills. Senator Jacob K. Javits (R— N.Y.) 
and Rep. John Dent (D— Pa.) have been the most active in 
pushing for pension reform but their sponsorship alone has 
been inadequate to elicit sufficient support for passage of 
such legislation. Members of Congress have been unwilling 
to support reform legislation without concrete evidence of 
need. Prior to the studies conducted during the 92d and 
93d Congress by the Senate Labor Subcommittee, the House
21 "Little Government Action on Health, Pensions, 
During 1969--1970 May be a Different Story," Weekly News 
Digest, Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports, 
January 23, 1970, p. 2.
77 "Nader Charges 'Fraud,'" p. 33*
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Pension Task Force, and the Departments of Labor and
Treasury, a strong need for reform was not demonstrated;
instead, only isolated incidents of abuse were emphasized.
Many of the bills proposed prior to the 92d and
93d Congresses contained "loopholes" designed to benefit
multiemployer pension plans.
There are in addition a number of technical 
defects which are obviously the result of inadequate 
study of the problem, but which if not corrected in 
the legislative process, could cause substantial and 
unnecessary difficulties in administering even the 
best of plans. J
Some bills are vague in definition and provision, leaving
the details of development to the administering agency.
For example, "one bill which had been introduced in the House
specified that the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare should design the details of a portability system
O/l,utilizing the Social Security System." Ambiguities, 
defects and loopholes clearly decrease the chance of 
passage. Moreover, the scarcity of intelligent, logical 
bills with strong sponsorship supports the premise that 
pension control has not been an urgent reform issue.
Recognition of Administrative Problems
The private pension plans currently in existence 
represent a diversity of plan types, benefit provisions
^Cummings, "Private Pension Plans," p. 80.
214."Tarver Suggests Changes in Nixon Administration 
Pension Bill: Pension Legislation a Certainty," Recent 
Developments in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit Plan 
Review, Research Report, November 17, 1972.
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and funding methods» thus increasing the difficulty of 
developing a set of comprehensive governing rules for 
pension reform. Even if all-inclusive legislation were 
drafted, there still remains the problem of determining 
the appropriate government agency to administer the 
program. In a television interview, Charles Ruff of the 
U.S. Justice Department said, "There is no government 
agency large enough to handle government regulation of 
pensions.
The administrative agencies most frequently 
suggested are the Labor Department, Department of the 
Treasury, Department of Health, Education and Welfare and 
a newly created Department of Pension Administration.
Since some of the pension reform bills with the strongest 
sponsorship come from the Labor Committees in both the 
House and the Senate, these Committees advocate regulation 
by the Labor Department. Because regulation by the Labor 
Department would be enforced through the federal court 
system, this type of reform is termed "penalty legislation." 
Administration of pension protection legislation by any 
agency, however, will result in dual regulation and the 
possibility of a conflicting interests. The Department of 
the Treasury regulating plan qualification has, as its 
prime responsibility, protection of revenue. The Labor 
Department would have the responsibility of protecting the 
individual's benefits. Particular conflict of interest
2^"NBC Reports," September 12, 1972.
could arise in the area of funding? e.g., benefit security 
of rapid funding versus revenue losses due to rapid 
funding.
Other parties interested in pension reform advo­
cate pension regulation that is administered through the 
Department of the Treasury. The Nixon Administration, the 
House Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Finance 
Committee and various private industry groups have supported 
enforcement of reform by amending the Internal Revenue
Code to require additional standards for plan qualifi- 
26cation. Since employers would have the incentive of 
favorable tax treatment, regulation by the Treasury Depart­
ment is termed ’'incentive legislation." There are several 
problems involved with incentive legislation. First, if 
vesting and funding are required as IRS qualification 
standards, an employee has no ready means of recovering 
damages for noncompliance. Second, it may be neither 
practical nor possible for an employee to recover damages 
because of an employer's failure to meet tax law require­
ments. Finally, with dual administration: by the Treasury 
Department and the Labor Department (under the provisions 
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act), it is 
possible that only cursory checks of compliance will be made.
26"Jurisdictional Problem Poses Some Realistic 
Questions in Connection with Proposed Pension Plan Legis­
lation," Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Report,
March, 1973» P» !•
27Ibid., pp. 3-5.
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Since dual administration of pension plans already 
exists, legislators must evaluate the problems involved 
with additional regulation. The determination of the 
appropriate regulating agency and the means by which con­
flicts of interest under dual administration may be mini­
mized have been among the major deterrents to passage 
of pension legislation.
Differences of Opinion--Political
In addition to the problems directly related to the 
drafting of an effective pension reform bill, there are 
also several obstacles of a political nature to enactment 
of pension legislation. First, the House, Senate and
Executive branch all have different approaches to pension
28reform. It will indeed be difficult to construct a 
piece of comprehensive compromise legislation aggreable 
to each of these factions.
A second hindrance to pension reform legislation 
is the fact that pension reform must pass through at 
least four committees, Senate and House Committees on
28Although some of the differences of opinion 
relating to the administering agency previously have 
been discussed, a more thorough analysis of the three 
predominant approaches will be presented in a later 
chapter. The provisions of the bills representing the 
three various approaches to pension reform are available 
in Appendix D.
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29labor and tax. 7 In addition to the " . . .  traffic jam
of bills on committee agendas, especially in the House
30Ways and Means C o m m i t t e e , t a x  reform legislation 
traditionally has originated in the House Committee on 
Ways and Means.
The House takes the view— and we must respect it 
because it is in a position to insist on it— that 
revenue measures must originate in the House. While 
the Senate may amend it, the House is not going to 
consider any legislation initiated in the Senate on 
a subject like this E private pension plans!, which 
the House has studied, on which it has conducted 
hearings, and on which it insists on its right to act 
further. That also is generally how the President 
of the United~States believes we should proceed on 
this subject.
An example of the Committee jurisdictional rivalry 
was demonstrated in the Senate during the closing months 
of the 92d Congress. Reform bill S. 3598 jointly sponsored 
by Senator Jacob K. Javits and Senator Harrison Williams 
and forty-one other Senators was reported out of the Senate 
Labor Committee. The Finance Committee, claiming juris­
diction in the area of pension reform, diverted the bill 
to the Finance Committee. The bill, however, was so
29Pension legislation traditionally has been felt 
to be tax related (except for fiduciary responsibility 
and disclosure) because of the favorable tax status afforded 
qualified private plans. That is, any change in pension 
plan requirements which will increase the level of con­
tributions by employers will implicitly decrease federal 
income tax revenue.
■^Robert W. Gardner, "Will Private Pensions be 
Retired?" Industry Week (March 13i 1972), p. 33*
-^Quoting Senator Russell Long, U.S., Congress, 
Senate, Debate, September 27» 1972, S.I6056.
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strongly supported that the sponsors were able to specify
that the Finance Committee should be allowed only one week
for consideration. During that one week, "the Finance
Committee gutted most of the bill, eliminating the vesting,
funding, reinsurance and fiduciary responsibility pro- 
32visions," and leaving only the disclosure and fiduciary 
responsibility provisions in tact. The Finance Committee 
essentially removed all parts related to tax issues to pre­
serve the tradition of House origination of tax reform. The 
reduced form of the bill was never brought to the Senate 
floor in the 92d Congress. The bill has been reintro­
duced, however, in the 93d Congress in the original form.
Pension Industry Lobby Groups
The continuing strength of pension reform advocates 
in Congress has led to the formation and extension of 
private industry lobby groups. The most active of these 
groups include the United States Chamber of Commerce, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, the American 
Bankers Association, the Life Insurance Association of 
America and the Association of Private Pension and Welfare 
Plans, Inc.
In addition to the traditional distrust of regu­
lation and the tendency for regulation to expand once it 
is initiated, the pension industry fears that regulation
•^"Politics in the Pension Legislation Arena,"
Weekly News Digest, Employee Benefit Plan Review Research 
Report, September 29» 1972, p. 2
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will inhibit the vitality of the private pension system.
Yet without the freedom to adopt their own funding 
and vesting practices and thus minimize initial costs, 
many companies that now boast outstanding pension 
programs-might never have taken the pension path 
at all. ̂
If you over-legislate, everybody will run to 
profit-sharing plans.-3
The private pension industry has encouraged indivi­
dual plan tailoring to meet the needs of employers in dif­
ferent industries, with varying numbers of employees who 
range in ages and pension needs. Such varied interests 
possibly may not be able to be met by a pension system 
with complicated minimum standards.
All penalty legislation is designed to regulate 
pension plans already in existence and does not affect 
employers who have ho pension plan. Also, there is 
no inducement for employers to establish new plans under 
such stringent regulation. Quoting Hilary L. Seal, a noted 
pension author, "Is the legislature justified in penalizing 
the •good® employer and allowing the *bad® to go scot 
free?"35
Lobby groups have been quick to point out that the 
cost of increased pension legislation could be reduced
33̂"The Push for Pension Reform," Business Week 
(March 17, 1973), p. 48.
34J Vance Anderson, Special Counsel, House General 
Subcommittee on Labor, private interview, Washington,
D.C.t August 10, 1972.
33James A. Curtis, "How Should the Pension Pie 
be Sliced?" Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 9 
(September, 1971), 33*
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benefits for employees or even bankruptcy for employers. 
Since employers have only a limited amount of money avail­
able for labor costs, future wage increases may be lost 
in order for the employer to meet pension contribution 
schedules. In essence, "the government will be telling 
the employees they have to save now, rather than spend 
on the here and now."-^ Thus, a question arises as to 
whether legislators in fact have the right to regulate 
the disposition of private wages beyond the satisfaction 
of basic needs, which is accomplished through the Social 
Security system.
Legislators and lobbyists alike fear the problems 
of unintended distortions often associated with regulation. 
For example, a minimum vesting standard could result in the 
forced termination of employees who suddenly become entitled 
by regulation to vested benefits. Similar cost savings 
could be made by employer manipulation of layoff periods in 
order to keep an employee from becoming vested.
The private pension system is adament in the defense
of the performance of that system. In answer to accusations
of fund abuse, the industry points out that most of the
'Hanky-panky® in pension funds has been in union 
situations. When investigations were conducted prior 
to the passage of the Federal Disclosure Act, not 
one instance of insurer malfeasance was discovered. '
•^Peter M. Flanigan, "A View of Pensions from the 
White House,” Financial Executive (February, 1972), p. 19.
•^Jay Kobler, "Employees, Pension Plans, and In­
surers,” Best*s Review; Life and Health Edition, LXXII,
No. $ (September, 1971), 12.
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Underfunding frequently is cited as an abuse in need 
of corrective legislation, but underfunding essentially 
is a contractual problem. As long as a business is a 
going concern, underfunding is not a problem. If a plan 
does terminate, the contractual termination provisions 
govern the disposition of fund assets. Whatever is 
promised by the plan is fulfilled. The well-known 
termination of the Studebaker plan is an example of this 
implied misconception of the promises of pension plans.
It £ the Studebaker pension plan 3. didn't promise 
anything that wasn't delivered. The union was aware 
at every step exactly what the condition of the 
pension plan was. In what way could a situation like 
that be handled through the federal government? Every­
day some small shop or factory closes down because 
there's no longer a demand for buggy whips or butter 
churns*Q Studebaker was the same thing on a larger 
scale.^
Pension plan administrators point to the improve­
ment of pension funding. According to this view, the 
federal income tax relief available for pension contributions 
and the Opinion 8 minimum funding standards for accounting 
certification are responsible for the alleged improved 
funding of pension benefits. Finally, the pension 
industry contends that the real problem facing legislators 
is inflation. "The loss of pension benefits resulting 
from inflationary governmental policies is currently 
running at more than 120 times the rate of loss due to
-^Jay Kobler, "Pension Reform and the Life Insurance 
Industry," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance 
Edition, LXXII, No. 5 (September, 1971), 12.
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uncompleted funding under plans terminating.
Changing Political Climate for Pension 
Control Legislation
With a long history of legislative concern for 
pension control, the current political climate may be more 
conducive to the enactment of pension reforms. Many 
feel that pension reform is an issue whose time is come.
Rep. John Dent* The time for reflection is drawing 
to a close. Congress is committed to* making the private 
welfare and pension system perform its proper function—  
that of providing a meaningful supplement to social 
security for the millions of workers already covered 
and the {pillions who will be covered as the system 
expands.
Sen. Jacob K. Javitsj Previous hearing records 
have been packed with debate over whether anything 
should be done. I think we have passed that point, 
and what we need now is careful analysis of these 
bills, with a view to making sure they are correct 
in_each detail, properly drafted, and properly 
tailored to fit tljie needs of pension participants 
and their plans. ~
Wall Street Journalt At this point it's a good 
bet that the main pension changes will become part of 
this year's package pf tax revisions, possibly the 
most important part.
Public Pressure
Congressional interest in pension control is
-^U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on 
Aging, Economics of Agingt Toward a Full Share in Abun­
dance . Hearings before the Special Committee on Aging, 
Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 1731*
kO "Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News. 
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972),
ki U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills, 
1972, p. 93.
KpWall Street Journal. March 26, 1973» P« 26.
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increasing due to public pressure. Widespread defense 
and industrial layoffs and,pension fund abuses have brought 
the pension problem to the attention of legislators.
Employees are becoming: increasingly aware of the need for 
pension fund protection. In a speech before Congress, Sen­
ator Hubert Humphrey said that the primary concern of 
workers is pensions: "They E workers 3 are not asking
us to get a pension for them. They are not asking us 
to raise their wages. They are asking us to protect 
their pension funds." J
Problems with the Existing Structure
In the absence of federal regulation, state legis­
latures will be free to pass their own regulations. Con­
flicting state regulations could create difficulties for
Lh.pension administrators of multistate employers. In 
addition, conflicting state trust laws are sometimes 
"permissive with respect to questionable practices.
For example, in some states it is possible to use pension 
funds to effect corporate takeovers.
Under the present federal Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act, misconduct may be difficult to
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Humphrey speaking 
for "The Worker's Right to Retirement Income Security,"
S. 3598, 92d Cong., 2d sess., October 13, 1972, Congres­
sional Record. S17986.
^There is pension control legislation pending 
before several state legislatures; e.g., Wisconsin, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois and Pennsylvania.
^5"The Push for Pension Reform," p. 49.
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expose and prosecute since the annual reports filed under
this regulation are so general. "It took many months,
for example, to develop evidence in the classic United
46Mine Workers case."
Government
In the Congress, the strong pressure on legislators 
for pension control may encourage sufficient compromise 
to permit enactment of pension reform letislation. The 
strong sponsorship of the Williams-Javits joint bill,
S. 4, is indicative of increased support for such legis­
lation* there are at least fifty-three sponsors of the 
bill, representing a majority of the Senate. The adverse 
reaction by other Senators to the Finance Committee’s 
stripping of the Labor Committee's pension bill in the 
92d Congress may make the Committee on Finance reluctant 
to repeat its former action and perhaps even have a 
stimulating effect in the Congress. In fact, the Finance 
Committee has expressed an interest in more thoroughly 
examining pension issues by creating a Subcommittee on 
Pensions for the 93d Congress and scheduling hearings on 
pension reform by that Committee in May, 1973*
Increased support for pension reform is also evi­
dent by the speeches on the floor of the Senate and 
House by such influential legislators as Senators Ribicoff, 
Hartke, Humphrey, Mansfield (Senate Majority Leader),
^6Ibid.
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Griffin (Senate Minority Leader), Bayh and Pell.^ The 
fact that pension reform legislation has been introduced 
by the Nixon Administration indicates the support of the 
Executive branch for legislation in this area.
Viewpoints on Pension Reform Indicating Growing Support 
for Pension Legislation
The stated positions on pension control legislation 
by various interested groups are presented in Table 7.
Most of the explicit viewpoints by labor and industry are 
presented by union or association representatives at 
Senate hearings. Of particular interest in assessing 
the climate for pension control legislation is any change 
in position as expressed in more recent hearings.
Labor.--Labor seems to be split in its views on 
pension reform. Although several major unions as the 
AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers and the United Steel­
workers have expressed support for pension reform, "many 
other unions such as the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, were not
48active in the drive for pension plan reform." There 
are various reasons for the absence of this support. For
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Debate, September 27» 1972, 
S16053? U.S., Congress, Senate, Sen. Ribicoff speaking for 
pension reform, Amendments to S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 
Congressional Record, CXIX, S2714; U.S., Congress, Senate, 
Sen. Humphrey— speech, October 13t 1972, S17985*
48 "Private Pension Plansi Congress Considers 
Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXX, No. 16 
(April 15. 1972), 850.
123
TABLE 7
STATED VIEWPOINTS ON PENSION CONTROL LEGISLATION










(1) Nixon's Bill not 
strong enoughi
a) No termination 
insurance
b) Benefit Protection
c) Tax advantages ac­
crue to least needy
(2) Endorse;
a) Reinsurance
b) Federal fiduciary 




(3) Think multiemployer 
plans should be exempt




(2) Supports minimum stan­
dards to be enforced 
through Dept of Labor; 
not tax incentives
(3) Think multiemployer 
plans should not be 
exempt
(1) Nixon's Bill not 
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a) No termination 
Insurance
b) Benefit protection
c) Tax advantages ac­
crue to the least 
needy
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Javits Bill (S. 4)
U.S. Chamber (1) Support; 
of Commerce; a) Minimum fiduciary
Representing standards
more than b) Minimum disclosure
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will be a financial 
burden and may not be 
of much help)
c) Rule of 50





(1) Endorse minimum stan- (l) Changed its for- 
dards on vesting, fund- fer stand against
ing, fiduciaries and 
disclosure
(2) Oppose other forms of 
pension reform
vesting and now 
support minimum 
early vesting
(1) Recent changes 
in position repre­
sent more liberal 
views*
a) 3 yr. transi­
tion (5 yrs. 
formerly)
b) Funding (formerly 
opposed)






a) Rule of 50 (all 
credited service)
b) Disclosure and 
Fiduciary Responsi­
bility
c) Coverage of all 
plans, no exceptions





ance of unfunded 
vested liabilities? 
loss assessment? not 
premium insurance
f) Tax provisions of the 
Nixon Bill
Oppose portability
Support* (1) Recent changes
a) Coverage of all in position repre­
plans, no exceptions sent more liberal
b) Rule of 50 a) Funding (pre-
c) Funding similar to viously opposed?
that of S. 4 e.g., in 1972)
d) Treasury administra- b) Vesting (op­
tion posed in 1968,
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American (1) 



























Support Nixon Bill (1) Previously
Oppose reinsurance and supported only dis-
portability closure and fiduci­
ary responsibility
Support both Nixon Bill (1) Position gener- 
and Williams-Javits ally liberalized 
Bill (S. 4)
Oppose portability
Support Nixon Bill 









c) Disclosure and fidu­
ciary standards
Opposei
a) Requirements that 
plans be certified by 












(1) Interest in 
pension reform 
only recent
Sourcei Hearings before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and House 
Committee on Education and Labor, with parti­
cular attention paid to hearings held in 
the 93d Congress.
126
example, since the Teamsters are developing their own 
portability system, major adjustments in their plan 
would be required should legislation be passed. The 
clothing and construction industries are subject to such 
high rates of turnover that minimum vesting standards 
would be extremely costly and perhaps result in benefit 
reductions for long-term employees. The United Mineworkers 
have also "appeared unenthusiastic about comprehensive 
reform legislation. The UMW had established no public 
position on the issue.
Many smaller unions also have placed a low priority 
on pension reform. The union negotiators would rather 
have the freedom to bargain for more immediate benefits 
such as wage increases or even additional options for 
existing pension plans such as death or spouse benefits 
in lieu of reform measures. These union officials realize 
that there is only so much money available for employee 
benefits and prefer to emphasize flexibility at the 
bargaining table for benefit negotiation.^0
Union support for pension control also is subject 
to the influence of other economic conditions in addition 
to that of wages. If industry profits are up, unions would 
support pension legislation since flexibility at the bar­
gaining table may not be a problem in such circumstances.
^9Ibid.
^°Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub­
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9t 1972.
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Similarly, in the face of federal wage controls from which 
minimum legislated pension benefits could be exempt, 
union officials are likely to support pension legislation. 
Since pension benefits would not be categorized as part 
of the aggregate wage increase, union members could receive 
pension benefits plus the full maximum wage increase 
allowed.
Even within the stated positions of union leaders, 
there are further conflicting opinions on the subject of 
pension reform. For example, the AFL-CIO contends that 
multiemployer plans, with their implicit portability 
feature, should be exempt from vesting and funding require­
ments. Conversely, the United Steelworkers think that 
such an exemption is not justified. In short, then, 
labor is far from united on pension control issues.
Pension Industry. Representing Employers.— Most of 
the representatives of private industry support minimum 
vesting (predominantly the Rule of 50 for only prospective 
benefits), fiduciary responsibility, disclosure and increased 
tax relief for employee contributions and self-employed 
persons. Preferably, such standards would be added to the 
requirements for plan qualification in the Internal 
Revenue Code. The primary administering agency thus 
would be the Department of the Treasury. Until recently, 
most of these groups have opposed funding and insurance of 
unfunded liabilities. On the basis, however, of recent 
testimony on the Williams-Javits bill (S. *0 by Charles
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D. Root of the consulting firm of Towers, Perrin, Forster 
and Crosby, Inc., it now appears that private industry 
has altered its position to include support of a minimum 
level of funding and insurance of unfunded liabilities 
(although at a more conservative level than that of S.
This modification represents the first of the conservative 
private interest groups to express such wide support for 
pension control and is further indication of the changing 
political climate for pension reform. Predictably, however, 
insurance companies have not been very vocal in voicing 
an opinion on pension control.
Many company officials readily admit (though 
rarely for attribution) that correction of abuse and 
misuse in the pension system is necessary, . . .
Insurers would like to see insured, funded and vested 
benefits. But those reforms are going to cost employers 
money and . . . insurers can ill afford to urge ^
measures that are going to offend corporate employers.
Conclusions
Although the concept of private pensions as a 
public concern is well established, and the need for 
regulation has been demonstrated by reports of countless 
abuses and inadequate coverage, a number of problems 
still face the advocates of pension reform. Two decades
^ U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees 
Act. 1973. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. k  
and S. 75» 93d Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 16, 1973»f 
PP» 385-^08.
^2Kobler, "Pension Reform," p. 11.
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of federal legislative concern have produced only fiduciary 
responsibility and disclosure standards, and these reforms 
are so general that even fund abuse is difficult to 
detect. Nevertheless! public pressure and the universal 
interest in reform expressed by legislators, the President, 
some factions of Labor and even private industry, may 
combine to make pension reform a reality. There are, however, 
a number of hindrances to quick passagei (1) the prece­
dence of landmark national health insurance legislation,
(2) delays by Congressional tax committees, (3) disputes 
over the appropriate administering agency, (4-) lack of 
consensus of opinion on appropriate regulation provisions 
and (5) the alleviate effects of recent increases in 
Social Security retirement income benefits.
Should the culmination of twenty years of concern 
be the passage of pension legislation, the resulting 
regulation probably will not include a portability pro­
vision. As is evident from the data in Table 7, the one 
issue on which Labor and industry is united is opposition 
to portability. At the present time, even highly mobile 
labor groups prefer the use of reciprocal agreements to 
promote benefit preservation. Portability is not a serious 
current reform issue because legislators and pension 
experts cannot visualize the mechanics of such a system 
or even determine whether portability is workable. Toward 
this end, the next section presents an examination of 
portability prototypes, suggestions for implementation of
transfer of pension credits and the mechanics of a trans­
fer system.
PART II
GROWTH OF THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT
CHAPTER V
PROTOTYPES OF THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT
The concept of portability has gained further 
acceptance from the successful implementation of pension 
credit transfers both abroad and in the United States and 
Canada. Proponents of the portability concept in the 
United States point to these successful implementations 
of portability as proof of the technical feasibility of 
a national transfer system. The purpose of this chapter 
is to examine the benefit transfer features of some of 
the existing pension systems to determine any applicability 
for a national portability program in the United States.
It should be noted, however, that while many of these 
systems have been categorized as portability schemes, 
in reality they are actually multiemployer or master 
plans. The degree of portability achieved in each system 
will be identified, with particular emphasis on appli­





Norway*— Vesting and portability of benefits is 
required in all private pension plans in Norway. The 
entire retirement income system recently was revised to make 
major regulatory and structural changes which could provide 
some insight into the effect of similar legislation on 
the pension industry in this country. In 1966, the 
National Insurance Act was passed which required employers 
to provide insurance and pension benefits for employees.
The amount of the benefit is related to a "Basic Amount" 
that is determined by the legislature to reflect the current 
cost of living. The objective of the act was to enable 
employees to maintain this standard of living beyond a 
retirement age of seventy. The National Insurance Insti­
tution administers the plan and contributions are made by 
the employee and employer on the basis of salary. Im­
plementation of the national legislation resulted in a 
40 percent decrease in the private pension business of 
Norwegian insurance companies. The latter administer 
approximately 95 percent of all private plans.
Supplementary private pension benefits are provided 
by some employers. Such plans generally have the ambitious 
1Although additional material was used for the analy­
sis of Great Britain, much of the information for this sec­
tion came from: U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Manage­
ment Services Administration, European Regulation of Pension 
Plans, Study prepared by Frank M. Kleiler (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, 1971)» PP« 1-18, 23-56,
65-71, 75-90.
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goal of providing a combined retirement income equal to 
two-thirds of an employee’s final salary. The retirement 
ages in the private plans often are earlier than age 
seventy. Tax relief is available for employers for 
minimum amounts? e.g., eleven times the Basic Amount.
Qualification for tax relief is based on stringent vesting, 
funding, disclosure and portability requirements. When 
an employee changes jobs, the insurance company or companies 
involved arrange a fund transfer. Hence, portability— a 
part of the Norwegian private pension system both before and 
after the National Insurance Act— is administered by the 
insurance industry and ”. . .  has not been difficult 
to handle."2
Finland.— Although portability is not part of 
the Finnish pension system, the goal of benefit preser­
vation is met through various regulations. In 19^2, 
legislation was passed to provide compulsory private 
pensions for all workers to supplement the national insurance 
flat rate benefit. The supplementary private pensions 
may be provided through an insurance company, a fund or a 
foundation. All vested pensions must be registered with 
the Central Pension Security Institute. When an employee 
retires, all accrued benefits are paid by the pension 
institution in which the employee was last covered. A 
general accounting of pension costs for retirees under
2Ibid., p. 48.
the various plans is made annually by the Central Institute 
at which time full cash settlement can be made between 
the participating institutions.
Employers can provide additional retirement 
benefits over and above the mandatory supplementary pay­
ments. Voluntary vested benefits are provided in the 
same manner as the compulsory vested benefits previously 
described for a terminating employee. Although fund 
transfer is not a part of Finland’s system, nevertheless, 
the goal of full benefit preservation is met.
Denmark.— The retirement income of Danes is pro­
vided through a combination of a social security plan, 
a contributory supplementary quasi-private institution 
which provides a flat rate benefit to all persons aged 
sixty-seven and approximately 5»000 private plans.
With the exception of 320 trust plans, most of the private 
plans are administered by specialized pension insurance 
companies. Individual, rather than group, annuity policies 
are purchased for employees and are fully portable upon 
termination. If the succeeding employer continues the 
same level of premium payment, the policy remains unaltered 
If the new employer's plan encompasses different premiums, 
the transferred policy is amended. Trust type private 
plans are carefully supervised and are subject to 
strict vesting, funding, investment, disclosure and 
portability standards. If an employee covered under a 
trusteed plan terminates, employer contributions are
locked in. Alternatives for fulfilling portability 
requirements are a transfer of funds to a succeeding 
employer's plan or purchase of an insured annuity 
contract.
Continental Europe
The Netherlands.— In addition to the governmental 
social security program, retirement income in the Netherlands 
is available through private industry individual or 
multiemployer plans. Whenever appropriate, employers are 
encouraged— or required, if petitioned by a union or 
employer association— to join industrial pension plans. 
Portability of benefits is available within a participating 
employer group as is true for any multiemployer plan. In­
dividually established pension plans are regulated stren­
uously with respect to vesting, funding and disclosure 
provisions. Although vesting generally is required after 
five years of service, no portability feature is imposed 
on individual plans. Employees terminating within the 
five year period prior to vesting are entitled to a refund 
of their contributions.
Switzerland.— No national portability system exists 
in Switzerland. There are, however, some portability 
agreements between employers and various trade associations. 
In these cases, city agreements are made as part of the 
bargaining process. "Most of such agreements relate to 
private plans based on contracts with life insurance
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companies or to employees changing jobs within the public 
sector.
France.— Frenchmen are provided with a limited form 
of portability through that country's vast compulsory 
multiemployer pension system. By law in France, whenever 
a major employer association enters into a collective 
agreement with a union, "the provisions of such agree­
ment may be extended by decree to all the employers and 
employees in a given industry or combination.of industries 
within the occupational and territorial scope of the col-
if,lective agreement." The result of this regulation has 
been the development of several large and many medium-sized 
multiemployer plans. The benefit levels of the plans 
vary. Generally, however, benefits are determined through 
a pension point system that is based on contributions.
The ultimate amount of an employee's pension depends on 
the value of the point and the number of points earned 
by the worker. The value of the pension point fluctuates 
every year on a cost of living basis. Retirement income 
thus may change from year to year. France has been sub­
ject to such intensive inflation over a long period of 
time that it is only through an escalating quasi-public 
pension plan that employees can be assured of maintaining 
a reasonable standard of living in retirement.
■^Ibid., p. 1 6.
^Ibid., p. 75.
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The compulsory multiemployer plans have fully 
vested benefits, with portability available within the 
scope of the industry plan. Funding is accomplished under 
a "distribution concept" which essentially is a pay-as-you-go 
or current disbursement approach. This type funding is 
possible because of the constantly increasing base of 
contributions arising from the compulsory nature of plan 
participation. Although the multiemployer plans in France 
and the United States are similar in some ways, the French 
features of compulsory participation, pay-as-you-go funding 
and benefit escalation represent such overwhelming dif­
ferences from the U.S. multiemployer pension approach that 
the two systems essentially are incomparable.
United Kingdom
In Great Britain, retirement is provided by a 
national insurance system (i.e., a state social security 
program) in the form of a flat benefit and a wage-related 
benefit (the latter added in 1959)• As an alternative 
to contributions to the national system, employers are 
allowed to "contract out" (i.e., fund) the wage-related 
portion to a private pension plan as long as the resulting 
benefits are at least the equivalent of that which employees 
participating in the national insurance system would re­
ceive. The contracted-out private pension plans are 
tightly supervised with regard to funding, investment 
practices and benefit maintenance. Benefits under 
contracted-out plans must be vested and portable. (The
139
British term for portability is "preservation of pension 
rights.") When an employee terminates, these wage-related 
vested benefit credits must either be transferred to a 
succeeding employer's contracted-out plan or preserved by 
ah appropriate payment to the National Insurance Fund.
In contrast to the close supervision of contracted- 
out pension plans, other private occupational pension 
plans that provide supplementary retirement benefits have 
been supervised only to that extent necessary to determine 
that such plans are not simply tax evasion schemes. Since 
1966, however, an investigation of these occupational 
pension schemes has indicated that additional regulation 
may be necessary. A government study's White Paper con­
cluded that mandatory vesting and portability provision 
should be the goal of future regulation of occupational 
pension plans.
In general, schemes will have to ensure that 
deferred pensioners are treated no less favorably in 
relation to their period of pensionable service than 
employees who stay on until pension age.-*
In summary, then, Great Britain has achieved 
portability within the private pension system for the 
wage-related portion of the national pension plan. Parlia­
ment also seems to be moving toward an extension of porta-
^Great Britain, Office of the Secretary of State 
of the Department of Health and Social Security, White 
Paper. 1971 (Londont Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
September, 1971)? reprinted in Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals 
for the Improvement of the Private Pension Plan System," 
Unpublished study prepared for Senate Labor Subcommittee 
Hearings on S. 3598 (Toronto, Canada, 1972), p. 143.
bility to supplementary private occupational pension 
schemes. Portability thus will have been implemented 
gradually over a period of time, possibly minimizing any 
adverse effects on employers and the pension industry.
Canadian System
Comparison to the U.S. System
The legislative changes in the Canadian pension 
system during the 1960*s have been viewed with interest 
by U.S. pension experts since many of the changes in 
the Canadian plan have been suggested for the U.S. 
pension industry. Moreover, the Canadian labor force, 
salary structure and pension system are considered to have 
greater similarity to the U.S. system than any other 
national system.
There are, however, several major differences 
between the two retirement systems which must be considered. 
First, employees are allowed to deduct their contributions 
(less employer contributions and subject to an upper 
limit) from taxable income for federal tax calculation 
purposes. Second, the private pension system is supple­
mentary to both a flat amount Old Age Security Benefit and 
a wage-related social insurance benefit. The social 
insurance benefit is administered under the Canada Pension 
Plan (1965) and its Quebec counterpart, the Quebec 
Pension Plan (1965)* The program is similar to the U.S. 
Social Security system except that under the Canadian
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plan, (1) contributions are not required on the first 
$600 of income, (2) the maximum wage base ($5*300) is 
lower than the U.S. wage base, (3) benefits are related 
to a cost of living index and (4) age is the only eligi-
fibility qualification for benefit payment.
A third major difference between the U.S. and 
Canadian pension systems is attributable to the latter's 
traditional Provincial government structure. The Provin­
cial governments do not permit the enactment of federal 
regulation which would supersede Provincial supervision, a 
conflict evident in the debate preceding the passage of 
the Canada Pension Plan. All Provinces except Quebec 
were willing to participate in the federal social insurance 
system. Quebec, however, set up its own similar social 
insurance plan. The problem of conflict of interest 
between Provinces has existed throughout the development of 
Canadian pension regulation. Employers concerned about 
conflicting Provincial regulation have worked with legis­
lators to ensure that pension regulation in the different 
Provinces is similar.
The Ontario Act
Private pension legislation was originally passed 
in Ontario in 1963 under the title of "The Pension Benefits 
Act 1962-63," with most of the provisions to be enacted
^U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services 
Administration, Canadian Regulation of Pension Plans, Study 
prepared by Frank M. Kleiler (Washington, D.C.s U. S . De­
partment of Labor, 1970), pp. 28-29*
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by January 1, 196 5. This legislation was quite stringent 
and required a minimum scale of vested benefits. The 
controversial "standard plans" provision of the act was 
repealed, however, when Ontario legislators agreed for 
the Province to participate in the Canada Pension Plan 
(i.e., the federal social insurance program). The amend­
ment was enacted July 30, 19&5» and was known as the Pension 
Benefits Act, 1965* or simply the Ontario Act. The 
legislation was designed to permit integration with the 
newly created Canadian social security program. Similar 
legislation subsequently has been enacted by the Provinces 
of Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan. In 1967 the federal 
government passed the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 
which calls for regulation similar to the Ontario Act 
of pension plans of banks, railways, shipping companies, 
radio stations and other communications companies as well 
as for pension plans in the Yukon and Northwest Territories 
and any other pension plans within federal jurisdiction.
In short, most Canadian private pension plans are regulated 
by different laws, all of which are patterned after the 
Ontario Act.
The principal provisions of the Ontario Act 
include (1) establishment of a Pension Commission to ad­
minister the standards, (2) vesting of prospective benefits 
for employees age forty-five and over with ten years of 
service, (3) eligibility for participation of thirty years
7Ibid., p. 3.
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of age or six months service, (4) twenty-five year amor­
tization of unfunded liabilities in existence upon Act 
passage and fifteen year amortization of future unfunded 
liabilities, (5) fiduciary responsibility and disclosure 
standards and (6) the establishment of a Central Pension 
Agency.8
The authorization for the establishment of a 
central clearinghouse, sometimes referred to as "Ontario's 
portable pension law," has received much attention by legis­
lators considering portability in the United States. Al­
though the capability exists to establish a central clearing­
house under all governing Canadian laws, no such mechanism 
has been established. The need for portability was lessened 
when the original stringent minimum statutory requirements 
for benefits and vesting were repealed so that Provincial 
regulation could be integrated with the federal social 
security legislation. The Canada Pension Plan is similar 
to the U.S. Social Security system in that the former 
allows labor mobility without loss of minimum benefits.
Since supplementary private pension benefits do not vest 
until an employee reaches age forty-five with ten years 
of service, there is no need for a central clearinghouse and 
none has been established.
It is unlikely that many workers upon retire­
ment will acquire rights to annuities from more than 
two or three employers. . . . Employers who terminate
8Ibid., pp. 37-97.
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with less than ten years of service usually receive 
cash refunds of their own contributions. Also it is 
permissible under the laws to provide for the cash 
payment of the commuted value of a pension or deferred
annuity if the amount thereof payable to the employee
at normal retirement age is less than $10 p month 
payable during his lifetime. . . . The 'portability* 
features of the Canadian laws are provided in the stan­
dards set for vesting and locking in of contributions 
and benefits and not in the authorization for a central 
agency. There would be a greater need for such a 
central agency if the vesting requirements were
reduced below the '45 and 10* formula.
Canadians also are allowed to transfer any vested 
benefits from one group plan to another registered plan or 
to an individual registered retirement savings plan with­
out incurring a tax liability.3-0 Tax free transfers, 
late vesting requirements and deductibility of employee 
contributions are the essential features of the Canadian 
pension system which render a federal or even Provincial 
portability system unnecessary.
Experience Under the Ontario Act and Similar Legislation 
The U.S. legislators interested in pension reform 
have watched the Canadian experience with interest. 
Canadian legislation was passed on the basis of need for 
extended coverage for the labor force and benefit preser­
vation; in the U.S., attention has been focused on both 
pension fund abuses and the need for additional coverage.
9Ibid., p. 94.
10Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension Bene­
fits," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, 
LXXII, No. 11 (March, 1972), 70-71.
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Regulation of pension plans in Canada generally is felt 
to have been successful and can serve as a prototype for 
U.S. legislation since the Canadian pension industry is 
similar to that in the United States.
In Canada, where 80 percent of the pension plans 
are required by law to have mandatory vesting, there 
have been almost no terminations and no evidence of 
a slowdown in the establishment of new plans.
The Canadian experience thus far proves that 
there is nothing impractical about regulating pension 
plans by legislation prescribing minimum standards of 
vesting, funding and management of intestments.
With regard to portability, however, the Canadian 
system would imply that if early vesting is required, and 
tax relief to individuals for contributions or fund trans­
fer is not allowed, a national clearinghouse would be 
helpful to effect fund transfers.
United States Systems
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (and College 
Retirement Equities Fund)— TIAA-CREF
TIAA was founded in 1918 to provide a retirement 
income system for the faculty members of colleges and 
universities that would not restrict faculty mobility. In 
contrast to many older private pension plans, TIAA parti­
cipants were active in the formation of their plan's
11Rep. Seymour Halpern, "Radical Departure Needed 
in Pension Legislation," Pension and Welfare News. VIII, 
No. 9 (September, 1972), 6 8.
12U.S. Department of Labor, Canadian Regulation,
P. 97.
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provisions. CREF, the variable annuity portion of the 
system, was added in 1952. The entire system covers 
at least ". . . 8 9  percent of the faculty of private 
colleges and 34 percent of the faculty of public colleges.
Faculty, clerical, administrative and service employees 
may participate as plan members and may allocate 20 to 
75 percent of their contributions to CREF. "Given the 
opportunity to choose, about 94 percent of the employees 
currently covered by TIAA have also decided to participate 
in CREF."1*'
Although the participating institutions may estab­
lish the contribution levels and eligibility requirements 
of a given plan, all benefits are fully vested and funded.
Members may transfer to other institutions within the 
system without the loss of pension credits or participation 
status. Technically, since no actual transfer of funds 
is made, true portability is not achieved; TIAA-CREF is 
more like a large multiemployer plan than a portability 
system. Benefits are purchased by the employer and/or 
the employee on a money purchase basis. The contributions 
often are based on a fixed percentage of salary; i.e., 
whatever benefit can be purchased by the contribution is
■^U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on 
Aging, Economics of Aging» Toward a Full Share in Abundance, 
Hearings, before the Special Committee on Aging, Senate,
91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 15&1.
*^Ibid., p. 1562.
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accrued to the employee's individual contract account.
When the employee retires* one aggregate benefit is paid 
to him on the basis of credits accrued from contributions 
made by the employee and all his employers.
The success of the TIAA-CREF system as a depository 
and clearinghouse for members' benefits has caused legis­
lators to wonder whether such a system on a larger scale 
is possible. For example, interested employers who join the 
system could make contributions to either the central fund 
or the employer's own pension fund. In the latter case, 
fund assets accrued on behalf of a terminated employee 
would be transferred to the central fund. There are, 
however, several problems with such an application. First, 
many small employers would not be able to afford to join.*-* 
Second, a tax law change may be necessary so that employees 
would not incur a tax liability from the constructive 
use of any transferred funds. Finally, the defined
benefit plan is more popular than the money purchase approach 
16in the U.S. and plan administrators would have to effect 
major plan changes to adjust to a defined contribution 
type formula.
*-*Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub­
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
16Joseph J. Melone and Everett T. Allen, Jr.,
Pension Planning (Revised ed. j Homewood, 111.i Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 32-33*
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Public Systems
Public School Retirement Systems.--Some state 
retirement systems allow teachers to buy into their system 
for out-of-state years of service. Usually, the amount of 
out-of-state credit allowed is very limited and the fund 
level to be transferred in is also defined. Should the 
fund assets accumulated in another retirement system prove 
inadequate, the teacher involved must personally supple­
ment the fund assets. A bill was introduced in the U.S.
House of Representatives in the 92d Congress to provide 
federal assistance for teachers attempting to transfer 
pension assets between state retirement systems.^ In 
general, however, wider application of this system is not 
practical since the transfer feature of public school 
retirement systems is so limited with regard to the level 
accepted by the succeeding system.
Law Enforcement Officers* Retirement Systems.— The 
public retirement systems of state law enforcement officers 
provide portability for members within the state in 
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, most of California, most 
of Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah and
17rU.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Encourage State 
and Local Retirement Systems to Adopt Provisions Facilitating 
the Interstate Mobility of Teachers. H.R. 10216. 92d 
Cong., 2d sess., 1971* (Similar bills have been introduced 
in the 93d Congress, including H.R. 996, H.R. 7346, H.R. 4924.)
18Washington. Most of the retirement systems listed above, 
however, do not provide for transfer from a state to a 
municipality system. Mobility thus is limited to the 
state law enforcement system, although some reciprocal 
agreements are being arranged between states. The Massa­
chusetts system provides a particularly interesting example 
of a nonfunded portability system:
This state appears to have a nonfunded retire­
ment system although employees contribute toward the 
cost of their pensions. Upon transfer, employee con­
tributions go with the employee. Employer costs are 
determined when the employee retires and the cost is 
prorated to each employer according to service with 
that employer. . . . The benefit is determined in 
accordance with the system from which the employee 
retires.
Federal Systems.— Both the Railroad Retirement 
System and Civil Service Retirement Systems are operated 
by agencies of the federal government. These federally 
administered programs permit member mobility within the 
system, but true portability'is not achieved because no 
fund transfer is made. The retirement programs essentially 
are master plans, with contributions accumulated in one 
fund from which accrued benefits are disbursed.
Private Systems
Union Plans.— Portability has been developed in
1 RU.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assis­
tance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement 
and Criminal Justice, Portable Police Pensions— Improving 
Interagency Transfers, Prepared by Geoffrey N. Calvert of 
Alexander and Alexander, New York, New York, 10007 (Washing 




a number of union and craft plans essentially operating 
as multiemployer type plans. Each of the following plans 
covers at least 100,000 or more workerst
1. The Central States, Southeast and Southwest 
Areas Pension Fund (Teamsters)
2. Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund
3. The Amalgamated Insurance Fund--Pension Fund 
(Clothing Workers)
4. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
Pension Benefit Trust Fund
5. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Cloak 
and Suit Pension Fund
6 . The United Mine Workers of Americas Welfare and 
Retirement Fund (Covering the bituminous coal 
industry) 2
7. Structural Iron Workers Pension Fund.
Other smaller plans include carpenters, bricklayers
plumbers, longshormen, brewery workers, bakery workers,
retail clerks, other retail, wholesale and department
21store workers and meat cutters. The plans vary widely in 
transfer provisions? some plans provide for contributions 
to be made to a central union fund while others act as 
a clearinghouse for funds of employees changing jobs.
Again, if contributions are made to a central fund and no 
transfer takes plane when an employee changes jobs within 
the system, true portability is not achieved.
Trade Associations.— -Trade associations and pro­
fessional groups are beginning to become active in en-
20U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Labor Mobility and Private Pension Plans?
A study of Vesting. Early Retirement.and Portability 
Provisions, sponsored by Office of Manpower, Automation 
and Training, BLS Bulletin No. 1407 (Washington, D.C.j 
Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 37-38.
21Ibid.
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couraging employers to participate in their multiemployer 
plans# One of the first of these groups to develop a 
plan for its members is the American Chemical Society, 
which organized "Pensions for Professionals" in 1970, a 
non-profit corporation. The organizers of this corporation 
have sought the cooperation of several professional societies, 
and is beginning operation with eight societies covering 
500,000 professionals.
Greatest emphasis in this effort will be placed 
on achievement of considerably improved 'portability.'
. . . PFP is nearing the end of the development 
stage in setting its objectives, preparing a unique 
prototype pension plan, obtaining IRS approval of 
this plan, concluding a contract with a carrier to 
provide investment and record-keeping services and 
marketing assistance, providing for participating of 
professional societies in the2gorporation and per­
fection the PFP organization.
The corporation's prototype benefit plan is very 
flexible and sefves only to guide the individual member 
and his employer in developing the exact benefit. Thus, 
the benefit level, death benefits, options and eligibility 
requirements are determined by individual negotiations 
between the employer and the employee, with technical 
assistance provided by the corporation managers. Contri­
butions by a member's various employers are made to the 
insurance carrier of the societies* corporation. When 
an employee reaches retirement, an annuity is purchased 
to provide the employee's retirement income on the basis
Arthur H. Hale,"Pensions for Professionals, Inc.," 
Unpublished description of a portable pension plan in the 
process of being established, Washington, D.C., August 
15, 1972, pp. 3-*f. (Mimeographed)
152
of his asset accumulation.
The success of this trade association plan is yet 
to be determined since it only recently has been developed. 
Professionals may find their employers unwilling to parti­
cipate in a plan, especially if the employers already have 
established their own plans. Although the term "portability" 
has been applied to Pensions for Professionals, since no 
asset transfer actually takes place the plan actually is 
a master pension plan, not a prototype of portability.
Conclusions
Although portability has been successfully imple­
mented in a number of European private pension systems, 
application of their transfer mechanism to the U.S. is not 
possible for several reasons. First, most of the portable 
pensions of the European plans examined are compulsory 
minimum benefits. Transfer thus is accomplished easily 
since the benefit is readily determinable. Second, European 
private plans are very highly regulated with regard to 
funding, vesting and investment practices to render sound 
asset protection. Moreover, vesting has been practiced 
widely in European plans since as early as 1900. Third, 
most of the private pension plans of the countries examined 
are administered by insurance companies, often on an 
individual employee contract basis, so that fund transfer 
is a matter to be worked out between insurance companies. 
Fourth, particular regulations in individual countries 
make comparison with the U.S. situation difficult. For
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example, compulsory industry multiemployer participation 
in France and the severe inflation problem in that country 
make the French private pension system unique. Similarly, 
the structural changes in Norway's pension system brought 
about by the introduction of compulsory minimum benefits 
would not be likely to occur in the United States because 
Social Security is well established as a floor of pro­
tection in the U.S.
Portability of the wage-related minimum benefit 
in British contracted-out private pension plans has been 
quite successful because the benefit is easily determinable 
and universally applied, and because government supervision 
is tight. Based on this success, Parliament may extend 
required portability to all private occupational pensions.
The gradual implementation of portability, starting with 
a defined minimum benefit and later extending to all 
benefits, thus may be a useful prototype of portability 
implementation in the United States.
Experience with regard to portability under 
Canadian regulation is helpful in determining the need for 
a national clearinghouse in the United States. Since 
vesting in Canada is not required until an employee reaches 
age forty-five with ten years of service, and since em­
ployees are allowed an income tax deduction for their own 
contributions and can transfer assets directly from one 
fund to another without incurring a tax liability, a 
portability clearinghouse has not been needed. Based on
the Canadian experience, therefore, if similar tax changes 
are made and a vesting rule similar to the Rule of 50 for 
prospective benefits is implemented, a national clearing­
house will not be necessary for the United States.
Finally, although there are a number of limited 
portability schemes in the United States, they are indi­
vidually tailored to meet the needs* of particular employee 
groups and provide little applicability to a national 
system.
CHAPTER VI
MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
PORTABILITY CONCEPT
Introduction
A number of different mechanisms for implementing 
the portability concept have been suggested by persons 
both within and outside the private pension field. In 
some cases, the mechanism is only part of a comprehensive 
pension reform program and in other cases, the mechanism 
could be operative by itself or integrated with any variety 
of other pension reforms. The various systems examined 
in this chapter will be limited to portability schemes: 
an actual transfer of funds from one group plan to either 
a succeeding plan, an insurance carrier or any other quali­
fied individual plan.
Portability systems may be either on a national 
basis or of a more limited scope. For example, limitations 
on portability may be in the benefit level; i.e., only a 
minimum benefit is transferrable. Another type of porta­
bility limitation is the scope of transfer. That is, 
funds may be transferred only within an industry, a desig­
nated employer group or geographic area.
Some portability mechanisms would necessitate a
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change in the Internal Revenue Code while others would 
not. Under current federal tax laws, if an employee 
gains constructive receipt of any lump-sum distribution 
of pension fund assets, the total amount is fully taxable 
as income. Certain portability systems thus would be 
ineffective unless this law were modified.
National Portability Systems
The Clearinghouse Concept
A portability mechanism which would not require 
a federal income tax change is the clearinghouse concept. 
Although the clearinghouse could be operated privately, 
most of the discussions related to the use of a clearing­
house have embodied the federal government as the adminis­
tering agency. Specific responsibility for such a clearing 
house could be within the Labor Department, the Department 
of the Treasury or an independent pension agency.
The most comprehensively detailed proposal for a 
national clearinghouse is one developed by Merton C. Bern­
stein. Under the Bernstein approach, the actuarial 
present value of an employee's accrued pension may be 
determined at any point in time. An employee wishing to 
change jobs would request his current employer to transfer 
this present value to the clearinghouse. These funds 
would remain on deposit at the clearinghouse until the 
employee requests transfer to a succeeding fund. The 
amount of the present value, plus interest, determines
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the level of benefits payable to the employee under the 
benefit formula of the succeeding plan. If the funds 
are not transferred out of the clearinghouse, then the 
clearinghouse could serve as a national group plan with 
the amount accrued in an individual's account administered 
on a money purchase basis to provide retirement benefits 
for participating employees. Thus, when an employee 
reaches retirement age, an immediate annuity could be 
purchased for the employee from an insurance company, 
or the retirement benefit could be dispensed directly 
from the clearinghouse fund. This national group plan 
also could be used as a master plan for small employers 
who cannot afford high installation costs or systematically 
substantial contributions to an individual group plan. 
Participating employers could contribute to the national 
group plan on a money purchase basis as their profits 
permit.
A major problem of the national clearinghouse 
concept is the determination of transfer values. In 
calculating the present value of a pension credit being 
transferred, the employer may use liberal actuarial assum­
ptions that result in a rather low asset value of the bene­
fit being liquidated from his fund. Conversely, the em­
ployer who receives transferred pension assets may calcu­
late the benefits due the new employee under the subsequent 
plan on more conservative actuarial assumptions. The 
benefit thus calculated by the succeeding employer would
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be lower than the benefit available had the employee re­
mained with his first employer. Mr. Bernstein does not 
see this as a problem if uniform actuarial assumptions 
are legislated for transfer purposes.
There is a certain element of arbitrariness in 
the whole system of actuarial analysis and compu­
tation (necessarily so), and another slightly 1 
arbitrary set of assumptions should be bearable.
A number of other suggestions regarding the mech­
anics and possible simplification of a national clearing­
house have been made by Mr. Bernstein. First, the employer 
could make installment payments to the clearinghouse over 
a specified period of time, thus minimizing any adverse 
liquidation problems to the fund due to the immediate 
transfer of large asset values. Second, the clearing­
house could "maintain records of 'cold storage' vested 
credits, with the credits themselves remaining with the
pplan under which they were earned." That is, the clearing­
house would serve as a registry of all vested credits; even 
employees who never change jobs would be registered with 
the clearinghouse. Third, to facilitate the registry ser­
vice, " . . .  the low cost, high efficiency Social Security
3record keeping facilities probably should be used."-'
1Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions 
(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 19^4) * p» 266.
2Ibid., p. 270.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on 
Aging, Economics of Aging: Toward a Full Share in Abun­
dance , Hearings before the Special Committee on Aging,
Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 1483.
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Fourth, the funds on deposit at the clearinghouse should 
not he refundable to an employee; i.e., pension credits 
should be locked in. Finally, legislation should be 
enacted to allow the assets held in the clearinghouse 
to be invested in both public and private areas. At present, 
government agencies are allowed to invest only in federal 
government securities.^
Individual Plans
Another means of implementing a national portability 
system that may be devoid of federal income tax complica­
tions is through the use of individual employee plans.
When an employee terminates, the present value of pension 
credits accumulated by an employee is transferred on his 
behalf to an individual retirement plan. For example, the 
employee can elect to apply his accrued benefit values 
to the purchase of a nontransferrable annuity to provide 
his retirement income. The annuity may be either an 
endowment policy utilizing a life annuity option for 
settlement, a defined benefit pension plan annuity or a 
pension plan flexible annuity (variable annuity).^
h. , .Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions, pp.
275-29^.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees 
Act. 1972. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of 
the Committee on Labor arid Public Welfare, Senate, on
S. 3598, S. 3012 and Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
1972, p. 404. (Treatment of insured individual retirement 
plans, especially the endowment policy, may require a 
federal tax change or ruling so that the terminating 
employee does not incur a tax liability for employer-paid 
premiums.)
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Individual annuity plans purchased to fulfill the pension 
obligation of an employer to a terminating employee are 
categorized as a form of portability for two reasons.
First, an actual fund transfer is effected from the pension 
fund of the employer to the insurance company. Second, a 
major goal of portability is met through this system} i.e., 
pension preservation with employee mobility.
Another approach to the implementation of porta­
bility through individual retirement plans has been sug­
gested by the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Illinois.
Upon termination of employment with vested rights, 
an employee could elect to have the value of those 
rights used to purchase a special Treasury bond which 
either could be redeemed in full at age 59a as in 
the case of HR-10 plans or paid over a period of 
years by submitting payment coupons to the Treasury.
The bonds would have to be fully redeemed at a 
certain age to eliminate the possibility of escaping 
estate taxes. The administration (and related costs), 
of such a program would be practically nonexistent.
There would be no bookkeeping records by the employer. 
The employee would have possession of the bonds 
and the employer need not notify him of his benefits 
sometime in the future or keep track of him.
Tax Free Direct Transfer
In order to allow an employee to transfer accumu­
lated pension fund assets directly to a succeeding employer's 
pension fund or qualified individual retirement savings 
program, a change in the federal income tax laws would be 
required to allow such a transfer to be tax free. At
6Ibid.. p. 1282.
l6l
present, it is virtually impossible to make direct fund 
transfers since all lump-sum distributions of pension 
assets are taxed as ordinary income. Rep. John B. Ander­
son (D— 111.) has pointed out that a pension fund transfer 
exemption would be natural even within the current federal 
tax structure.
There is a solid precedent, it seems to me, in 
our tax laws for this kind of reinvestment in kind.
We allow persons who sell their homes for a profit 
and reinvest their gain in a new house within a 
year, or I think it is 18 months, to have that 
gain exempt from income tax.
There are two ways that tax free transfers of 
pension funds could be allowed. First, Section 401(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code which designates qualification 
requirements could be amended to compel pension plan 
administrators to allow fund transfers on behalf of ter­
minating employees as a condition of favorable tax treat­
ment. In addition, it would be necessary for such an 
amendment to require that benefits be locked in to prevent 
income tax abuses by employees who willfully terminate
Oin order to gain control of pension assets. Other sug­
gested limitations on the tax free transfer involve the 
type of plans between which such a transfer is allowedj
7U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans. 
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
1972, p. 113.
ONorman H. Tarver, "Proposals for the Improvement 
of the Private Pension Plan System," Unpublished Study 
prepared for the Senate Labor Subcommittee on S. 3598, 
Toronto, Canada, 1972, pp. 40-43.
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e.g., transfers may be allowed only between qualified
pension plans, profit sharing, Keogh plans, qualified
individual retirement savings plans or other tax deferred
annuity plans.^
A second means of implementing a tax free transfer
involves no change in the Internal Revenue Code. This
approach was outlined in a letter to Sen. Harrison A.
Williams (D--N.J.) from representatives of Towers, Perrin,
Forster, and Crosby, Inc., a pension consulting firm
interested in pension legislation.
Individual portability would be encouraged if 
the Internal Revenue Service were to issue a revenue 
ruling which states that the qualified status of a 
plan under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code will not be affected adversely if the actuarial 
reserve required to provide for a vested employee's 
benefits is transferred at the employee's option and 
with the employer's concurrence, either to:
(a) a legal life insurance company to purchase 
an annuity to which the employee is entitled, or
(b) another qualified pension plan to provide such
pension
The concept of a tax free transfer of pension funds 
to implement pension portability has received rather wide-
g70ne of the strongest legislative proposals in the 
area of tax free transfers is found in the Nixon Adminis­
tration pension reform program. Although the entire reform 
proposal will be discussed in a later chapter, it should 
be briefly noted that the tax free transfer portion of 
the Nixon program allows fund transfers between an employer's 
fund and a qualified individual retirement account or a 
succeeding qualified employer's plan. (Additional con­
tributions to an individual retirement savings account are 
allowed tax free by both the employee and later employers.)
10U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Hearings, on S. 3598 and Other Bills,
1972, pp. 1028-1029.
veste^Qbenefits to the employee under such
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spread support. Testimony by interested leaders of industry, 
labor and pension groups at tax reform hearings has indi­
cated that tax free transfer of pension credits is a
11popular pension reform issue. Opposition is negligible
because the cost of the reform would be reflected as lost
federal tax revenue? little increased expense would be
incurred by pension plans or employers. Since there would
be some tax revenue lost through such transfers, an upper
limit would have to be set on the amount transferred.
The determination of an equitable upper limit on fund
12transfers may be difficult. While some pension plans 
may create extensive asset accumulations that normally, 
and legally, are eligible for possible transfer, the same 
amount aggregated under other plans may involve discrimina­
tory practices favoring more highly compensated employees.
In addition, any federal tax law change or revenue ruling 
would have to specify that allowable asset transfers must 
not discriminate in favor of officers, supervisors, share­
holders or other highly compensated employees. For 
example, transfers may not be allowed for sums only in 
excess of a specified amount for which few employees 
would qualify.
1 1U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Hearings on H.R. 12272.
1 2Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub­
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
In summary, suggested mechanisms for implementing 
national portability systems include utilizing a national 
clearinghouse, individual insured annuities, U.S. Treasury 
bonds and tax free direct transfers. An inherent pre­
requisite of the latter mechanism is the modification of 
the current federal tax environment to permit pension plan 
administrators to effect tax free transfers of pension 
assets. In the absence of this tax change, pension reform 
advocates desiring pension preservation and labor mobility 
will have to circumvent the problem of constructive receipt 
by indirect transfers through a clearinghouse, insurance 
company or U.S. Treasury retirement bonds.
Ralph Nader's Portability Program
The national portability systems discussed in 
the above section require only a simple reform of the 
present pension system. The portability program suggested 
by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, on the other hand, would 
require a complete transformation of the U.S. pension 
industry.
Mr. Nader's thorough censure of the private pension 
system has been widely publicized both in speeches and 
in his recent book, You and Your Pension, which is 
co-authored by Kate Blackwell. Denunciations such as the 
following are indicative of the Nader-Blackwell belief 
that the present private pension system must be abolished 
and replaced.
165
In terms of dollar impact, the private pension 
system represents one of the most comprehensive 
consumer frauds that many Americans will encounter in 
their lifetime. And I use the term 'fraud* advisedly.
Those . . . who sell, service, and administer 
private pension plans, as well as those who negotiate 
and establish plans, have seriously and deliberately 
misrepresented the nature of this pension system. ^
Its E the private pension system's J. operative 
premise remains the same; some must lose so that 
others may gain.
We do not yet know whether the private pension 
system can be made to work in the way most people 
believe it should or whether it is essentially too 
flawed and too expensive to offer more than its 
present limited benefits. ^
Reform Proposals
Mr. Nader has suggested in speeches and in various 
publications that the present private pension system may be 
replaced by a number of competitive private independent
16pension funds outside the control of employers and unions. 
Each employee would choose a fund to which tax deductible 
contributions could be made on his behalf by himself and 
all employers throughout his entire working career. 
Individual accounts would be established by the fund
■^Ralph Nader, Remarks before the Sixth Annual 
Conference on Employee Benefits, New York City, May 24,
1972, reprinted in Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell, You and 
Your Pension (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973)» P» 158.
^"Private Pension Plans." Congressional Quarterly 
Report. XXXI, No. 9 (March 3, 1973). 73V.
*^Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell, You and Your 
Pension (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973)» P» 123.
16For example, see Ibid., pp. 124-126.
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administrators for all participants and a passbook would 
be available for each employee to maintain a record of 
accrued benefits. The plans would be structured on a 
money purchase basis, with retirement benefits being 
dependent on aggregate contributions plus accrued interest. 
All contributions would vest immediately.
If an employee changes jobs, the succeeding employer 
may begin contributions to the fund originally selected by 
the employee. Thus, portability as a fund transfer when 
an employee changes jobs is not included in the Nader 
proposal. Should the employee, however, become dissatis­
fied at any time with the management of his chosen fund, 
his accrued pension assets may be transferred to another 
fund. In this sense, then, since complete labor mobility 
without pension credit loss is accomplished and asset 
transfer between qualified funds is allowed at the employee's 
discretion, a type of portability is available under the 
Nader system.
Also included in this proposal is the requirement
that the qualified funds be licensed and regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, with directors elected
by participating members. Officers or administrators of
the fund would be appointed by the directors and "required
17to poll the membership for investment preferences." The 
funds could be administered by insurance companies or by
17Ibid., p. 1 2 5.
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any other qualified group which could obtain a license.
Pension fund administrators, investment managers, 
actuaries and other persons with the necessary ex­
pertise who joined together to form corporations would 
be eligible to apply for licenses. It would be 
possible for a bank's pension trust department, if 
it were spun off and all the connections with the 
commercial department severed* to qualify as an 
independent retirement fund.
Since these funds would compete for fund accruals, 
fund managers would have the incentive to offer the 
highest possible rates of return commensurate with the 
risk accepted, to keep administrative costs low and to 
operate the fund in a prudent and honest manner.^
Implementation of Mr. Nader's pension system 
would cause a vast restructuring of many financial insti­
tutions. Accordingly, two transitional provisions have 
been suggested. First, only the asset values of employees 
who are older than age thirty-five could be transferred 
to a new fund of that employee's choice. The asset values 
accrued on behalf of younger employees may be retained in 
the employer's pension fund for the duration of the transi­
tion period. Eventually, the thirty-five year age limit 
would be eliminated. Second, since many of the retired 
people may have already "lost" in the "pension lottery,"
1 ft"What Nader Really Saids Question Posed Shifts 
Argument to Fundamental Concepts," Recent Developments 
in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit Plan Review Research 
Reports, August 6 , 1971, P» 1.
19Nader and Blackwell, You and Your Pension.
pp. 125-1 2 6.
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such individuals would receive a subsidy financed by a
corporate income surtax coming out of "dividend payments
on a uniform basis. In effect, it would be a contribution
by shareholders in recognition of services rendered to all
20American corporations." Again, this is solely a transi­
tional measure and would be eliminated when the need to 
bring the retired population above the poverty level 
vanishes.
Reactions to Nader's Proposals
Mr, Nader’s proposed reform of the private pension 
system has prompted strong reactions from the pension 
industry, employers and other pension reform advocates.
I t i s  one thing to chastise the pension plans 
for being too slow to recognize the changed circum­
stances of modern industrial life for failing to 
institute needed changes in light of these circumstances. 
It is quite another to crucify these plans on the cross 
of 'consumer fraud.' . . .  If we were to adopt Mr.
Nader's proposal— and I doubt that anyone will want 
to--we would turn upside down and emasculate the 
private pension system and the-fundamental incen­
tives for its further growth.
In addition to the general reaction of fear of 
chaos in the financial community brought about by the 
transition to Nader's competitive private funds, some 
pension experts contend that the private pension system
20Nader, Sixth Annual Conference on Employee 
Benefits, May 24, 1972, pp. 165-166.
21 "Javits Replies to Nader," Pension and Welfare 
News, VIII, No. 7 (July, 1972), 4-8, 6l, condensation of 
Sen. Jacob K. Javits rebuttal of Nader's Speech, Sixth 
Annual Conference on Employee Benefits, New York, May 25, 
1972.
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might be endangered further by forcing employers into
22profit sharing plans. Such plans could proliferate if 
regulation of the private funds by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and the resulting controls over 
contributions to these funds, involve more supervision 
than employers are willing to accept.
Other criticisms of Mr. Nader's proposals are more
specific than the general allegation of endangering the
private pension system. For example, Nader's program is
based on the money purchase concept, while most of the
pension plans in the U.S. are of the defined benefit 
23type. The money purchase formula rarely is used because 
it generally results in small contributions during an 
employee's early working years due to the lower salaries 
ordinarily earned in that period. As indicated previously, 
the money purchase concept is more appropriately used in 
a stable noninflationary economy; and, even then, an 
employee's current standard of living is reduced at retire­
ment to reflect the lower wages in his early career for 
which contributions were made. The fixed benefit formula, 
on the other hand, is designed to reflect the standard of 
living just prior to retirement. The problem of inflation 
and its effects on any fixed income is especially acute 
for older employees under a money purchase plan. Although
22Gordon, private interview, August 9» 1972.
23•^Norman H. Tarver, "Pension Reform Legislation," 
Pension and Welfare News. VII, No. 11 (November, 1971), p. 30.
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an employer may increase past service and accrued future 
service benefits under a defined benefit formula- to reflect 
an increased cost of living, retroactive increases in 
money purchase contributions are rare.
Another criticism of Mr. Nader's proposal is that 
it would do little to extend private pension coverage to 
people not currently covered. Approximately half of the 
labor force in the U.S. is not covered.
By far the major proportion of these uncovered 
employees are probably employed by small employers.
It is with this type of employer that a pension plan 
based on a money purchase formula is likely to be 
be least suitable. A small employer when he starts 
a pension plan is likely to have on his staff older 
employees who have a few years to go before retirement.
A money purchase formula will do an inadequate job 
for these older employees.
Moreover, the lack of financial experience of the 
employees who are currently covered may make it difficult 
to choose the fund best suited to personal retirement needs. 
The competitive nature of the funds probably would result 
in the availability of a wide selection of risk-return 
tradeoffs in the different funds. Consequently, employers 
and employees may find that investment counseling is a 
necessary prerequisite for effective utilization of the 
competitive funds.
Although the benefit payment function of competitive
o Ll Charles D. Spencer, "One Answer to Naders Employ­
er's 'Promises' Looks Good Compared to Future Uncertainty," 
Recent Developments in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit 
Plan Review Research Reports, August 20, 1971.
^Tarver, "Pension Reform Legislation," p. 30.
funds may be operated in a number of ways, a common 
practice of many existing trust funds is to utilize an 
unallocated advance funding technique. That is, the fund 
assets of a given employee are pooled with the assets of 
other active employees prior to the time of the actual 
retirement. At retirement, a portion of the pooled assets 
are withdrawn to purchase from an insurance company an 
immediate annuity on behalf of the retiring worker. While 
the unallocated funding approach appears highly adaptable 
to Mr. Nader's competitive fund system it also is the 
most expensive of all the insured group techniques. It 
would be much less expensive (or higher benefits could 
be provided for the same amount of money), if the pension 
credits were insured in the employees* preretirement years 
since premium rates may be lower for deferred annuities for 
younger employees than immediate annuities for retiring 
employees. That is, insurance companies may require 
utilization of more conservative actuarial assumptions 
for premium rates for retiring employees than for young, 
active employees.
Finally, many technical problems may be encountered 
in the operation of the competitive funds. For example, 
the investment funds may be difficult to manage since there 
are so many voting rights that may be exercised by parti­
cipants with an active interest in the fund's operation.
The transition of the pension system to these funds may 
produce further repercussions in the capital markets as
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large volumes of securities are liquidated in the ownership 
change.
Future of Ralph Nader's Pension Program
Although Mr. Nader's pension program has received 
wide criticism, support for his plan is growing both in 
the Congress and on the consumer front. If reform 
legislation is delayed indefinitely due to political and 
technical pressures, additional opportunity will exist for 
Mr. Nader's consumer oriented hook on pensions, You and 
Your Pension, to become more widely read, thus building 
further support for his approach. Mike Gordon, Minority 
Counsel to the Senate Labor Subcommittee has pointed out 
that "the longer action is delayed, the more time Mr. Nader 
will have to gain acceptance for his money purchase
26approach with four or five alternative investment choices."
The Nader pension plan has received support from
a number of legislators, including Sen. George McGovern
(D— S. Dak.),2^ Although it is not clear who will be the
legislative sponsor, introduction of Mr. Nader's proposal
, 28appears imminent.
"Subcommittee Counsel Sees 'Nader Bill'Resulting 
from Failure of S. 3598," Weekly News Digest. Employee Bene­
fit Plan Review Research Reports, October 20, 1972, p. 1.
^"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News,
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), W .
p o "Nader Proposes His Own Plan for Pension Reforms," 
The National Underwriter; Life and Health Insurance Edition, 
LXXII, No. 9 (March 3, 1973)» 1? Rep. Peter A. Peyser,
Remarks before the Annual Conference of the Association of 




Portability may be implemented on a limited basis
through a reciprocal agreement. Such arrangements may
29be established on a formal multiemployer basis or as 
simply an informal agreement between two plans. Under 
a multiemployer plan which provides for portability, fund 
assets accrued by an employee who changes jobs within the 
participating employer group may be transferred to a 
succeeding employer. Depending on the contractual arrange­
ment, fund transfer may be delayed or made on an installment 
basis in order to minimize adverse asset liquidation 
problems.
Informal reciprocal agreements between two plans 
rarely occur except in special individual situations. For 
example, companies in need of specialized professional 
employees may utilize fund transfers in order to obtain 
the desired technical services of these individuals, 
Generally, the professionals negotiate for the fund transfer 
as a condition of employment.
The portability provided by reciprocal agreements 
is limited by, and to, the participating employer group.
29Multiemployer plans, as discussed in Chapter I, 
may be of two types. First, there is the master plan 
type in which no actual portability is available; i.e., 
a group of employers are considered as one employer for 
pension plan purposes. Each participating employer con­
tributes to one master plan. The second type of multi-^ 
employer arrangement is discussed in this section, and is 
more properly called a reciprocal agreement.
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The amount of the benefit, however, is not usually limited 
in these arrangements.
Second Laver of Social Security
Another type of limited implementation of the 
portability concept is related to the benefit level. One 
such mechanism has been suggested in various forms, but 
generally may be called a second layer of Social Security.
Actuarial Committee Solution.— A layer of private 
pensions for all employees to provide an income above 
Social Security has been suggested by a committee of twelve 
actuaries from leading pension consulting firms. This 
plan was outlined by George B. Swick at an actuarial 
conference devoted to pensions in March 1972.-^° Every 
employer with five or more employees would be required 
to establish a payroll deduction plan, so that employees 
would be able to finance additional retirement income if 
they so desire, but with the advantages of the group 
mechanism. Employee contributions would be tax exempt 
up to 5 percent of Social Security covered earnings. This 
group plan could utilize an insurance carrier, a trust 
mechanism or any other available funding medium. The 
benefits would be fully vested, funded and portable.
If the employer did not wish to set up his own group 
plan for the second layer of retirement income, an "annuity
J George B. Swick, "Report of the Legislative 
Panel of the Society of Actuaries," Address presented 
at the Society of Actuaries Regional Meeting, New Orleans, 
Louisiana, March 20, 1972. (Mimeographed)
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pool, or a series of annuity pools, would be established 
on a quasi-governmental basis. These pools would, however, 
invest in the private sector of the economy."31 These 
pools also could be used to implement the portability 
concept; i.e., if an employee changes jobs, the assets 
supporting his vested benefit credits could be transferred 
to the pool. If the employee so desires, his accrued 
assets then could be transferred to the fund of a succeeding 
employer. In effect, the annuity pools would serve as 
a series of clearinghouses in the private sector.
With regard to employer-supported retirement 
benefits, the actuaries suggested that eligibility, 
vesting, funding and portability legislation be limited 
to "a layer of benefits between Social Security and 50 
per cent T sic I of Social Security covered earnings."^ 
Employer-paid retirement benefits, however, would not be 
compulsory and portability could be made available at the 
employer's option through the annuity pools developed 
for the employee-supported second layer of Social Security.
The concept of a limited portability system to 
provide a second layer of Social Security, as suggested by 
the actuarial committee, has received little support in 
Congress and is not likely to be incorporated in any legis­




the successful British contracted-out private plans, 
essentially is "too complicated and too late" for con­
sideration.
Norman H. Tarver*s Special Laver II-Laver III 
Concept.— Canadian pension expert Norman H. Tarver has 
suggested a Layer II-Layer III portability concept (Layer 
I would be Social Security) for use in the United States.
Layer II would be subject to minimum vesting, benefit and 
locking-in standards and would be required before a more 
generous Layer III could be established. Layer III would 
not be subject to any regulation more stringent than the 
current Internal Revenue Service qualification standards.
Neither layer would be compulsory under the Tarver proposal 
but, in essence, any employer with a private pension plan 
would have the layer of benefits above Social Security 
subjected to strict benefit and solvency regulations.
Transfer of vested benefit credits under the Tarver pro­
posal would be accomplished by a direct transfer of funds 
from one qualified plan to another. Mr. Tarver also suggests 
that federal tax law changes be made so that the transfer 
would be a tax free negotiation.
-^See previous chapter for a description of the 
British second layer plan.
'ih,
J Ronald B. Gold, Financial Economist, U.S. Treasury, 
representing the Nixon Administration on Pension legislation, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1972.
-^Tarver, "Proposals," pp. 100-101.
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Robert Paul's Required Second Laver Plan*—  Robert 
Paul of the Martin E. Segal Company has suggested that 
a universal money purchase layer be required to extend 
coverage to all employees. ^  Each employer would be 
required to contribute approximately 1 percent of earnings 
subject to Social Security taxes for all employees over 
age twenty-five. The employer may utilize (or establish) 
his own private pension plan, purchase insured annuities 
or use a government administered central fund to fulfill 
this obligation. The required benefits would be immediately 
vested and funded. Mr. Paul has not worked out the porta­
bility portion of the required benefit plan, but, presuma­
bly, the government administered central fund could serve 
as a clearinghouse for pension credits being transferred.
Although Mr. Paul's plan would not help older
employees, since there is no adjustment for past service,
the proposal would be expected eventually to provide "the
average retiree with a pension equivalent to some X5%> of
his preretirement income, which would be added to the
35% ( 50% in the case of married couples) now provided
37by Social Security."^
Conclusions
Any mechanism for implementing the portability 
concept on a national basis must involve either a direct
-^"The Push for Pension Reform," Business Week,
March 17, 1973. pp. ^6-58.
•^Ibid. , p. 52.
transfer implying a federal income tax change, an indirect 
transfer utilizing a clearinghouse, individual insured 
annuities or retirement bonds, or a series of private 
funds which effectively would serve as clearinghouses.
More limited portability is available currently through 
reciprocal agreements which allow fund transfers. Such 
systems may experience further expansion to meet the 
needs of particularly mobile employees. Suggestions 
to implement a second layer of Social Security on a 
private basis similar to the British required minimum 
private pensions are not serious candidates for enactment. 
To date, legislators consider the national clearinghouse 
and the tax free direct transfer as the most viable 
means of implementing portability.
Although the authors suggesting portability mech­
anisms have discussed the dynamics of the fund transfer, 
there has been little mention of the calculation of the 
asset values to be transferred. Whether a direct or 
indirect fund transfer is utilized, the calculation of 
transfer values is the same. In order to explore the 
mechanics and problems incurred in such a calculation, 
sample transfers are presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII
THE PORTABILITY CONCEPTj ITS COST AND THE 
EFFECT ON FUNDING AND BENEFIT LEVEL
Introduction 
The portability concept largely has been criti­
cized for its excessive cost, complexity and corrosive 
effect on benefits as well as for being unnecessary if 
adequate vesting is available. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore the veracity of these allegations.
The cost of portability is derived from adminis­
trative expenses, lost income due to the necessity of keeping 
highly liquid assets, and increased funding costs. Lost 
income because of liquidity needs essentially is an op­
portunity cost which need not be considered in this chapter 
since terminations are predictable, enabling plan adminis­
trators to plan cash flows for the fund. In addition, 
since funds are constantly being paid into the fund by 
the employer and in the form of payroll deductions (if the 
plan is contributory), cash flow forecasting is further 
facilitated. Portability costs attributable to increased 
funding, lost turnover relief and administrative expenses 
in the form of a percentage rate, however, are examined 
in this chapter.
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The complexity of calculating transfer values is 
exemplified by the necessity of making simplifying 
assumptions in illustrating the effect of portability on 
pension funds. For example, although the present value 
of a benefit easily can be calculated, and translated 
into a comparable benefit in a succeeding plan, it is 
necessary to assume that all transferred-in pension assets 
for a new employee are refundable to him or his benefi­
ciaries in the event of death or disability prior to retire­
ment. Such assets could not be treated as an actuarial 
gain for the succeeding employer's fund since that employer 
was not responsible for the supporting contributions. 
Although such complexities do exist, they are treated only 
summarily in subsequent analysis since the examples simu­
lated for this chapter were designed primarily to isolate 
major problems, rather than presenting a comprehensive 
solution for portability implementation.
In addition, the effect of portability on the 
benefit level for a mobile employee is examined and com­
pared with similar benefits for long service employees. 
Finally, in order to determine the effectiveness of vesting 
as a substitute for portability, the same benefits are left 
in "cold storage" with the original employer and compared 
to ported benefits. All of these calculations are made 
on the assumption that the employee for whom the analysis 
is made lives until retirement.
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The Effect of Portability on Fund Solvency
One of the major objections to portable pensions 
is the possibility that a plan's fund adequacy may be 
endangered when employees transfer pension fund assets to 
a succeeding employer. That is, the assets remaining 
after the transfer may be inadequate to meet the liabilities 
created by the benefit promise for the employees staying 
with the employer until retirement. The funding problem 
is caused by the prevalent practice of underfunding past 
service benefits. As previously explained, when an employer 
initiates a private pension plan that includes recognition 
of an employee's service prior to the effective date of 
the plan, the funding of the initial past service liability 
may be deferred almost indefinitely. To maintain a quali­
fied status for favorable federal income tax treatment, 
the employer need only pay the annual interest accruing 
on the unfunded liability. Thus, amortization of the 
past service liability is not required, although many 
employers do try to amortize such sums over a period of 
twenty to forty years.
Table 8 hypothetically illustrates the effect of 
portability on the solvency of the pension fund of Company 
A. Although the pension reserves for Company A are based 
on various funding methods, all calculations reflect 
identical age, benefit level and actuarial assumptions.
The plan and population statistics in Table 8 are given 
in the next section, followed by a brief explanation of
182
of the funding methods utilized in the illustration. The 
funding methods chosen for demonstration do not repre­
sent all possible funding alternatives but are representative 
of contrasting fund accumulation methods and amortization 
schedules. Briefly stated, the Accrued Benefit (or Unit 
Credit) Cost Method, with maximum amortization of past 
service liabilities, becomes fully funded after thirteen 
years and, as such, is the most conservative funding form 
in the sample. The Individual Level Cost (or Entry Age 
Normal) Method is the least conservative funding approach 
with no amortization of past service liabilities. Thus, 
a twenty to forty year amortization schedule implies a 
fund reserve position at some point between the Accrued 
Benefit reserve (with amortized past service credits) and 
the reserve of either of the unfunded methods.
Plan and Population Statistics for Company A
1. Effective Date of Plant January 1, i960
2. Reserve Valuation Datei January 1, 1970
3. Benefit Formula:
Past Service— Flat amount of $100 annual retirement 
income per year of credited past service; plus 
Future Service— Flat amount of $120 annual retire­
ment income per year of future service
Vesting: 1 0 0 $ after 10 years participation
5* Portability: All accrued vested benefits fully
portable to a succeeding plan or clearinghouse at 
employee's request. Present value of benefits 
transferred out calculated using actuarial 
assumptions in (9) below, plus an additional k$> 
loading or expense charge reduction
6. Normal Retirement Age: 65
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7. Normal Retirement Date: First day of that month coin­
cident with or next following attainment of age 65
8. Eligibility Requirements: None
9. Actuarial Assumptions for Reserve Valuation Purposesi
a. Mortality: 1951 Group Annuity Table projected
eight years by Scale C and rated one year 
younger for females
b. Interest! k-%
c. Fund accumulation ratei
d. Loading! 0$
e. Salary Scale: Not applicable since benefits
are based on a flat amount benefit formula
f. Turnover: None assumed since cost reduction
effects of turnover offset possible cost 
increases attributable to inflation and the 
portability of vested benefits
10. Employee Contributions! None
11. Population Statistics!
aT Sex: 100$ male
b. Average ages 40
c. Date of Employment: All covered workers assumed
employed on January 1, 1950
d. Number of covered employees: 100
Reserve Accumulation Under Different Funding Methods
Accrued Benefit (or Unit Credit) Method: Maximum
Funding of Supplemental Liability.— An accrued benefit 
cost method is one under which the actuarial costs are 
based directly upon benefits accrued to the date of cost 
determination. The amount of annual cost attributable 
to the current year of plan*s operation is precisely 
equal to the present value of the benefits credited to 
the employee participants for service during that year. 
Thus, this cost method funds future service benefits 
fully as they accrue. The plan's past service liability 
is funded at the maximum rate (10 percent of the initial 
supplemental liability per year) allowed by the Internal
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Revenue Service for purposes of tax qualification. Such
amortization requires a funding period of about thirteen
years since the supplemental liability figure reflects a
discount for interest. As soon as the total benefits
accrued (e.g., past service credits plus all accrued future
service benefits) are fully funded, the aggregate reserve is
1equal to the present value of total accrued benefits. Table 
8 illustrates the pattern of reserve accumulation for 
Company A under the Accrued Benefit (or Unit Credit) Method 
with maximum funding of supplemental liability.
Accrued Benefit (or Unit Credit) Method; Unfunded 
Supplemental Liability.— This method is similar to the 
one described above; i.e., the actuarial costs of the plan 
are based on benefits accrued to the date of valuation. For 
any given year, the employer is liable for the cost of each 
unit of benefit earned in that year. Thus, the normal cost 
is the annual cost attributable to a given year of a plan's 
operation. Since the future service cost is equal to the 
present value of the annually accrued benefit at that date 
(e.g., the net single premium for the benefit), the reserve 
for future service credits under the Accrued Benefit (Un­
funded Supplemental Liability) Method is similar to the re­
serve for the Accrued Benefit (Maximum Funding Supple­
mental Liability) approach.
The creation of a liability for past service
■^Material for this entire section obtained from 
Dan M. McGill, Fundamentals of Private Pensions (2d ed.; 
Homewood, 111,*. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964)» PP* 156-157*
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TABLE 8
RESERVE ACCUMULATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT FUNDING METHODS 
(Closed Population— No Turnover)
Unit Credit 
Unit Credit Unfunded 
Year Ending Maximum Supplemental Entry Age
Age Dec. 31 Funding Liability Normal
30 i960 $50,618 $27,108 $36,495
31 1961 104,405 56,424 74,48232 1962 162,027 88,092 114,026
33 1963 222,780 122,304 155,19534 1964 287,232 159,120 198,062
35 1965 255,755 198,864 242,70336 1966 428,366 241,500 289,200
3? 1967 505,516 287,424 337,636
38 1968 587,373 336,744 388,106
39 1969 674,298 389,760 440,70440 1970 712,364 415,986 495,53741 1971 839,571 491,826 552,71642 1972 942,360 572,676 612,359
43 1973 1,025,368 642,768 674,61644 1974 1,116,668 717,840 739,654
45 1975 1,214,136 808,336 807,66646 1976 1,318,144 884,544 878,866
4? 1977 1,429,584 977,184 953,486
48 1978 1,548,816 1,076,616 1,031,782
49 1979 1,676,880 1,183,680 1,114,026
50 1980 1,813,836 1,298,556 1,200,530
51 1981 1,961,232 1,422,432 1,291,637
52 1982 2,119,136 1,555,536 1,387,715
53 1983 2,289,200 1,699,200 1,489,15554 1984 2,472,000 1,854,000 1,596,415
55 1985 2,669,348 2,021,448 1,709,98556 1986 2,881,928 2,202,228 1,830,389
57 1987 3,111,228 2,397,696 1,958,239
58 1988 3,359,552 2,609,652 2,094,173
59 1989 3,627,100 2,838,600 2,238,9376o 1990 3,918,072 3,087,972 2,393,334
61 1991 4,233,548 3,358,848 2,558,351
62 1992 4,576,592 3,653,892 2,735,046
63 1993 4,949,952 3,975,552 2,925,03264 1994 5,358,600 4,328,100 3,129,863
65 1995 5,806,780 4,715,280 3,351,708
credits also is similar for the two Accrued Benefit 
techniques. The present value of credits for past ser­
vice prior to the effective date of the contract is the 
"basis of the plan's supplemental (or initial past ser­
vice) liability.
In this second sample case illustrated in Table 8, 
however, no contributions are made to reduce the supple­
mentary liability. The only payments made are the interest 
charges on the unfunded past service benefits. This 
assumption is made to demonstrate the extreme situation 
of minimal funding and the corresponding unfunded amount 
that would exist should contract termination occur.
Individual Level Cost (or Entry Age Normal) Method t 
Unfunded Supplemental Liability.— Under Entry Age Normal 
funding, a level (or constant) amount is paid into the 
fund each year on behalf of each employee. It should be 
noted, however, that with respect to the initial group 
of employees covered under the plan, a supplemental 
liability is created by the cost averaging nature of this 
actuarial cost method. The level contribution on behalf of 
each employee is calculated on the assumption that payments 
begin with the first year each participant could have 
joined the plan had it always been in effect. The payments 
which are assumed to have been made prior to the inception 
of the plan are the basis of the plan's supplemental 
liability. The annual level contribution for each employee 
under this funding method equalst
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(1) The present value at entry age of total projected 
benefit beginning at age 65,
(2) Divided by the present value of a temporary annuity 
due for the total number of years of an employee's service.
The actuarial liability of fund accumulation at 
any one year is equal to the present value of total bene­
fits minus the present value of future normal costs. This 
reserve thus includes previous payments (plus interest) as 
well as the plan's unfunded supplemental liability. The 
actual reserve accumulation however, is equal to only 
what is in the fund plus payments toward liquidation of the 
unfunded liability. If no payment is made on the unfunded 
liability other than the interest on the initial past 
service credits, the possibility of a fund shortage is 
readily apparent. If any one employee retires before 
his past service credits are fully funded or transfers 
the present value of his accrued pension credits to a 
succeeding fund, assets are withdrawn from the fund to 
complete the financing of these credits. The risk of insuf­
ficient funding is assumed by the employer since the plan
is based on actuarial cost assumptions that presume
oindefinite continuation. Table 8 illustrates the reserve 
accumulations for Company A using the Entry Age Normal 





The vested benefits available to a terminating 
employee under the pension plan of Company A are presented 
in Table 9. Since there is a ten year pre-vesting parti­
cipation requirement, an employee aged thirty with ten 
years of past service at plan inception would not be 
eligible for a vested benefit until age forty. At that 
time, the employee's total accrued benefit of $2,320 (past 
service benefit IT 10 x $100 = $1,000 2 plus future service 
benefit I 11 x $120 = $1,320 3 ) would become fully vested.
If the employee terminates at age fifty-five and 
transfers his pension credits to a succeeding plan, the 
value of the benefit transferred out would be $25*626, 
representing an annual annuity for life of $3»955 (.96 x 
$4,120). The benefit transferred out is less than the 
amount the employee would have received had he stayed 
with the original employer. The benefit reduction is 
made by adding a 4 percent loading charge to the actuarial 
assumptions used in calculating the present value of the 
vested benefits.-^ The expense charge is made to offset 
two potential fund costs. First, investment losses may 
be incurred due to the forced liquidation of securities 
at an inopportune time. Second, the employer no longer 
has the advantage of possible favorable mortality gains
^Other changes in the actuarial assumptions could 
accomplish the same purpose. For example, instead of 
adding a direct expense charge, less conservative mortality, 
interest and age rating assumptions could be made.
TABLE 9
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF VESTED BENEFITS IF














40 $2,320 3.382 3.247 $7,533
41 2,440 3.523 3.382 8 , 2 5 2
42 2,560 3.671 3.524 9,021
43 2,680 3.826 3.673 9,844
44 2,800 3.988 3.828 10,718
45 2,920 4.158 3.992 11,657
46 3i040 4.336 4.163 12,656
47 3,160 4.524 4.343 13,724
48 3,280 4.722 4.533 14,868
49 3,400 4.932 4.735 16,099
50 3,520 5.153 4.947 17,413
51 3,640 5.388 5.172 18,826
52 3,760 5.636 5.411 20,345
53 3,880 5.900 5.664 21,976
54 4,000 6 . I 80 5.933 23,732
55 4,120 6.479 6.220 25,626
56 4,240 6.797 6.525 27,666
57 4,360 7.136 6.851 29,870
58 4,480 7.499 7.199 32,252
59 4,600 7.885 7.570 34,822
6o 4,720 8.301 7.969 37,614
6l 4,840 8.747 8.397 40,641
62 4,960 9.227 8.858 43,936
63 5,080 9.744 9.354 47,518
64 5 ,200 10.305 9.893 5 1 ,444
65 5,320 10.915 10.478 55,743
^Assume 10 years past service.
on funds that are transferred out.
In order to demonstrate the effect on a pension 
fund of an employee's transfer to a succeeding plan, the 
fund deficiencies created under several actuarial cost 
methods are presented in Table 10. For example, if an 
employee aged fifty-one transfers his accrued benefits 
in Company A to a succeeding employer, under the Accrued 
Benefit Method (without supplemental funding), a $4,602 de­
ficiency would be created by that one termination, leaving 
the reserve .32 percent unfunded (in addition to the under- 
funding of the remaining employees* past service benefits). 
The .32 percent reduction represents an additional cost 
to the employer since the funding deficiency must be 
eliminated if the pension plan is to retain its qualified 
status.
Since under Company A's Accrued Benefit Method 
(with supplemental funding), previous service credit 
funding was assumed to be complete after thirteen years, 
the fund experiences an actuarial gain (.01 x .04) from 
the expense charge for termination transfer of funds. The 
gain begins in the twelfth year but levels off to .04 
percent in the thirteenth year.
The cost of portability per employee steadily 
decreases as age increases under the Accrued Benefit 
Method (without supplemental funding). Quite the opposite 
is true, however, under the Entry Age Normal funding 
method. The cost of portability decreases during the
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TABLE 10
FUND DEFICIENCY IF ONE EMPLOYEE WERE TO TRANSFER FUNDS 


















4-0 $4-09 .06 $3,373 .81 $2,578 .524-1 -.02* 3,334 .68 2,725 .494-2 -4-03 -.04- 3,294 .58 2,897 .47
4-3 -4-10 -.04- 3 »4l6 .53 3,098 . 4644 -44-9 -.04 3,540 .49 3,321 .454-5 -484 -.04 3,574 .44 3,580 .44
4-6 -525 -.04 3,811 • ̂ 3 3,867 .44
4-7 -572 -.04 3,952 .40 4,189 .44
4-8 -620 -.04 4,102 • 38 4,550 .44
4-9 -64-8 -.04- 4,262 .36 4,959 .45
50 -72 5 -.04 4,427 .34 5,408 .45
51 -786 -.04 4,602 .32 5,910 .46
52 -84-6 -.04 4,790 .31 6,468 .47
53 -916 -.04 4,984 .29 7,084 .4854- -988 -.04 5,192 .28 7,768 .49
55 -1,067 -.04 5,412 .27 8,526 .50
56 -1,153 -.04 5,644 .26 9,362 .51
57 -1,24-2 -.04 5,893 .25 10,288 .53
58 -1,34-4- -.04 6,155 .24 11,280 .54
59 -1,4-4-9 -.04 6,436 .23 12,433 .5660 -1,567 -. 04- 6,73^ .22 13,681 .57
*Since funding is completed after 13 years and no 
turnover is assumed in the reserve calculation! actuarial 
gains from turnover occur due to the 4-% expense dharge for 
fund transfer.
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younger ages (age 40-46), because of the expense charge, 
but increases beyond age 46.
The cost of portability is not insignificant.
Assuming only a 1 percent rate of turnover, an employer
with an unfunded qualified pension plan will incur costs
of approximately .22-.81 percent of fund assets per year.
Nevertheless, many employers are more concerned with the
cost of benefits as a percentage of payroll. Based on
an average annual salary of $7»000 and a 1 percent rate
of turnover, the cost of portability to Company A is
approximately .36-1.95 percent of payroll. Since most
pension plans cost 3-5 percent of payroll, with some
4ranging as high as 10-15 percent, the cost increase 
attributable to portability clearly is significant. The 
more fully funded a plan is, however, the lower the cost 
of portability.
The Effect of Portability on the Benefit Level
In order to determine how portability affects 
the level of benefit available to a mobile employee, 
annuity income under several different plans have been 
calculated for an employee changing jobs twice. Since 
the level of vesting required influences the benefit
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Retirement Income for Employees Act, 1973. 
Hearings, before a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee 
on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 4 and S. 75»
93d Cong,, 1st sess., February 15» 1973*
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available for transfer, benefit calculations were made 
under a ten year, 100 percent vesting plan, the Rule of
50, and 100 percent immediate vesting.
Employee X worked for Company A for 15 years (from
age twenty to age thirty-five), then went to work for 
Company B. After five years with Company B, he transferred 
to Company C for a salary increase. Each termination 
involved a transfer of vested pension credits to the fund 
of the succeeding employer. This benefit simulation is 
designed to illustrate several of the problems associated 
with portability. First, an employee can experience bene­
fit loss (or gain) due to change in actuarial assumptions 
used by different employers. Second, benefit loss can 
occur if vesting requirements are not met. This problem, 
however, would be present whether or not portability were 
available. Third, benefit loss can occur if the employer 
allowing the transfer from his fund makes an administrative 
expense charge to cover any fund liquidation losses in­
curred on account of the transfer. Finally, an employee 
transferring funds into a succeeding employer's fund may 
have a benefit under the new plan greater than he would 
have been eligible for had he been employed by that succeeding 
employer throughout his entire working career. He would 
then accrue a benefit under the succeeding employer's 
plan larger than that of comparable employees who had 
been employed continuously by that same employer. This 
situation may cause morale problems among the co-workers with
the lower benefits, in spite of the fact that the higher 
benefit was accrued, under a previous employer's plan.
The following summary of the major provisions of 
the pension plans for Companies A, B and C is the basis of 
annuity simulations in Tables 11, 12 and 13. Since the 
benefit formula for Companies B and C are salary related, 
separate annuity calculations are presented for those 
companies in Tables I k  and 15. Finally, an analysis is
made of benefits available had the employee remained
with the same employer (Table 16 ) as well as the benefits 
available where 100 percent immediate vesting is provided 
in lieu of portability.
Plan Provisions 
Company A
1. Benefits Past Service benefit of $100 for each 
year of past service plus Future Service bene­
fit of $120 for each year of future service
2. Actuarial Assumptions for transfer values:
a. Mortality: 1951 Group Annuity Table
projected eight years by Scale C and rated
one year younger for males and six
years younger for females
b. Interest: k percent
c. Loading for transfer purposes: k percent 
Company B
1. Benefit: Career average benefit of li percent 
of salary for each year of service (no past 
service benefit except that transferred into 
the plan which is nonforfeitable in the event 
of death)
2. Salary Scale: 2 percent per year increase
3. Actuarial Assumptions for transfer values:
a. Mortality: 1951 Group Annuity Table pro­
jected eight years by Scale C and rated 
one year younger for males and six years 
younger for females
b. Interest: 4-| percent
c. Loading for transfer purposes: none 
4, Eligibility Requirements: None
Company C
Benefit: Future Service Benefit of 1 percent
of final five year average salary for each year 
of credited future service (no past service 
benefit except that transferred into the plan 
and that amount is nonforfeitable)
2. Salary Scale: 1 percent per year increase
3. Actuarial Assumptions:
a. Mortality: 1951 Group Annuity Table 
projected sixteen years by Scale C and 
rated one year younger for males and six 
years younger for females
b. Interest: 2j? percent
c. Loading for transfer purposes: None
4. Eligibility Requirements: None
Annuity Simulation
Ten Year Vesting.— The annuity simulation for 
Employee X under a plan of 100 percent vesting after ten 
years of service is presented in Table 11. When Employee 
X transfers his benefits (100 percent vested) from Company 
A, the full present value is not transferred out because 
of the 4 percent expense charge made by that employer. The 
more liberal actuarial assumptions employed by Company B, 
however, result in a higher benefit transferred into the 
second plan than would have been available under Company 
A's plan.
Since Employee X remains with Company B only five 
years, he accrues no vested benefits. The asset value 
transferred out of Company B is the amount transferred 
in from Company A, plus interest. Again, a change in 
the benefit level occurs when the benefit is calculated
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TABLE 11
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE UNDER
10-YR. VESTING RULE3- FOR FUTURE SERVICE BENEFITS 
(All Transferred-in Benefits Automatically Vest)
Asset Value Asset Value
Company Transferred Company Transferred Company




33 1,48034 1,600 b ps==1,981°35 1,720 $4,561° 2,082
3 6 1,840 (equivalent 2,185
37 1,960 to $1,561 2,290
38 2,080 annuity; 2,398
39 2,200 $69 annual 2,507 r| PS=9874o 2,320 annuity 2,618 $5,683 1,107
41 2,440 lost because 2,732 (equivalent 1,227
42 2,560 of expense 2,848 to $1,874 1,347
43 2,580 charge) 2,966 annuity; 1,46744 2,800 3,087 $650 annual 1,587
45 2,920 3,210 annuity lost 1,70746 3,040 3,335 due to ex­ 1,827
47 3,160 3,463 pense charge 1,94748 3,280 3,594 and lost 2,067
49 3,400 3,727 accrued 2,187
50 3,520 3,863 annuity) 2,307
51 3,540 4,002 2,427
52 . 3,76o 4,143 2,547
53 3,880 4,287 2,667
5k 4,000 4,434 2,787
55 4,120 4,584 2,90756 4,240 4,737 3,027
57 4,360 4,893 3.147
58 4,480 5,052 3,267
59 4,600 5,214 3,3876o 4,720 5,380 3.507
61 4,840 5,549 3.627
62 4,960 5,721 3,747
63 5,060 5.897 3.867
6 k 5,200 6,076 3,987
65 5,320 6,259 4,107
aIn this example, the Williams-Javits deferred 
graded vesting formula (30 percent after eight years service 
plus 10 percent for each year thereafter) would produce the 
same results as the ten year vesting.
TABLE 11--Continued
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2.65 x $1,720 = $4,561 (Present value of $1,720 
annual annuity at actuarial assumptions for Company A 
with expense loading).
0 See Table 14 for annuity calculations for 
Company B.
*1
Since the employee stayed with Company B only 
five years, no accrued future service benefits were vested.
service benefits with 
246 « $5»683)
J. V  W X W W W V -I- ^ ^  W  i
The only vested benefits were past vi< 
interest ($4,561 x (1.045)-3 = $4,561 x 1
eSee Table 15 for annuity calculations for Company C.
on the basis of the actuarial assumptions of Company C, 
which include a more conservative interest assumption 
and a more conservative mortality assumption. The use of 
these different actuarial assumptions in benefit recalcu­
lation result in a benefit loss for the transferring employee
The complete benefit development for Companies 
B and C are presented in Tables l^ and 15* Had the employee 
remained with Company A, he would not have had the salary 
increases brought about by changing jobs, but the final 
retirement benefit would have been $1,213 per year higher.
Rule of 50.— The annuity available for the same 
mobile employee under the Rule of 50 for vesting is calcu­
lated in Table 12. The final benefit under this vesting 
provision is considerably lower than that under the ten 
year vesting provision; i.e., $1,717 annual benefit is 
lost due to the two job changes. The reasons for benefit 
loss are the same under the Rule of 50 as under the ten 
year vesting provision, except that only 50 percent of 
Employee X's benefits are vested when he makes his first 
job change. Thus, since termination occurs before full 
vesting is attained, half of the accrued benefits are 
lost. Other benefit adjustments are similar to those 
made in Table 11.
Immediate Full Vesting.— As is indicated by the 
benefit calculation under a 100 percent immediate vesting 
provision in Table 13, a final benefit loss is experienced
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TABLE 12
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE UNDER
THE RULE OF 50 VESTING FOR FUTURE SERVICE BENEFITS 

















35 1,720 $2,280a 1,091
36 1,840 (equivalent 1,194
37 1.9 60 to $825 1,29938 2,080 annuity; 1,407 ri39 2,200 $895 annual 1,516 PS=49340 2,320 annuity lost 1,627 $2,841° 603
4l 2,440 because of 1,741 (equivalent 723
42 2,560 expense chargel,857 to $937 843
43 2,680 and incom­ 1,975 annuity; $643 96344 2,800 plete vest­ 2,096 annual 1,083
45 2,920 ing; $2,280 2,219 annuity lost 1,20346 3,040 f 2.762 = 2,344 due to ex­ 1,32347 3,160 $825) 2,472 pense charge 1,443
48 3,280 2,603 and incom­ 1,563
49 3,400 2,736 plete vest­ 1,683
50 3,520 2,872 ing; $2,84l 1,803
51 3,640 3,011 f 2.032 = 1,923
52 3,760 3,152 $937) 2,043
53 3,880 3,296 2,16354 4,000 3,443 2,283
55 4,120 3,593 2,403
56 4,240 3,746 2,523
57 4,360 3,902 2,643
58 4,480 4,061 2,763
59 4,600 4,223 2,883
6o 4,720 4,389 3,003
61 4,840 4,558 3,123
62 4,960 4,730 3,243
63 5,060 4,906 3,36364 5,200 5,085 3,483
65 5,320 5,268 3,603
a2.652 x $860 = $2,280 (Present value of $860 
annual annuity at actuarial assumptions for Company A with 
4 percent expense loading. Since age (35) plus years of
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TABLE 12— Continued
service (15) total 50» the employee is 50 percent vested 
under the Rule of 50; i.e., vested benefit is 50 percent 
of accrued benefit or .50 x $1,720 = $860.)
See Table 14 for calculation of annuity for 
Company B.
cSince employee transferred to Company C at 
age forty with only five years of service, no future 
service benefits with Company B were vested. The only 
vested benefits were past service benefits with interest 
($1,280 x (1.045)-5 = $2,280 x 1.246 = $2,841).




ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE
















33 1,480 ■u34 1,600 PS==1,981
35 1,720 $4,56la 2,08236 1,840 (equivalent 2,185
37 1,960 to $1,651 2,290
38 2,080 annual 2,398 /i39 2,200 annuity; 2,507 $1,31340 2,320 $69 annual 2,618 $7,56lc 1,4334i 2,440 annuity lost 2,732 1,55342 2,560 due to ex­ 2,848 1,673
43 2,680 pense 2,966 1,79344 2,800 charge) 3,087 1,913
45 2,920 3,210 2,03346 3,040 3,335 2,153
47 3,160 3,^63 2,27348 3,280 3,594 2,393
49 3,400 3,727 2,513
50 3,520 3,863 2,633
51 3,64o 4,002 2,753
52 3,76o 4,143 2,873
53 3,880 4,287 2,993
54 4,000 4,434 3,113
55 4,120 4,584 3,233
56 4,240 4,737 3,353
57 4,360 4,893 3,473
58 4,480 5,052 3,593
59 4,600 5,214 3,71360 4,720 5,380 3,83361 4,840 5,549 3,95362 4,960 5,721 4,073
63 5,060 5,897 4,19364 5,200 6,076 4,31365 5,320 6,259 4,433
a2.652 x $1,720 = $4,561 (Present value of $1,720 
annual annuity at actuarial assumptions for Company A 




See Table 1^ for annuity calculation for 
Company B (Same as annuity under ten year vesting rule).
c2.888 x $2,618 (Present value of $2,618 annual 
annuity at actuarial assumption for Company B).




ANNUITY CALCULATION FOR COMPANY B
Annuity for Cumulative Cumulative 
Salary = Year Annuity Annuity
Age Salary |1.02) (.015xSalary) 10-Yr. Vesting Rule of 50
PS=l,98la PS= 990
35 $6,730 101 2,082 1,091
36 6,865 103 2,185 1,194
37 7,000 105 2,290 1,29938 7,190 108 2,398 1,407
39 7,285 109 2,507 1,51640 7,430 111 2,618 1,627
41 7,580 114 2,732 1,741
42 7,730 116 2,848 1,857
43 7,885 118 2,966 1,97544 8,040 121 3,087 2,096
45 8,205 123 3,210 2,21946 8,365 125 3,335 2,34447 8,535 128 3,463 2,47248 8,705 131 3,594 2,603
49 8,880 133 3,727 2,736
50 9,055 136 3,863 2,872
51 9,240 139 4,002 3,011
52 9,420 141 4,143 3,152
53 9,610 144 4,287 3,29654 9,805 147 4,434 3,443
55 10,000 150 4,584 3,593
56 10,200 153 4,737 3,746
57 10,405 156 4,893 3,902
58 10,610 159 5,052 4,o6l
59 10,825 162 5,214 4,22360 11,040 166 5,380 4,389
61 11,260 169 5,549 4,558
62 11,485 172 5,721 4,730
63 11,715 176 5,897 4,90664 11,940 179 6,076 5,085
65 12,190 183 6,259 5,268
aPast Service Annuity calculated from amount trans­
ferred in ($4,561), using actuarial assumptions for Com­
pany B ($4,561 r 2.302).
b$2,280 * 2.302 = $990.
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TABLE 15
ANNUITY CALCULATION FOR COMPANY C
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative 
Annual Annuity Annuity Annuity
Salary = Annuity 10-Yr. Rule of 50 Immediate
Age Salaryx_1(1.01) Earned Vesting Vesting Vesting
40 $8,500
PS=987^ $987 $493° $1,313d120 1,107 603 1,43341 8,628 120 1,227 723 1,55342 8,757 120 1,347 843 1,67343 8,889 120 1,4 67 963 1,79344 9,022 120 1,587 1,083 1,913
45 9,157 120 1,707 1,203 2,03346 9,295 120 1,827 1,323 2,15347 9,434 120 1,947 1,443 2,27348 9,576 120 2,067 1,563 2,39349 9,719 120 2,187 1,683 2,51350 9,876 120 2,307 1,803 2,633
51 10,013 120 2,427 1,923 2,75352 10,163 120 2,547 2,043 2,873
53 10,316 120 2,667 2,163 2,99354 10,471 120 2,787 2,283 3,113
55 10,628 120 2,907 2,403 3,23356 10,787 120 3,027 2,523 3,353
57 10,949 120 3,147 2,643 3,473
58 11,113 120 3,267 2,763 3,593
59 11,280 120 3.387 2,883 3,71360 11,449 120 3,507 3.003 3,83361 11,621 120 3.627 3,123 3.95362 11,795 120 3.747 3,243 4,073
63 11,972 120 3,867 3.363 4,19364 12,151 120 3,987 3.483 4,313
65 12,334 120 4,107 3,603 4,433
aPast Service Annuity calculated from amount trans­
ferred in ($5,583), using actuarial assumptions for Com­
pany C. ($5,683 f 5.760)
toli percent of five year final average salary;
.015 x .2($11,621 + 11,795 + 11,972 + 12,151 + 12,334).
c$2,841 t 5.760 = $493.
d$7,651 t 5.760 = $1,313.
even when no losses are incurred due to vesting provisions. 
The benefit loss, $887. is not as severe as that experienced 
under either of the limited vesting provisions and is 
due solely to calculation using different actuarial assump­
tions and the transfer charge made by Company A.
Comparison of Retirement Benefits Available to the Mobile 
Employee and the Long-Service Employee
Continuous Service.--Table 16 illustrates the 
annuity available to Employee X had he been employed con­
tinuously by either Company A, B, or C. The starting 
salary earned by the employee with an entry age of twenty 
is assumed to be approximately $5,000 for each company.^ 
Although different benefit formulas are used by the companies 
the ultimate benefit for employees with similar salaries 
and service periods are nearly equal. Many employers try 
to follow the so-called "50 percent of final average income" 
rule of thumb in establishing the broad benefit objectives 
of a pension plan, especially for long-term employees. The 
final benefit available to employees under Companies B and 
C comply with this criterion: 46.9 percent for Company B
and 45.1 percent for Company C.
By remaining in continuous service with one 
employer, Employee X would have received considerably 
higher benefits than as a mobile participant under the plan
■^Salary is irrelevant for the benefit calculation 
for Company A, since the benefit formula is a flat amount 





























ANNUITY AVAILABLE HAD EMPLOYEE REMAINED WITH













$1,120 $6,065 $91 $833 $1,2001,240 6,215 93 926 1,3201,360 6,340 94 1,020 1,440
1,480 6,470 97 1,117 1,5601,600 6,595 99 1,216 1,6801,720 6,730 101 1,317 1,8001,840 6,865 103 1,420 1,9201,960 7,000 105 1,525 2,0402,080 7,190 108 1,633 2,1602,200 7,285 109 1,742 2,2802,320 7,430 111 1,853 2,4002,440 7,580 114 1,967 2,5202,560 7,730 116 2,083 2,6402,680 7,885 118 2,201 2,7602,800 8 ,040 121 2,322 2,880
2,920 8,205 123 2,445 3,000
3,040 8,365 125 2,570 3,1203,160 8,535 128 2,698 3,2403,280 8,705 131 2,829 3,3603,400 8,880 133 2,962 3,4803,520 9,055 136 3,098 3,6003,640 9,240 139 3,237 3,720
3,760 9,420 141 3,378 3,840
3,880 9,610 144 3,522 3,960
4,000 9,805 147 3,669 4,080
4,120 10,000 150 3,819 4,200
4,240 10,200 153 3,972 4,3204,360 10,405 156 4,128 4,440
4,480 10,610 159 4,28 7 4,560
4,600 10,825 162 4,449 4,680
4,720 11,040 166 4,615 4,800
4,840 11,260 169 4,784 4,920
4,960 11,485 172 4,956 5,0405,060 11,715 176 5,132 5,1605,200 11,940 179 5,3U 5,280
5,320 12,190 183 5,494 5,400
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of either Company A, B, or C. In additiont the benefit 
amount would have been similar. Although the employee 
gained a salary increase with each job change, there was 
considerable erosion of pension benefits due to termination 
with the portability feature.
Full Vesting without Portability.— Benefit preser­
vation can be achieved with 100 percent immediate vesting 
as is shown by the benefit calculation in Table 17. If 
all plan benefits were 100 percent vested and left in 
"cold storage" with each previous employer, and thus not 
subject to recalculation on the basis of different actuarial 
assumptions and administrative charges, Employee X would 
receive (from three different sources) an aggregate annual 
retirement income of $5,366. This amount is nearly com­
parable to the possible benefit available under either of 
the three plans had the employee been in the service of 
only one employer.
Benefit preservation similar to that indicated in 
Table 17 would result from all employers using uniform 
actuarial assumptions for transfer purposes, without 
imposing a portability expense charge. That is, each 
terminating employee would transfer the full value of his 
accrued benefits to the succeeding employer's fund. Never­
theless, slight deviations would occur if the actuarial 
basis of a plan differs from the uniform assumptions.
Employers eventually may attempt to standardize all cal­
culation assumptions to eliminate any confusion. It is
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TABLE 17
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE 
(No Portability)



























Vesting Formula Total Annuity Available
100 percent Immediate Vesting $5,366
Rule of 50 3*980
10-Yr. Vesting (same as Williams-
Javits Deferred Graded Vesting) 4,840
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unlikely, however, that the expense charge for fund trans­
fers will be eliminated since investment losses still 
could result from forced liquidation and mortality dis­
counting would no longer be possible for the terminated 
employees.
Conversion Factors for Transfer Values
The effect of plan assumptions on benefits being 
transferred is indicated by the following hypothetical 
illustration. Simulated conversion factors were developed 
for transfers between plans that differ only in several 
key assumptions. The evaluation includes a description 
of plan assumptions, an analysis of the conversion factors 
and a table of present value factors for $1 of annual 
annuity available under each plan.
Plan Assumptions
Plan 1
1. Mortality» 1951 Group Annuity Table projected
eight years by Scale C and rated one year
younger for males and six years younger for 
females
2* Interest: ^ percent
3* Loading? ^ percent
4. Normal Retirement Age; Male 65
Plan 2
1.-3. Same as Plan 1
4. Normal Retirement Age t Male 60
Plan 3
1,-2. Same as Plan 1
3. Loadings None
4. Same as Plan 1
Plan b
1. Same as Plan 3
2. Interest: b jt percent
3>-~b. Same as Plan 3
Plan 3
1. Mortality: 1951 Group Annuity Table projected
sixteen years by Scale C and rated one year 
younger for males and six years younger for 
females
2. Interest: 2|- percent
3. Loading: None
b , Normal Retirement Age: Male 65
Analysis of Conversion Factors
An employee transferring from Plan 1 with a normal 
retirement age of 65 to Plan 2 with a normal retirement 
age of 60 would lose J b , 6  percent of his benefits as 
shown in Table 18. The right, however, to retire early 
under Plan 2 in comparison to Plan 1 may compensate for 
the benefit loss.
If an employee transfers pension assets from a 
fund which is assumed to earn b percent to a fund assumed 
to earn bj? percent, a benefit increase can be expected. For 
example, an employee aged fifty-one who transfers assets from 
Plan 3 to Plan b , will experience a benefit increase of
11.1 percent. The higher interest rate will benefit 
younger more than older employees since the accumulation 
period is longer for younger participants as compared to 
that for older employees. In a similar manner, if the 
employee changes to a fund using more conservative (lower) 
interest assumptions, the benefit would be reduced. For 

































CONVERSION FACTORS FOR TRANSFER VALUES 
(Applied to Benefit Level— No Expense Charge)
From Plan 1 
to Plan 2
From Plan 3 
to Plan 4
From Plan 3 
to Plan 5
.654 1.229 .507.654 1.223 .515.654 1.217 .522
.65 4 1.212 .530
. 654 1.205 .538.654 1.200 .546
. 654 1.194 • 55^.654 1.189 .562.654 1.182 .570
.654 1.177 .579. 654 1.171 .587. 654 1.165 .596
.65 4 1.160 .605.654 1.154 .614
.654 1.149 .623.654 1.151 .632.65 4 1.138 .642
. 654 1.132 .651
. 654 1.127 .661
.654 1.122 .671




.65 4 1.095 .723.654 1.090 .735.654 1.085 .746
. 654 1.080 .758
. 654 1.074 .770
.654 1.069 .781
. 654 1.064 .794





PRESENT VALUE OF $1 ANNUITY BEGINNING AT NORMAL
RETIREMENT AGE
Age Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 3 Plan 4 Plan 5
30 2.353 3.599 2.259 1.838 4.453
31 2.449 3.746 2.351 1.923 4.56832 2.549 3.900 2.447 2.011 4 .685
33 2.654 4.o6o 2.548 2.103 4.80734 2.763 4.226 2.652 2.200 4.931
35 2.877 4.400 2.762 2.302 5.060
3 6 2.995 4.581 2.875 2.408 5.192
37 3.119 4.771 2.994 2.519 5-32838 3.248 4.968 3.118 2.637 5.467
39 3.383 5.174 3.248 2.760 5.41240 3.523 5.389 3.382 2.888 5.7604l 3.670 5* 6l4 3.523 3.023 5.91342 3.824 5.850 3.671 3.164 6.071
4 3 3.985 6.096 3.826 3-314 6.23344 4.154 6.354 3.988 3.470 6.40245 4.331 6.624 4.158 3.613 6.57746 4.517 6.909 4.336 3.810 6.75 8
47 4.713 7.209 4.524 3.995 6.94848 4.919 7.525 4.722 4.190 7.145
49 5.137 7.858 4.932 4.397 7.352
50 5.368 8.211 5.153 4.6l6 7.568
51 5.612 8.585 5.388 4.850 7.79 4
52 5.871 8.980 5.636 5.098 8.031
53 6.146 9.401 5.900 5.362 8.28054 6.438 9.848 6.180 5.643 8.543
55 6.749 IO.323 6.479 5.944 8.820
56 7.080 10.829 6.797 6.266 9.111
57 7.433 11.370 7.136 6.610 9.419
58 7.811 11.947 7.499 6.980 9.745
59 8.214 12.565 7.885 7.376 10.09060 8.647 13.227 8.301 7.801 10.45761 9.111 8.747 8.259 10.84562 9.611 9.227 8,754 11.259
63 10.154 9.744 9.290 11.70264 10.734 10.305 9.872 12.178
65 11.370 10.915 10.507 12.690
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funds from Plan ^ to Plan 3* a benefit reduction of 10.0 
percent would be experienced.
An employee changing jobs which involves two 
pension plans based on widely different interest and 
mortality assumptions may also experience a benefit change.
The mortality and interest assumptions for Plan 5 are more 
conservative than those used in Plan 3* The conservative 
actuarial assumptions employed in Plan 5 result in large 
benefit losses for younger employees; i.e., almost 50 
percent of accrued benefits are lost. The benefit loss 
for older employees is not as great (only an approximate 
20 percent benefit loss) because the interest accumulation 
period is not as long for younger employees. It is clear, 
therefore, that changes in actuarial assumptions, especially 
interest earned by the pension fund, can have a significant 
effect on pension preservation.
Conclusions
The very simple examples presented in this chapter 
illustrate a few of the problems related to the determination 
of transfer values for pension credits. For example, 
incomplete funding could endanger the adequacy of the 
pension fund if many terminations are experienced. In 
addition, benefit fluctuations may result from an employee's 
changing jobs several times if transfer expense charges 
are made by an employer and/or the actuarial assumptions 
used by different employers are not uniform.
Since an employer must forego mortality cost 
reductions for benefits transferred out of the fund, some 
charge must be made so that the remaining employees are 
not treated inequitably. The pension credits ported to 
a succeeding fund on behalf of the terminating employee 
must become nonforfeitable; i.e., a death benefit equal 
in value to the transferred pension credit must be payable 
to the beneficiaries of an employee who dies prior to 
normal retirement by the succeeding employer. On the 
other hand, employees who remained with one employer may 
have pension benefits which are forfeitable upon death 
in the preretirement period. Unless an offsetting charge 
is made, a mobile employee would have more secure benefits 
than the long-service employee since ported credits are 
fully funded and nonforfeitable. The determination of 
such an expense charge would be difficult. The flat 
percentage reduction of pension assets transferred out 
as suggested in this chapter may not be suitable in every 
situation. Another possible solution would be a fee based 
on the terminating employee's prorated portion of the un­
funded supplemental liability.
The administrative problems created for the suc­
ceeding employer by this nonforfeitable benefit would be 
numerous. Each employee's nonforfeitable assets would 
have to be accounted for separately; each employee would 
have a death benefit of a different amount.
The problem of the creation of nonforfeitable
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benefits is easily circumvented, and benefit preservation 
fully maintained, by providing vesting. The employee 
would receive the same (or larger) benefits if vesting 
without portability were implemented, thus giving credence 
to the supposition that portability is not necessary.
Although portability might be feasible if uniform 
transfer values were legislated and the nonforfeitability 
of transferred pension credits were ignored, the desirability 
of such actions is questionable. Private pension plans 
as a whole would be subject to a loss of flexibility 
because of the increased funding necessary to maintain 
a plan's qualified status in the event of adverse termina­
tion experience. In addition, the uniformity of actuarial 
assumptions for transfer purposes may lead to a further 
standardization of all actuarial assumptions, thus removing 
a stimulative competitive factor in the pension industry.
The many problems related to portability imple­
mentation have caused legislators to avoid considering 
passage of any legislation mandating portability. The 
strongest legislative proposals before the 93d Congress, 
however, do involve more limited forms of portability and 
are analyzed in the next chapter for the purpose of 
determining the future of full portability.
CHAPTER VIII
THE PORTABILITY FEATURES OF MAJOR PENSION 
LEGISLATION BEFORE THE 93d CONGRESS
Introduction
There are three major pension reform bills before
1the 93d Congress as well as many additional minor bills. 
Major legislation has been introduced by (1) Senators 
Harrison A. Williams (D— N.J.) and Jacob K, Javits (R— N.Y.) 
of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
(2) the Nixon Administration (sponsors: Rep. Wilbur D. 
Mills (D— Ark.); Rep.John N. Erlenborn (R— 111.); Rep.
John Dent (D— Pa.) and Rep. Albert H. Quie (R— Minn.)) and
(3) Rep. John Dent, Chairman of the House General
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education
/
and Labor. Each of these bills includes a portability 
feature, representing opposing and contrasting positions 
on the degree, as well as on the means of implementation, 
of portability. The jointly sponsored Williams-Javits 
bill provides for a voluntary clearinghouse administered
■'"See Appendix E for a summary of the minor bills 
before the 93d Congress. These bills are deemed to be 
minor because they are either narrow in scope, or less 




within the Department of Labor. The Dent bill, on the 
other hand, contains a provision for a clearinghouse 
supervised within the Department of Labor, but partici­
pation by employers is mandatory.
In direct contrast to the clearinghouse concept 
espoused by the Senate and House Labor Committee bills, 
the proposal by the Nixon Administration includes as a 
tax free transaction any lump-sum distribution of assets 
from either a qualified individual or employer-sponsored 
private pension plan to a succeeding qualified individual 
or employer-sponsored private pension plan. Reinvestment 
must occur within a specified period of time and all 
involved parties must consent to the transfer. The porta­
bility feature of the Nixon Administration bill, therefore, 
is voluntary and fund transfer is direct.
The portability features of three major bills 
indicated above are discussed in detail in this chapter.
In addition, provisions of these bills which are related 
only indirectly to portability are briefly outlined. A 
complete statement of the major bill provisions is presented 
in Appendix D.
Williams-Javits Joint Senate Bill
Background of the Bill
The "Retirement Income Security for Employees
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Act of 1973" (S. 4-),̂  also referred to as "RISE," was 
introduced in the 93d Congress on January 4, 1973^  
Currently, S. ^ has fifty-three sponsors, which is a 
majority of the Senate.^” It thus is expected that this 
bill will be passed as soon as it is brought to the Senate 
floor.
The 1973 Williams-Javits bill is nearly identical 
to S. 3598, a 1972 bill introduced and sponsored by the 
same Senators in the 92d Congress which was not passed. 
Although primarily developed by the Subcommittee on Labor 
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. 3598 
was based on an earlier bill introduced by Sen. Javits 
alone.^ The latter was developed by Sen. Javits because 
of his own personal interest in and study of pension 
reform and was patterned after the Ontario Act.
As a result of the increased interest in pension 
reform evidenced during the 91st Congress, the Subcommittee
pU.S., Congress, Senate, Retirement Income Security 
for Employees Act of 1973. 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973» S. k ,
-̂ The House counterpart of S. 4 has been intro­
duced by Rep. Henry P. Smith (R— N.Y.) as H,R. 2^32.
^Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1973* P» 26.
^S. 2, introduced in the 92d Cong., 1st sess., also 
had been introduced by Sen. Javits in several earlier 
sessions of Congress,
A complete discussion of the provisions of the 
Ontario Act and similar Canadian legislation is included 
in the analysis of portability prototypes in Chapter 5*
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on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare was authorized to conduct a study of private
nwelfare and pension plans . ( Continuation of this study 
has proceeded through the 92d and 93d Congress. The 
scope of the three year Senate-sponsored study has in-
Oeluded hearings on various aspects of pension reform, 
studies conducted in cooperation with the private pension
gindustry, and a statistical cross-section survey of 1,493
private pension plans.10
The Senate survey of private pension plans has
been widely criticized for several reasons. First, only
plans which had been in existence since 1950 and were
still active in 1970 were reviewed and plan experience,
in some cases, was averaged over that twenty year interval.
Plans with that longevity obviously have provided 
an unusually long time in which individuals could
7U.S., Congress, Senate, Authorization of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Labor to Conduct a Study of Pension 
and Welfare Plans, S. Res. 3^0, 91st Cong., 2d sess.,
March 12, 1970.
O
For example, in addition to hearings on general 
pension reform, hearings on terminations alone have been 
reported in: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Private Welfare Pension Plan Study, 
1972— Report of Hearings on Pension Plan Terminations,
92d Cong,  t 2d sess., September, 1972.
qU.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Study of the Cost of Mandatory Vesting 
Provisions for Private Pension Plans, by Donald S. Grubbs, 
Jr., Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, February, 1973)*
10U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Statistical Analysis of Ma.ior Character­
istics of Private Pension Plans, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 
September, 1972.
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meet service and, indeed, age requirements. Shorter- 
lived plans do not provide equal opportunities.
Similarly, such averaging may not represent a current or
realistic ahalysis of the future.
A second area of criticism of the study involves
the questionnaire used to complete the survey. The
questionnaire was lengthy (over thirty pages) and contained
questions deemed "ambiguous," "out-of-context," conducive
12to misinterpretation, and "irrelevant." Many of these 
questions would impose a heavy reporting burden on partici­
pants, Moreover, since some of the answers required 
were averages, any recent improvements in the plan might 
be distorted. In addition, "although the staff intends 
to work objectively, there is danger of influence by 
partisan politics unless outside objective expertise is 
called upon."1-̂ Although outside advice initially was 
rejected by the Senate Labor Subcommittee staff, later 
studies were conducted with the cooperation and assistance 
of the private pension industry.
A final source of criticism of the Senate survey
11Merton C. Bernstein, "The Pension Industry and 
Effective Reform," Pension and Welfare News. VII, No. 9 
(September, 1971)» 15.
12Frank L. Griffin, "President of Conference 
of Actuaries in Public Practice Comments on Pension 
Questionnaire and Offers to Interpret Results," Employee 
Benefit Plan Review; Research Reports, October, 1970, p. 2.
13̂"Leary Reviews Washington Scene at Merdinger 
Seminar," Weekly Mews Digest, Employee Benefit Plan 
Review Research Reports. October 2, 1970, p. 1.
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is related to the statistical analysis of the survey 
results. For example, the "one-in-nine" rule established 
by the Senate Subcommitte survey has been widely disputed 
because of the implication that only 11 percent of those 
covered under private pension plans ever receive benefits 
from those plans.
The logical error of such statements is that 
they fail to recognize that an employee who leaves 
one employer without any vested rights does not drop 
out of the labor force. He goes to another employer 
and typically, in time, will settle down and work 
long enough to establish his entitlement to vested 
benefits.
Despite the barrage of criticisms surrounding the 
early activity of the Senate Labor Subcommittee, legislation 
has been reported out of the whole Committee in both the 
92d and 93d Congress primarily on the basis of the recom­
mendations of the study. S. h, the current bill from the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, provides 
deferred graded vesting, minimum funding standards, 
termination insurance for all unfunded vested liabilities, 
increased disclosure and fiduciary responsibility standards, 
overfunding procedures, termination priorities and volun­
tary portability for all plans with twenty-five or more 
employees. The provisions would be administered by the 
Department of Labor, which would be empowered to petition
•t h William A. Dreher, "Deadline for Private Pensions," 
Pension and Welfare News. VII, No. 9 (September, 1971)t 16.
13̂See Appendix D for a complete description of the 
provisions of S. k .
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the courts to compel compliance.
The Voluntary Portability Provision
Title III of the Retirement Income Security for
Employees Act of 1973 provides for a Voluntary Portability
Program Fund to be established and administered by the
16Secretary of Labor. This voluntary portability program
is designed to facilitate transfer of vested credits between
qualified pension and profit-sharing retirement plans. It
is voluntary on the part of both the employee and the
employer; i.e., either party may require that vested
pension credits ramain in the employer's fund. In addition,
the Secretary of Labor is ". . . empowered to protect
the employee's vested interest from his initial plan by
assuring that the credits purchased from the new plan
17have equivalent actuarial value."
All funds deposited in the portability fund are 
to be invested in interest-bearing accounts of commercial 
banlts and savings and loan associations. The amount deposited 
in each of these financial institutions cannot exceed the 
deposit insurance maximum specified by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan 
Insurance Corporation.
16U.S., Congress, Senate, Retirement Income Security 
for Employees Act of 1973, S. 4,  ppT l 4 o - l 4 l .
17U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Report to Accompany S. 4, Retirement In­
come Security for Employees Act of 1973, Rept. No.
93-127* 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973. S. 4, p. 24.
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An additional provision of Title III of S. 4 
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to provide any technical
v
assistance requested by plan administrators for the 
purpose of entering into a reciprocal arrangement. Such 
an arrangement would allow free transfer of pension 
credits within the participating employer group. The 
Secretary is not required to establish reciprocal arrange- 
ments, but merely to provide technical advice.
The clearinghouse concept has been utilized by 
the Senate Labor Subcommittee as a means of facilitating 
pension fund transfers because that Committee is not 
authorized to initiate tax code revisions. If a central 
clearinghouse were not used, the terminating employee 
would get "constructive receipt" of the pension funds 
which would be taxed as ordinary income to the employee.
Obviously, if present tax laws could be modified 
to permit the tax-free transfer of vested credits 
by employees from job to job, then the 'clearinghouse' 
system established by this Title might not be indis­
pensable. However, in the absence of such far-reaching 
tax charges, the voluntary program established herein 
Can provegto be of inestimable value to many parti­
cipants.
The employers most likely to join the voluntary
portability program would be those in industries which
compete for skilled labor; e.g., technicians and professional
people. The portability feature would be an attractive
19fringe benefit for mobile employees.
l8Ibid.
■^Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub­
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits, 
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
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Criticisms of a Voluntary Portability Clearing­
house .— In addition to the general criticisms of the 
concept of portability, further criticism has been directed 
toward the idea of a voluntary portability system. For 
example, some experts contend that a voluntary system 
will not be supported. Former Secretary of Labor, James 
D. Hodgson has stated:
I think it flies in the face of natural moti­
vation of employers to expect them to develop an 
interest in providing portability that is an invi­
tation for a worker to leave their employ. It is 
highly dubious that much will result frompthis 
kind of situation, maybe a few odd cases.
It also is argued that the voluntary portability fund 
is unlikely to be supported because of the cost of parti­
cipation in the fund. Merton C. Bernstein has pointed 
out that when funds are transferred out of the pension 
fund, the employer no longer has the advantage of interest 
and mortality discounting as a means of reducing pension 
costs. If the employer is forced to base the fund transfer 
on conservative reserve actuarial assumptions, his loss 
is magnified; i.e., the more conservative the actuarial
assumptions used for the transfer value calculation, the
21higher the cost to the employer.
POU.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees 
Act, 1972. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598,
S. 302^, S. 3012 and Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
1972, p. 107.
? 1"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News,
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), VT,
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Other criticisms of the voluntary portability
program are more obvious than the premise of lack of
participation. First, the voluntary system may provide
nothing more than preservation of vested benefits. Second,
since portability may be difficult to apply to unallocated
funds, false hopes might be raised for employees. Finally,
"in order to take advantage of the F.D.I.C. insurance,
the clearing house would have to open thousands of accounts.
22It would fast run out of banks.'
Future of Voluntary Portability.— In commenting
on the voluntary portability feature of the Williams-Javits
bill, Mike Gordon, minority counsel to the Senate Labor
Subcommittee, has said that portability is not the strongest
part of the bill since Labor and Management both testified
23against it and no one really supported it. J The volun­
tary portability feature probably will be dropped if the 
tax free transfer provisions of the Nixon Administration 
proposal are adopted.
The Nixon Administration Proposal
Background of the Bill
The "Retirement Benefits Tax Act" (H.R. 7157) was 
introduced into the House of Representatives on April 
18, 1973 on behalf of the Nixon Administration by Rep.
22Ibid.
^U.S., Congress, House, Retirement Benefits Tax 
Act, 93d Cong,, 1st sess., H.R. 7157.
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Wilbur D. Mills for himself and others.2^ The bill has
been referred to the Committee on Ways and Means since
it is a federal income tax related bill.2-’ Although the
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means was the primary
sponsor of the tax reform bill, Rep. Mills has not openly
2 6supported this legislation this year.
The Nixon Administration proposal was developed 
by the White House Pension Task Force and supported by 
studies made by the Departments of Labor and the Treasury 
and an A.S. Hansen, Inc. study ( a private pension con­
sulting firm) of its clients.2"'7 Tax reform legislation 
that pertains to private pensions was proposed by the 
Nixon Administration in the 92d Congress (as H.R. 12272), 
but the bill was never reported out of the Committee on 
Ways and Means. The version introduced in the 93d Congress 
has been expanded and liberalized considerably.
2LlU.S., Congress, House, Retirement Benefits Tax 
Act, 93d Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 7157*
2^The Senate counterpart of this bill, S. 1631, was 
introduced by Sen. Carl Curtis (R— Neb.) for himself and 
others, and referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
The Administration proposals for Fiduciary Responsibility 
and Disclosure, to be administered by the Secretary of 
Labor, introduced as S. 1557 in the Senate and H.R. 6900 
in the House, have been referred to the concerned Labor 
Committees of each respective house.
26Committee prints pertaining to the Administration 
pension reform bill clearly state that such information 
does not represent the position of the Committee on 
Ways and Means.
27Ronald B. Gold, Financial Economist, U.S. 
Treasury, representing the Nixon Administration position 
on Pension Legislation, private interview, Washington,
D.C., August 10, 1972.
227
The Administration reform bill has been centered 
around the obtainment of several goals. For example, 
concern has been expressed that the private pension 
system be encouraged rather than inhibited through 
penalty legislation. As stated by former Secretary of 
Labor James D. Hodgson in a speech before the National 
Foundation of Health, Welfare and Pension Plans;
We have also been very much concerned with the 
maintenance of continued health, flexibility, and 
vigor of our private pension system and assuring an 
interest by the employer in maintaining and expanding 
it. We regard this system as one of the triumphs of 
our form of enterprise. So we are very anxious 
not to impair its growth or damage its flexibility 
to meet needs in widely different circumstances.
The desire to meet this goal was made manifest in the
bill provisions which would add minimum vesting and
funding standards to the requirements for qualification
for favorable tax treatment of pension fund contributions
in the Internal Revenue Code of 195^* Enforcement of
these standards would be effected by the Secretary of
the Treasury by denial of plan qualification in the
event of noncompliance; the incentive to comply is evident.
Another goal of the Nixon Administration pension 
tax reform is the encouragement of individual self-reliance 
and personal savings. Toward this end, three specific
"Secy. Hodgson Promotes Pension Reform as Saving 
Private Pension System," Recent Developments in Pension 
Benefits. Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports, 
December 31» 1971» P« !•
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29tax related provisions have been included in H.R. 7157• 
First, an employee would be allowed to deduct from his 
gross income for federal income tax purposes any contri­
butions to a qualified individual retirement account 
(QIRA) or a qualified employer-sponsored private pension 
plan. Second, self-employed persons who contribute to 
some type of qualified pension plan for themselves and 
their employees (called Keogh or H.R. 10 plans) would be 
allowed a more generous deduction than that now permitted. 
Third, a tax free transfer could be made from one quali- 
fied individual or group plan to another qualified plan.-'
A final general goal of the Nixon Administration 
regarding private pension plans is related to the groups 
of employees who will receive the greatest benefit and 
protection. For example, the Rule of 50 for vesting and, 
to a lesser extent, the funding provision (twenty year 
amortization of the unfunded vested liabilities) favor 
the older employee. Ronald B. Gold, a U.S. Treasury 
financial economist who was active in the development of 
the Nixon Administration proposal, pointed out that the 
Rule of 50 does discriminate against the younger worker, 
but that many of the young are not covered anyway, so 
protection of their interests would be mythical. Thus,
^ S e e  Appendix D for a complete description of the 
provisions of H.R. 7157*
-̂CThis provision, is discussed in greater -detail 
in the next section since it is the basis of the voluntary 
portability system.
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the Rule of 50 was a "chosen trade-off," with more pro­
tection to the older worker planned.3'1'
A second group which will benefit substantially 
from the Nixon Administration tax proposals are middle- 
income employees who wish to save for their own retirement. 
For example, under the President's proposal, tax savings 
as a percentage of income are at a maximum for persons 
earning $7,500 per year whether or not they are covered 
under an existing plan.32 Although a desirable goal may 
be to help the low-income employee, such aid simply may 
not be possible through private pension reform.
The proposal by its nature will not benefit 
low-income employees. But their most pressing need 
is not greater retirement income but greater current 
income. Such persons require direct assistance both 
during their working career and at retirement through 
improved social security and public assistance 
programs. ^
Portability Through the Tax Free Direct Transfer Provision
Section 5 of the Retirement Benefits Tax Act, 
introduced as H.R. 7157» provides that an employee will 
not incur an income tax liability upon the receipt of a 
lump-sum distribution from a qualified retirement plan 
if the employee "reinvests the funds in a qualified indi­
vidual retirement account or a qualified employee-sponsored
33-Gold, private interview, August 10, 1972.
32Ronald B. Gold, "Tax Deductions for Individual 




retirement plan within 60 days after the close of the 
employee's taxable year."3^ In addition, any interest 
accrued on contributions made by an individual to a 
qualified retirement savings program would be nontaxable 
until benefits are received as retirement income.
Individual retirement savings programs include 
investment in "stocks, bonds, mutual fund shares, annuity 
and other life insurance contracts, face amount certifi­
cates and savings accounts with financial institutions."33 
Benefits from such a plan, to qualify for tax relief as 
a retirement program, cannot be paid until age 592 except 
in the case of death or disability. Penalty for noncom­
pliance with this rule is an exise tax of 30 percent 
of the amount withdrawn. In addition, withdrawals must 
begin by the time the taxpayer reaches age 70f- and must be 
large enough so that " . . .  the entire accumulation will 
be distributed over his life expectancy or the combined 
life expectancy of the taxpayer and his spouse."-^ The 
penalty for noncompliance by a taxpayer aged 7Oi or older 
is an annual exise tax of a specified amount.
The effect of the tax proposals are far reaching.
-^U.S,, Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Study Material Relating to Administration Proposal 
Entitled the "Retirement Benefits Tax Act," Committee 
Print (Washington, D.C.s Government Printing Office,




Any employee receiving a lump-sum distribution of retire­
ment benefits upon termination would be allowed to reinvest 
those assets tax free in his own individual retirement 
savings program or a succeeding employer's qualified 
private pension plan. The lump-sum distribution is made 
by the employer on a voluntary basis; i.e., the employer 
would have the option of retaining the pension fund assets 
supporting any vested liability and dispensing vested 
benefits from his own fund when the terminated employee 
retires. Provision is made, however, for both individuals 
and labor unions to negotiate for lump-sum distributions 
of retirement benefits. Since individuals and bargaining 
parties are left to develop their own portability programs, 
President Nixon's goal of individual self-reliance has 
been furthered.
Although the Nixon bill's provision for lump-sum 
distributions recontributed to qualified retirement plans 
was introduced only recently (April 18, 1973) reaction 
to the idea seems to be generally favorable. The major 
hindrance to successful passage of the entire Administration 
proposal is cost. The portability feature, latent in 
the lump-sum distribution provision, will not be costly 
since few such distributions currently are made. On the 
other hand, the revenue loss from deductions for individual 
voluntary retirement savings is expected to be $300 million
J This provision was not part of the Administration 
proposal before the 92d Congress (H.R. 12272) and is only 
one of the additions for the 93d Congress version.
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the first year after passage and $480 million hy the
nQ
fourth year. Similarly, the revenue loss resulting 
from increased contribution ceilings for self-employed 
retirement plans is expected to be $55 million in'the 
first year after enactment and rise to $110 million in 
subsequent years,39 These figures are based on the 
President's earlier pension reform proposal (H.R. 12272) and 
may understate the revenue loss since the current reform 
proposal is slightly more liberal with respect to accep­
table qualified retirement plans. The revenue loss from 
these tax reform proposals, therefore, may prevent passage 
of the entire package, including the provision for favorable 
tax treatment of lump-sum distrubutions reinvested in 
qualified retirement plans.
The Dent Bill
Background of the Bill
The "Employee Retirement Benefit Security Act"
(H.R. 462) was introduced in the House by Rep. John Dent 
on January 3i 1 9 7 3 This bill establishes a mandatory 
portability program and reinsurance of all unfunded vested
3®U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans.
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess,
1972, p. 72.
39Ibid., p. 75- 
40U.S., Congress, House, Employee Retirement Bene- 
Security Act, 93d Cong., 1st sess. , H.R.462.
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liabilities acquired after bill enactment. An additional 
bill, H.R. 2, which was introduced simultaneously by Rep.
i), iDent, provides for full vesting after ten years with 
transition provisions, minimum funding, eligibility,
j[i 2disclosure and fiduciary standards. Together, these
two bills comprise the pension reform proposals of Rep. Dent.
Although Rep. Dent has been interested in pension 
reform legislation for a number of years and has intro­
duced such legislation in prior Congressional sessions,^ 
much of the study and research supporting the current 
Dent proposal was conducted by the Pension Study Task 
Force of the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor. This committee 
was formed by the House of Representatives on September 
29, 1971 to conduct a study of vesting, funding, porta­
bility, benefit insurance, disclosure, and fiduciary 
responsibility.^ The Task Force study of pension reform 
issues will continue through the 93d Congress.
U.S., Congress, House, Employee Benefit Security 
Act, 93d Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 2,
[lO See Appendix D for a complete description of 
the Dent proposal.
^ F o r  example, Rep. Dent sponsored H.R. 1269 in 
the 92d Congress. H.R. 1269 was similar to the combined
H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 except for the omission of a portabi­
lity feature in the earlier bill.
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education 
and Labor, Interim Staff Report of Activities of the 
Pension Study Task Force of the General Subcommittee on 
Labor, Committee Print, 76-420 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.
The Mandatory Portability Provision
Title I of H.R. 462 authorizes the Secretary of 
Labor to establish and administer a Portability Program 
Fund.^ Since participation in the portability program is 
mandatory for all employers, every employee may benefit 
from the program. The employer must apply for membership 
in the program; membership is indicated by a certificate 
from the Labor Department. When an employee partici­
pating in a "member plan" terminates, he may request that 
"a sum of money equal to the current discounted value of 
. . . vested rights under the plan" be transferred to 
the portability fund administered by the Secretary of 
Labor.^
The employee may leave on deposit with this federal 
clearinghouse such accrued pension assets, or he may 
request that these funds be transferred to a succeeding 
employer's qualified plan. If the accrued pension assets 
are not transferred out of the federal portability fund, 
an immediate life annuity (or other similar insured 
retirement benefit) will be purchased on the employee's 
behalf when he retires.
The Secretary of Labor would be required to main­
tain individual accounts for all assets deposited in 
the fund. The assets of the portability fund could be
l± £-^U.S., Congress, House, Employee Retirement Bene­
fit Security Act, H.R. 462, pp. 12-15.
46 Ibid., p. 12.
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invested in interest bearing accounts of commercial banks
and savings and loan associations. The amount deposited
in any one financial institution, however, could not
exceed 10 percent of the amount in excess of that required
to meet current and anticipated withdrawals.
As indicated in House hearings in the 93d Congress,
the mandatory portability feature of the Dent proposal
for pension reform has not been well received by either
labor or management. It is quite likely, therefore, that
portability will be dropped from H.R. 462 in markup sessions
by the House Committee on Education and Labor before the
4*7bill goes before the House. ' Since that Committee was
to hold pension reform hearings in eight different cities
through May 1973» no markup sessions are anticipated 
48before summer.
Conclusions
The pension reform legislation before the 93d Con­
gress represents two contrasting means of implementing 
portability. The Nixon Administration tax proposal calls 
for the direct transfer of funds from one qualified retire­
ment plan to another. The terminating employee who
47Joseph P. Leary, Executive Director of The 
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Inc., 
telephone interview, Washington, D.C., May 16, 1973*
I* Q
"Pension Hearings to Tour 8 Cities; Report 
Released," The National Underwriter; Life and Health 
Edition, LXXVII, no. 12 (March 24, 1973). 1.
requests the transfer would not incur a tax liability for 
the lump-sum distribution of retirement benefits; i.e., 
the problem of constructive receipt would be nonexistent. 
Conversely, the Williams-Javits and Dent proposals utilize 
a central clearinghouse for implementation of portability. 
Since both of these bills are from Labor Committees which 
cannot originate tax provisions, the clearinghouse con­
cept is necessary to facilitate tax free fund transfers. 
That is, the clearinghouse solution to the problem of 
constructive receipt of transferred funds is mandatory 
since tax law modifications cannot be incorporated in 
a Labor Committee bill.
If the Nixon Administration pension tax reform 
proposals are passed, the clearinghouse mechanism will 
be dropped from the House and Senate Labor Committee 
bills. The clearinghouse would no longer be necessary 
since voluntary portability would be available through 
the tax free direct transfer provision.
PART III
FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE 
PORTABILITY CONCEPT
CHAPTER IX
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
PORTABILITY CONCEPT
Introduction
The portability concept, involving the right of a 
terminating employee to transfer the assets supporting 
his pension credits to a succeeding pension plan, has been 
proposed as a solution to the problem of providing an 
adequate, secure retirement income to a mobile labor force 
in the United States. Labor mobility is highly desirable 
as a supplement to general economic efficiency; i.e., 
allocation of economic resources is facilitated by the 
existence of an adaptable labor force able to relocate in 
adjustment to changing demand. Since private pension fund 
contributions by employers primarily are considered a 
form of deferred wages, the preservation of pension rights 
upon employee termination is a natural consequence of both 
the deferred wage theory and the desirability of labor 
mobility.
Without some means of private pension preservation, 
many employees will be unable to participate in a healthy 
American economy during their retirement years. Pension 
preservation may be achieved either by vesting alone or
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by a combination of vesting and portability. Proponents of 
vesting as a prerequisite to a fund transfer contend that 
vesting alone is not an adequate means of implementing 
a pension preservation system which permits labor mobility 
without loss of retirement credits.
For example, even if an employee remains with one 
employer long enough to accrue vested pension credits, 
a number of problems could be encountered which may endanger 
ultimate fulfillment of the promised benefit. First, 
the employer could suffer financial reverses sufficiently 
severe to force cancellation of the pension plan due 
to business necessity. If the terminated pension plan is 
even partially unfunded, there will not be sufficient 
assets to provide the accrued benefits of all pension 
promises. Second, although fraudulent practices involving 
pension funds may be rare, such abuses can occur and en­
danger pension fund adequacy. The safety of vested 
benefit rights thus can be questioned with validity; an 
employee terminating with vested pension rights may be 
well advised to have his credits transferred to a succeeding 
plan, Finally, whether the succeeding plan is another 
qualified employer-sponsored plan or some kind of indi­
vidual qualified savings program, the employee will have 
greater access to financial reports on the subsequent 
fund#s performance and adequacy than he would as a ter­
minating employee with vested credits under the original 
plan. Moreover, - an employee is more likely to be aware
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of financial problems and pension fund adequacy relating 
to his current employer than he would a former employer.
In direct contrast to the employee who is actively 
concerned about the adequacy and preservation of his 
retirement income, many employees are unaware of their 
accrued pension rights and may not become concerned about 
retirement until late in their working careers. This 
lack of interest is the natural result of a general tendency 
to concentrate on more currently pressing problems such as 
career development, family, financial and social pressures 
and children's education. In attempting to resolve such 
problems, the issue of retirement is easily forgotten. 
Employees who change jobs may fail to maintain a record 
of vested credits so that it becomes difficult when they 
retire to file for these retirement rights. Portability 
has been suggested as a means of eliminating the problem of 
inaccurate or nonexistent records of vested benefits: 
had retirement credits followed the employee throughout 
his career, accrued benefits would be combined for dis­
bursement from the pension fund of the final employer.
The Problem of Converting an Appealing 
Idea into a Workable System
Although the portability concept has broad appeal 
for mobile employees in need of a pension preservation 
mechanism which transcends that offered by vesting, a 
number of problems and misconceptions have been encountered 
in developing a workable portable pension system. For
example, many concerned pension reform advocates have 
been unsure of the costs entailed in a portability system. 
Since some kind of funding and vesting programs must 
accompany a portability system to ensure that a pension 
right supported by adequate assets is available to port, some 
cost estimates of portability have included the cost of 
funding and vesting. The actual cost of portability, however 
should include only those costs related to the change 
in actuarial assumptions necessitated by a termination 
because of elimination of a turnover or withdrawal assumption 
additional administrative expenses and increased fund 
liquidity requirements because of the withdrawals. Never­
theless, isolation of the types of costs associated with 
portability have not provided a meaningful method of esti­
mating the level of costs.
Another problem related to the implementation of 
the portability concept is the resulting complexity of 
such a system. Opponents of the concept point out that 
even if actuarially feasible, fund transfers may not be 
equitable. An employee may prefer the benefits available 
under one plan (e.g., early retirement) and thus be 
reluctant to forfeit those benefits by a fund transfer. 
Moreover, the actuarial assumptions employed as well as 
benefit and wage patterns vary from plan to plan.
Any analysis of portability immediately leads 
to the question of whether or not portable pensions are 
really necessary. Reform advocates, legislators and labor
leaders concede that portability does not provide most 
employees with much more than that available through a 
sound minimum vesting program. Although portability may 
help the highly mobile employee, many employees accrue 
vested benefits from only two or three employers. Filing 
for and receiving retirement benefits from two or three 
employers is not an excessive burden on the retiring 
employee.
Federal legislative interest in the development of 
the portability concept has been stimulated by the desire 
of Congress to protect the pension rights of individuals 
and prevent pension fund abuses. The contributions made 
by an employer to a qualified private pension plan are a 
deductible expense for federal income tax purposes and, 
as such, are a type of public subsidy of the private 
pension system. Federal lawmakers thus have an incentive 
to see that individual and public interests are protected. 
Since portability has been proposed as one means of pre­
serving pension rights, Congressional interest in the 
concept is well founded. Consequently, many of the develop­
ments regarding portability have been initiated and de­
bated in Congressional hearings with legislative proposals 
often representing opposing positions on the means of 
implementing portability.
Conclusions of Analysis of the 
Portability Concept
In an effort to examine in depth in this study
2^3
the general allegations against and arguments presented 
for the portability concept made in business and finance 
journals as well as in Congressional hearings, analysis 
was made of existing systems, suggestions for implementing 
a national system and specific legislative proposals 
for portability. In addition, the mechanics of a transfer 
system were explored since it has been the focus of such 
wide concern.
Applications for the United States of Portability Prototypes 
Although the European and Canadian portability 
systems do not offer a very useful prototype for direct 
use in the United States, there are a number of general 
principles associated with those programs which should 
be heeded by U.S. legislators and pension reform advocates. 
First, the European private pension systems are highly 
regulated to enforce minimum levels of benefits, vesting, 
funding, investment, actuarial assumptions, disclosure 
and fiduciary responsibility. It may not be possible to 
implement a mandatory portability system in the United 
States and still retain the flexibility and competitive 
market structure that characterizes the U.S. private 
pension system. Second, since many of the European 
private pensions are insured (administered by an insurance 
company) through individual policies, the portability 
option available to European employees may be more easily 
implemented than in the United States. That is, the 
portability option may not be appropriate in the United
States since the pension industry is dominated by indi­
vidual trusts which utilize the group pension plan form, 
often with an unallocated funding approach. The adminis­
trators of U.S. insured private pension plans may be 
better prepared to allow fund transfers, since their 
records of asset accumulations may be on an individual 
basis. Contributions to an insurer administered pooled 
account, however, often are not made on behalf of any 
one employee; rather, a lump-sum payment is made on the 
basis of some criterion such as a percentage of gross 
payroll.
A third area of application of the portability 
experience of European private pension systems is derived 
from Great Britain. The British require that a minimum 
layer of wage-related benefits above the social security 
program be vested, funded and portable. Employers may 
provide this second layer of benefits by contributing 
to a government-run national program or by contracting 
out the administration of the benefits to private pension 
institutions. Portability thus is required of closely 
regulated minimum benefits, which can be administered by 
the private pension system. Parliament, however, is 
considering expanding the portability requirement to all 
private pensions. If this regulation is passed, observati 
of the British pension system will become even more rele­
vant in the future. Portability of minimum benefits in 
the past has been successful and if extension of the
portability feature to all private pensions in Great 
Britain is equally successful, the lesson of implemen­
tation of portability in stages is evident. By initially 
requiring portability of only minimum benefits, the U.S. 
pension industry would have the chance to develop workable 
transfer procedures.
Canadian pension regulation, particularly the 
Ontario Act, has served as the pattern for several reform 
bills that have been introduced in the U.S. Congress. 
Observation of the experience in Canada, however, indicates 
that a voluntary federal clearinghouse is unnecessary 
under certain conditions. For example, if vesting is 
required after only, say, ten years of service and 
attainment of age forty-five, most employees probably will 
accrue vested benefits from only two or three employers. 
There is little advantage, therefore, in pension credit 
transfers to effect consolidation of benefits for dis­
bursement from one fund. In addition, Canadian federal 
income tax regulations permit tax free transfers of the 
actuarial value of pension credits between qualified 
pension plans. If a similar system of minimum vesting 
and tax free direct transfers are developed in the United 
States, a clearinghouse to implement portability would 
not be necessary.
iviechanisms for Implementation of the Portability Concept
There are two basic approaches to implementing 
the portability concept, each with varying mechanical
246
details. The first approach utilizes a central clearinghouse 
as a depository for financial assets supporting the pension 
credits of terminated employees. The clearinghouse 
would effect the transfer of funds accrued by a terminating 
employee to the clearinghouse and, if appropriate and re­
quested by the employee, from the clearinghouse to a suc­
ceeding employer's fund. Since the funds are transferred 
by and through the clearinghouse, the employee would not 
incur a tax liability because he does not receive construc­
tive use of the pension fund assets.
Because it eliminates the problem of modifying 
federal income tax law, the clearinghouse concept has been 
put into the form of legislative pension reform proposals 
by both House and Senate Labor Committees. The Senate 
Labor Subcommittee proposal (S. 4), principally sponsored 
by Senators Jacob K. Javits (R— N.Y.) and Harrison A.
Williams (D— N.J.) and cosponsored by fifty-one other 
Senators, establishes a voluntary portability clearinghouse 
within the Labor Department. Because of this strong 
support, voluntary portability is likely to pass in the 
Senate. Members of the House, on the other hand, have not 
been receptive to portability even on a voluntary basis.
Under the leadership of Rep. Wilbur D. Mills (D— Ark.), 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, the House 
may adopt a tax incentive approach to pension reform, 
an alternative that would eliminate reliance on a Labor
24?
iLabor Department clearinghouse. An additional obstacle
to the clearinghouse concept is the fact that the Nixon
"Administration is dead set against the idea, and reformers
2are not pushing it very hard."
The second basic approach to implementing the 
portability concept is the tax free direct transfer of 
pension fund assets from one qualified pension fund or 
retirement savings plan to a subsequent arrangement. This 
approach would necessitate a change in the Internal 
Revenue Code to allow the reallocation to be made without 
the employee incurring an income tax liability based on the 
amount of the funds involved in the transfer. The Nixon 
Administration proposal, principally sponsored in the 93d 
Congress by Rep. Wilbur D. Mills in the House and Sen.
Carl Curtis (R— Neb.) in the Senate, would permit a tax 
free lump-sum distribution of pension fund assets from an 
employer-sponsored plan if the funds are reinvested in a 
qualified individual or employer-sponsored retirement 
plan within sixty days of the distribution. Since this 
proposal is based on a lump-sum distribution which in­
herently is voluntary on the part of the employer, the 
entire portability mechanism implicitly is voluntary.
The current Nixon Administration proposal originally was 
1"Pension Reform Getting Attention Early in Con­
gress," The National Underwriter; Life and Health Insurance 
Edition, LXXVIII, No. b (January 27, 1973), 1.
2"The Push for Pension Reform," Business Week 
March 17, 1973, p. 50.
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introduced in modified form in the 92d Congress as a 
limited system of tax free transfers restricted to 
qualified individual retirement savings plans. As indicated 
by their favorable testimony in House hearings,^ this 
proposal was so well received by employers, labor leaders 
and the pension industry that the tax free direct transfer 
concept was expanded to its present status in the legis­
lative proposal for the 93d Congress,
Passage of the Nixon Administration tax reforms 
is quite likely unless they are impeded by procedural 
problems or are felt to be too costly in terms of lost 
tax revenue. Government policy makers must make a diffi­
cult choice between passing pension reform legislation 
which would result in lost tax revenue and maintaining 
that revenue source for the federal budget. In addition 
to reducing lost tax revenue from incentive pension reform 
legislation can be inflationary for two reasons. First, the 
lost revenue remains in the public sector and can be used
for private investment, an incidence which has an economi­
cally accelerated stimulative effect. Second, the lost 
revenue can be spent (or deferred for later consumption), 
thus creating an immediate inflationary impact through 
increased demand.
In summary, then, a voluntary portability system
-^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and 
Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans,
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House 
of Representatives on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972.
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in the nature of a clearinghouse or a tax free direct 
transfer is the most likely form to be implemented by 
Congress, The tax free transfer probably is the more 
popular of the two techniques but its adoption may be 
prohibited by such economic pressures as inflation and 
revenue requirements. If the revenue reform approach is 
blocked, pension reform advocates may press harder for 
acceptance of the Labor Department clearinghouse concept.
In either instance, however, mandatory portability is 
considered to be outside the responsibility of Congress 
and therefore will not be a part of any pension reform 
program. As stated by Sen. Jacob K. Javitss
Portability is more of a question mark because 
it is not indispensable to achieving adequate pro­
tection against undue private pension losses but 
rather is a means of j, improving the workers' ultimate 
retirement benefits.
The Mechanics of the Pension Fund Transfer
Whether the clearinghouse or the tax free direct 
transfer is utilized, several functional problems may 
be encountered, as was illustrated in Chapter VII by 
the analysis of the mechanics of the pension fund transfer. 
First, if an employer's pension plan is underfunded, a trans­
fer of the assets supporting the vested pension credits of 
a terminating employee may endanger the fund's adequacy 
to meet future liabilities created by pension promises to
4Sen. Jacob K. Javits, Rep. John H. Dent, Joseph 
P. Leary, Norman H. Tarver, "Legislative Forecast, '73»" 
Pension and Welfare News, IX, No. 2 (February, 1973)t 44.
remaining employees. The employer may be forced to contri­
bute additional amounts to the pension fund in order to 
maintain its qualified status for federal income tax 
purposes. The additional contributions, therefore, may 
represent a cost of portability to the employer. This 
cost either may be fully absorbed by the employer or 
paid by both the employer and the employee. The latter 
payment would be effected by charging a fee for fund trans­
fers against the pension assets to be ported. This fee 
could be based on a flat percentage of pension fund 
assets or a prorated portion of the total unfunded lia­
bility of the fund,
A second problem related to pension fund transfers 
is the possible benefit fluctuation resulting from 
transfers between funds which utilize significantly dif­
ferent actuarial assumptions. For a given level of con­
tribution, an employer whose plan is based on conservative 
actuarial assumptions would provide a correspondingly 
lower pension benefit than an employer whose plan is 
formulated on less conservative actuarial assumptions.
The third problem related to pension fund trans­
fers may be the most subtle and complicated of all the 
difficulties connected with the portability concept. When 
pension funds are transferred to a succeeding pension 
fund, the vested benefits which those assets support 
must be nonforfeitable; i.e., in the event of a participant* 
death or permanent disability, the benefits must be paid
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to the employee or his beneficiaries. Transferred pension 
credits thus are extremely secure; not only are the bene­
fits vested and funded, but, in addition, are nonfor­
feitable. The employer from whose fund the assets are 
transferred must either absorb the funding cost and the 
nonforfeitability cost (attributable to the reduction 
in discounted contributions in anticipation of mortality 
experience) or make a charge against withdrawn funds. If 
the latter alternative is used, the charge can be deter­
mined on the basis of the life expectancy of the employee 
at his attained age; however, the fee may be more easily 
administered by charging a flat percentage of transferred 
funds. If the employer wishes to offer portability as a 
fringe benefit, all or part of the flat rate would be 
paid by the company.
Nonforfeitability of transferred pension credits 
also creates a problem for the succeeding employer into 
whose fund the ported assets are reinvested. Since the 
benefits are completely nonforfeitable, they cannot be 
integrated wholly into the succeeding plan. The funds, 
of course, can be pooled with other pension funds but 
separate records must be maintained for each employee's 
nonforfeitable pension benefit in a manner similar to 
the separate records maintained for employee contribu­
tions, which also are nonforfeitable.
The Future of the Portability Concept
The immediate outlook for the portability concept
is its probable enactment as a voluntary system based on 
either the central clearinghouse approach or the tax free 
direct transfer proposal. The numerous problems of im­
plementing the portable pension system will be left 
to individuals, employers and unions to resolve in private 
negotiations and at the bargaining table. That is, the 
mechanism will be made available by enabling legislation 
but it will be the responsibility of the concerned parties 
to take advantage of the portability option. This type 
arrangement has several advantages. First, individual 
and unique problems associated with specific pension 
funds and funding forms can be resolved on an individual 
basis. In such cases, mandated transfer procedures may be 
difficult to apply. Second, the competitive flexibility 
of the private pension industry as well as the bargaining 
flexibility desired by union officials can be maintained. 
Third, the portability feature may be sought primarily by 
only a relatively few highly mobile employees, many of 
whom are skilled technicians in a position to demand a 
portable pension. The voluntary feature thus ensures 
that the entire labor force will not suffer the reduction 
in benefits required to pay for the adoption of the 
portability option by a small group of participants. 
Finally, voluntary portability will give the pension 
industry as well as the nation's employers as opportunity 
to adjust, develop and experiment with appropriate transfer 
techniques.
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After a period of adjusting to voluntary porta­
bility during which transfer procedures can be perfected 
and solidified, it then may be possible to extend the 
transfer concept in individual cases and through reci­
procal agreements covering large groups of employees. In 
addition, pension reform advocates probably will be in a 
better position to press for this extension. Senator 
Jacob K, Javits, known for his support of pension reform, 
has expressed continued belief in the portability concept: 
"Ultimately, the individual is entitled to greater 
portability and to have his pension benefits get the 
benefit of better management in a pooled reserve. But we 
think that is an evolutionary proposition.
As more and more people are covered by private 
pensions and the private pension industry is subject to 
increasingly strict vesting, funding, fiduciary responsi­
bility and disclosure standards, portability will be 
sought as an attractive means of strengthening and securing 
pension programs. That is to say, portability as a 
pension reform issue is a theme which will be heard for 
years to come. Although portable pensions are an appealing 
concept, the intricate technical and mechanical problems 
cannot be solved instantaneously. Rather, the portability 
concept must be developed slowly with a long period of
^U.S,, Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, 
Hearings on H.R. 12272, p, 210.
maturation in order to achieve portability's full potential 
as a valuable management tool for the provision of a 





MAJOR BILLS— 92d CONGRESS
Bills S. 2, "Pension and Employee Benefit Act"
Sponsors Sen. Jacob K. Javits
Date Introduceds January 25» 1971
House Versions H.R. 3823 (Rep. Helstoski)
Committee References Labor and Public Welfare 
Ma j or Provi s i ons s
1. Central Pension Commission— independent authority
2. Prospective deferred graded vesting (10% after 6 
years service; full vesting after 15 years of 
service)
3. 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
b . Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act amended 
increasing fiduciary responsibility and disclosure 
requirements
6. Voluntary portability through a central commission
7. Powers of Secretary of Labor increased for pro­
vision of technical assistance in reciprocity 
arrangements
8. Eligibility requirements less than 6 months; 
continuous service defined
Bills H.R. 1269. "Employee Benefit Security Act"
Sponsors Rep. John Dent
Date Introduceds January 22, 1971
Senate Versions S. 4-326 (Sen. Harrison A. Williams) 
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss
1. Administered by the Department of Labor
2. Prospective 10 year full vesting; with alternate 
phase in options for plans in existence and plans 
established after enactment
3. Eligibilitys later of 3 years of service and age 
25; continuous service defined
4-. 25 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
5. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
6. Increased disclosure and fiduciary standards
7. Secretary of Labor to study portability
APPENDIX A— Continued
Bills S. 1993* "Federal Reinsurance of Private Pension 
Plans Act"
Sponsors Sen. Vance Hartke 
Date Introduced: January 22, 1971
Committee Reference: Finance
Major Provision: Insurance of unfunded liabilities?
administered by the Department of Labor
Bill: H.R. 686, Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code
of 195̂ - and the Social Security Act 
Sponsor: Rep. Dingell
Date Introduced: January 22, 1971
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Prospective 10 year full vesting as a requirement 
of qualification
2. Voluntary portability through a central clearing-' 
house administered by the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare in conjunction with Social 
Security
3. Powers of the Secretary of Labor increased for 
provision of technical assistance in developing 
reciprocal and other portability arrangements
Bill: H.R. 2150, "Pension Benefit Security Act"
Sponsor: Rep. Collier
Date Introduced: January 25* 1971
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor
2. Prospective 10 year full vesting; with alternate 
phase-in options for plans in existence and 
plans established after enactment
3. Eligibility: later of 3 years of service and age
25? continuous service defined
25 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
5. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
6. Secretary of Labor to study portability
Bill: H.R. 3272, "Employee Benefits Protection Act"
Sponsor: Rep. Derwinski (On behalf of President Nixon)
Date Introduced: February 2, 1971
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provision: Amends the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to increase disclosure and fiduciary 
standards
APPENDIX A— Continued
Bill: H.R. 3296, "Federal Pension Insurance Program"
Sponsor: Rep. McFall
Date Introduced: February 2, 1971
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Board of Directors of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
2. Minimum funding standards set by the Board
3. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
4. Increased disclosure and fiduciary standards
5. Voluntary portability through a central clearing­
house within the F.D.I.C.
Bill: H.R. 6530. "Pension and Employee Benefit Act"
Sponsor: Rep. Halpern
Date Introduced: March 23» 1971
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Independent pension commission created
2. Prospective alternative deferred full vesting 
formulas with age and service requirements
3. 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
4. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5. Minimum fiduciary standards; annual independent 
audit
6. Voluntary portability through a central pension 
commission
Bill: S. 2485» "Pension Protection Act"
Sponsor: Sen. Griffin
Date Introduced: September 8, 1971
Committee Reference: Finance
Major Provisions:
1. Government Corporation within the Department of 
Treasury created
2. 10 year vesting with phase in provisions (past 
and future service)
3. Eligibility: later of age 25 and 1 year of
service; continuous service defined
4. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5. Secretary of Treasury to study portability
Bill: S, 2486, "Employee Benefits Protection Act"
Sponsor: Sen. Griffin
Date Introduced: September 8, 1971
Committee Reference: Labor and Public Welfare
Major Provision: Amends the Welfare and Pension Plans




Bill: H.R. 12272, "Individual Retirement Benefits
Act of 1971"
Sponsors: Representatives Mills, Byrnes, Ford, Betts
and Edwards (On behalf of President Nixon)
Date Introduced: December 14, 1971
Senate Version: S. 3012 (Senators Curtis, Bennett,
Dominick, Fannin, Hansen, Jordan, Scott, Thurmond)
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Tax deductions (with specific limitations) allowed 
for contributions by individuals to qualified 
individual retirement accounts
2. Deduction limits for self-employed persons raised 
from $2,500 to the lesser of $7,500 or 15$ 
income (Keogh or H.R. 10 Plans)
3. Minimum prospective vesting standard: Rule of 50
Bill: H.R. 12337* "Employee Benefits Protection Act"
Sponsors: Rep. Erlenborn and Others (on behalf of Pres. Nixon)
Date Introduced: December 14, 1971
Senate Version: S. 3024 (Sen. Jacob K. Javits and Others)
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Amends the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to provide increased disclosure and 
fiduciary standards
Bill: 29CFR 460; Amendment to Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act (Form D-l)
Sponsor: W.J. Usery, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Labor
Date Introduced: January 31, 1972
Reference: Department of Labor
Major Provision: Increased disclosure requirements
Bill: H.R. 14470, "Private Pension Transfer Act"
Sponsors: Rep. Anderson and 39 other cosponsors
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
to allow an individual tax free transfer of funds
2. Transfer of credits may be partial, but any funds 
not transferred to be taxed as ordinary income and 
capital gains (if applicable)
3. Reinvestment required within 1 year (H.R. 14133* 




Bill: S. 3598, "Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act of 1972"
Sponsors: Senators Williams and Javits and 51 other Senators
Date Introduced: May 11, 1972
Committee Activity: Reported out of Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare; Reported out of Senate Finance 
Committee with essentially all but 6 below eliminated; 
never brought to Senate floor 
Major Provisions:
1. Minimum deferred graded vesting standard (past 
service for persons over ^5 and future service):
30$ vested after 8 years of service plus 10$
for each year of service thereafter; 100$ vesting 
after 15 years of service
2. 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
3. Plan discontinuance priorities defined
k . Eligibility requirements of less of 1 year of
service and age 25
5. Voluntary portability through a central clearing­
house administered by the Secretary of Labor
6. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act amended
to increase disclosure and fiduciary responsibility 
standards
7. Insurance of unfunded liabilities; fund to be 
within the Treasury department
8. General administration within the Department
of Labor; Secretary empowered to compel compliance 
through federal courts
9. Powers of Secretary of Labor increased to provide 




EXISTING REGULATION OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
Act: National Labor Relation Act (Wagner Act) of 1935s
4-9 Stat. 449* 29 U.S.C. 151s Inland Steel Ruling 
Year of Enactment: 194-7
Regulating Body: National Labor Relations Board
Major Provision: Pensions designated as remuneration for
labor and subject to the same rights and privileges as 
wages in the collective bargaining process
Act: Labor Management Relations Act (Taft Hartley Act);
6l Stat. 136, 157 (194-7), U.S.C., sec. 186 (1964-);
Sec. 302 pertinent to pensions 
Year of Enactment: 194-7
Regulating Body: Federal Judicial System; U.S. Justice Dept.
Major Provisions:
1, Prohibits transfer of funds from employer to 
employees or their representatives (purpose: to 
protect employees from any outside influence over 
participatipation by labor leaders or factions)
2. Prohibits contributions by the employer to a 
pension fund solely administered by a union or 
its representatives; a lawfully established 
pension fund must be administered by labor and 
management
Act: Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-
Griffin Act); 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 4-01 (1964-) 
Year of Enactment: 1959
Regulating Body: Federal Judicial System; U.S. Justice
Department
Major Provision: Required bonding of administrators
and officers of union pension funds
Act: Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), 52 Stat. 1060: 29
U.S.C., sec. 209; Equal Pay Act (1963), 77 Stat. 56:
29 U.S.C., sec. 206; Civil Rights Act (1964-), 78 Stat. 
24-1: 26 U.S.C., 14-4-7 (a) (4-) 5 4-2 U.S.C. 1971, 1975 (a);
Age Discrimination and Employment Act (1967), 81 Stat.
602: 29 U.S.C., 621
Regulating Body: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission




1. Requires pension benefits to be treated equally
with all other aspects of employment compensation
2. Prohibits unequal treatment of employees on the 
basis of sex, age, or race
Act: Securities and Exchange Act of 193^* Sec. 10
Year of Enactment: 1934
Regulating Body: Securities and Exchange Commission
Major Provision: Separate accounts subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the Act, but not registration, 
regarding the purchase and sale of securities
Act: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Secs. 401(a) to (f)—
4o4, 501(a)
Year of Enactment: 1954
Regulating Body: U.S. Treasury Department; Internal
Revenue Service 
Major Provisions: Requirements for qualification (con­
tributions to the pension fund allowable as deductible 
business expenses):
1. There must exist a written trust, contract or 
legally binding arrangement.
2. The program must be permanent, continuing and 
communicated to the employees. It must be for 
the exclusive benefit of the employees and their 
beneficiaries.
3. The funds cannot be diverted. The plan must not 
discriminate in favor of stockholders, supervisors, 
officers or highly compensated employees.
4. Benefits must be definitely determinable.
5. The plan must be in existence the year in which 
the tax deduction is made.
Act: Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 401(a) amended
Year of Amendment: 19&2
Regulating Body: U.S. Treasury Department; Internal
Revenue Service 
Amendment: When a plan terminates, or the employer dis­
continues contributions, benefits accrued to date are 
vested to the extent of the fund
Act: Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act; 29 U.S.C.
Secs. 301 et, seq.
Year of Enactment: 1958
Regulating Body: U.S. Department of Labor
Major Provisions: Requires the administrators of pension
plans to disclose to the Labor Department annual fi­
nancial reports on the structure, assets and liabilities 
of pension plans, fees paid to officers and trustees 
(Limited penalties for false reporting)
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Act: Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act amended;
29 U.S.C., Secs. 302, et seq. (Supp. IV, 1963)
Year of Amendment: 1962
Regulating Body: U.S. Department of Labor
Major Provisions: Increased power given to the Secretary
of Labor to:
1. Compel disclosure
2. Investigate suspected abuses
3. Seek criminal penalties for embezzlement, kick­
backs, bribery, false statements and conflicts 
of interest
Require bonding of plan administrators
Act: Treasury Regulations; Secs. l.^Ol-Mc)
Year of Enactment: 1963
Regulating Body: U.S. Treasury Department; Internal
Revenue Service 
Major Provisions:
1. Set minimum funding requirements as a further 
condition for qualification; i.e., contributions 
must at least cover normal cost plus interest on 
any unfunded accrued liability
2. Fund contributions in excess of the following 
sum are not deductible:
a. Normal cost plus
b. 10?S of any unfunded accrued liability
3. If the plan terminates within a few years after 
the plan's inception and it is found not to be
a bona-fide plan, all prior tax deductions may be 
disallowed.
*4-. Any actuarial gains must be used to offset future 
normal costs.
Revenue Ruling: 72-5, I.R.B. 1972-2, 16 , which amplifies
Revenue Ruling 69-139b (C.B. 1962-2, 123)
Year of Ruling: 1972
Regulating Body: U.S. Treasury Department, Internal
Revenue Service 
Major Provisions: If no discrimination is involved,
transferrability of prior service credits to a suc­
ceeding employer is allowed. This ruling is applied 
to corporations which (1) frequently acquire other 
corporations or (2) frequently merge or reorganize. 
Frequent plan amendments may thus be eliminated.
APPENDIX B—  Continued
Opinions "Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans," 
Opinion No. 8, pars. 16 , 17, 18, 2 k  
Year Rendered: 1966
Rendering Body: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Accounting Principles Board (only 
authority is denial of accounting certification)
Major Provisions:
1. Annual pension cost should not be less than the 
sum of:
a. Normal cost
b. Payment sufficient to ensure 20 year amorti­
zation of unfunded vested benefits
2. Annual pension payments should not exceed the 
sum of:
a. Normal cost
b. 10°?o of the initial unfunded past service cost 
(until fully amortized)
c. 10% of any unfunded past service liability 
arising out of a plan amendment
d. Interest payments on the difference between 
total pension liabilities and amounts funded.
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APPENDIX C
THE EFFECT OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 
ON LABOR MOBILITY
Prior to the 196o's, there were no comprehensive 
studies conducted to determine the effect of private pen­
sion plans on labor mobility. The lack of interest in 
determining whether or not private pension plans are a 
deterrent to labor mobility perhaps is due to (1) the 
difficulty of obtaining meaningful data on termination 
motivation and (2) the traditional, universal agreement 
that private pensions do restrict worker mobility. Early 
treatments of the relationship between labor mobility 
and private pensions were based on the "common sense" 
conclusion that pensions were a hindrance to labor 
mobility.^
Summary results of the major studies which speci­
fically dealt with the effect of private pensions are 
presented in Table 20. The early studies by Michael 
Purchek, Herbert S. Parnes and Robert Tilov.e, which were 
rather narrow in scope, produced results in direct
1For example, see: Gordon F. Bloom and Hebert R.
Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations (Homewood, 111.: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958), p. 597•
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TABLE 20
STUDIES OF EFFECT OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 
ON LABOR MOBILITY













ual workers ex- 2. 
amined to deter­
mine effect of 
pensions on 
labor mobility)
Robert Tilove; 1. 
1959
2.
U.S. Department 1. 
of Labor; Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 
BLS No. 1359?
1963 2.
Coverage and withdrawal experience 
of plans studied does not support 
the contention that pension plans 
restrict labor mobility.
Pension coverage was so narrow that 
retirement accruals not a factor; 
those most likely to terminate were 
not covered.
Turnover not changed by introduction 
of pension plan
Private pension plans make little 
little difference in the degree to 
which manual workers are tied to 
their employers.
Job attachment or retention most 
attributed to seniority and fear 
of unknown
Turnover rates the highest from ages 
20-^0, when retirement not a major 
influence on job consideration, al­
though the chance of forfeiture 
is the greatest
Pensions may be a restraining factor 
for older employees, although older 
employees may have more vested credits 
and be more influenced by family, 
social, community ties as well as 
job seniority.
Impossible to isolate pensions as a 
major impediment to labor mobility; 
other influencing factors: seniority,
age, composition of the workforce, 
size of the firm, wages and industry 
Trends which have mitigated the effect 
of pensions in reducing mobility—  




Study, Date Major Provisions
U.S. Department 1. 





Seniority may,be a more significant 
deterrent to worker mobility than 
private pensions.
Difficult to isolate effect of pensions 
on labor mobility since pension 












1. Possible that pensions have no sigr 
nificant effect on turnover as indi­
cated by the following
a. Employees induced to stay on the
job until credits vest
b. Employees seem unconcerned about
retirement as evidenced by the 
wide practice of cash withdrawals 
upon termination
1. Pensions do restrict mobility but
not uniformly throughout all ages and 
industries; restriction greatest 
among older workers with unvested 
pension rights, but then workers 
also have other reasons for not 
terminating such as seniority, 
tenure, security, and community and 
social ties.




Overall economic condition of country 
major determinant of labor mobility 
Other influences on labor mobility: 
growth and development of unions, 
large corporations, seniority, age, 
fringe benefits, level of employment.
Source: The complete title of each study is cited in
the bibliography, by author. Summary results 
have been quoted directly— no adjustments 
have been made to the authors' conclusions.
opposition to the widely-held contention that private 
pension plans were a deterrent to labor mobility. The 
results of these early studies were supported by later 
major studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the 
U.S. Department of Labor as well as summary surveys by 
Lowell C. Smith and Jozetta H. Srb.
In general, it may be concluded that private 
pension plans cannot be isolated as a major determinant 
of labor immobility. Other factors often cited as major 
influences on employee termination include seniority, 
age (older workers are less likely than younger workers to 
terminate), community position, availability of alter­
native job offers and general resistance to change. Pri­
vate pension plan coverage often is related to seniority 
and age and thus cannot be segregated as a source of 
restriction on the nation's labor mobility. In addition, 
recent trends of increased vesting and early retirement 
in private pension plans as well as the spread in the 
multiemployer plan concept actually may stimulate labor 
mobility rather than serve as a hindrance.
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ADDENDIX D
MAJOR BILLS— 93d CONGRESS
Williams-Javits Joint Senate Bill
Title: Retirement Income Security for Employees Act, 1973
Bill Number! s7“5
Sponsors: Sen. Harrison A. Williams and Sen. Jacob K.
Javits for themselves and 51 other Senators 
Bill Origination: Senate Labor Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
Bill Status: Reported out of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare
House Counterpart: H.R. 2^32 (Referred to the Committee
on Education and Labor)
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor
2. All private plans with more than 25 employees 
to be covered (Major exceptions: labor union
plans financed solely by members' dues and 
public plans)
3. Registration within 6 months of effective date
4. Vesting (effective 3 years after bill enactment
a. 30$ after 8 years service plus 10$ each 
year thereafter
b. All service to be included (past and future 
service)
c. Eligibility: later of age 25 and 1 year 
service
d. Only 3 of the 8 years need be continuous
e. If the existing plan's vesting provisions 
are more favorable that that described above, 
the employer may have two plans; one for
new employees with above requirements and 
the original plan for old employees.
f. Other phase-in options for vesting available
5. Funding— 30 year amortization of all unfunded 
liabilities; if initial costs of meeting 
funding schedule are excessive, cost may be 
spread over 5 years.




7. Employer responsibility established for funding 
schedule payments due to date
8. Variances for funding and vesting requirements 
allowed by the Secretary of Labor in cases of 
extreme hardship
9. Portability
a. Voluntary fund established by the Secretary 
of Labor
b. Individual emplovee records kept
c. Technical assistance provided to help es­
tablish private portability and reciprocity 
arrangements by the Secretary of Labor
10. Termination insurance required for all unfunded 
vested liabilities
a. Limited in amount to lesser of 50$ of the 
highest 5 year average monthly wage of 
participants and $500
b. Will not cover vested benefits effective 
within last 3 years nor benefits : of plans 
which terminated within 3 years of effective 
date
c. Will not cover employees who own more than 
10$ of the company's (employer's) stock
d. Premiums based on funding status and amount 
of unfunded liability (recommended range: .2$—  M)
e. Solvent employers liable for all insurance 
benefits up to 50$ of net worth
f. Administered by Department of Labor with 
fund in the Treasury
11. Waiting periods for provisions to take effect
a. Insurance and portability— 1 year
b. Vesting and funding--3 years
12. Increased Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsi­
bility standards— penalties applied if employees 
are harassed when requesting plan information
13. Enforced by the Secretary of Labor, who is
empowered to petition the courts to compel com­
pliance
1^. Overfunding-required equitable distribution 
of plan assets in the event of termination 
of contributory plans
15. Supersedes state laws
16. Additional study regarding
a. Extension of provisions to plans of state 
and local governments





Titles Employee Benefit Security Act 
Bill Numbers H.R. 2
Sponsorss^ Rep, John Dent and Carl Perkins 
Bill Originations Pension Task Force of the Committee 
on Education and Labor 
Bill Statuss Referred to the Committee on Education and 
Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor through 
a revision of the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act
2. Increased Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsibility 
standards
3. Vesting— 10 year full vesting of all accrued 
benefits with alternative phase-in options for 
existing plans:
a. 50$ vesting after 10 years plus 10$ for 
each year thereafter
b. 100$ after 20 years, with service reduced 
to 10 years after no longer than 9 years 
(effective after 2 years)
Eligibility--later of 2 years service and age 
30; continuous service defined as all service 
with that employer except services
a. Before age 25
b. When employee refused to contribute
c. Under periods of suspension
5. Funding— 25 year amortization of all vested 
unfunded liabilities plus normal costs and 
interest on other unfunded liability
Titles Employee Retirement Benefit Security Act 
Bill NumbersH.R. k62
Sponsors: Rep. John Dent and Rep. Carl Perkins
Bill Originations Pension Task Force of the Committee on 
Education and Labor 
Bill Status: Referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor through 
a revision of the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act
2. Mandatory Portability Program Fund
a. All employers must register with the 
Secretary of Labor
APPENDIX D— Continued
b. Upon the request of a terminating employee, 
employer must transfer to the fund the 
present value of vested benefits
c. Separate employee accounts to be Kept 
for each employee
d. Secretary of Labor to provide technical 
assistance for the development of reci­
procal arrangements
3. Plan termination insurance required for all
unfunded vested liabilities acquired after
enactment
a. Premium to be determined by the Secretary 
of Labor (not more than .2%>)
b. Insurance pool fund to be created within 
the Treasury department, but administered 
by the Secretary of Labor
c. Limitations on amount of individual 
benefit* less of 50%> of highest 5 year 
average monthly wage or $500
d. Will not cover vested benefits arising in 
first 3 years of plan.
e. Solvent employers liable for benefits 
paid out by insurance fund
Nixon Administration Proposal
Title* Retirement Benefits Tax Act 
Bill Numbert H.R. 7157
Sponsors! Rep. Wilbur Mills for himself and Others 
Bill Origination! White House Pension Task Force,
Department of Labor and the Department of the 
Treasury
Bill Statusi Referred to the House Committee on Ways 
and Means
Senate Counterpart! S. 1631 (Referred to the Senate 
Committee on Finance)
Major Provisions!
1. Vesting— prospective benefits
a. Employer plans-Rule of 50 (50% vesting
when age plus years of participation in the
plan total 50, plus 10% vesting for
each year participation thereafter)
b. 3 year waiting period
c. Eligibility— 30 years of age
d. Can exclude employees within 5 years of re­
tirement for initial vesting eligibility 
determination
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e. Rule of 35 for persons who own more 
than 50% of a company ( 50% vested when 
age plus service total 35 plus 10%> vesting 
for each year of service thereafter)
f. Prospective benefits only for vested benefit 
calculation;for plans in effect upon 
enactment, only benefits accrued after 
January 1, 1973 used in calculation. Past 
service prior to enactment, however,
used to determine whether qualified for 
vesting.
Tax deductions
a. Lesser of 20% income or $1,500 for indivi­
duals' contributions to a qualified indi­
vidual retirement account (QIRA) or private 
qualified retirement plan sponsored by
the employer, to be reduced by employer 
contributions
b. Raising of ceiling for tax deductions of 
contributions of a self-employed person to 
his Keogh (H.R. 10) plan to lesser of 
$7500 or 15% of income
Funding— 5%> per year of unfunded vested 
liabilities
Eligibility for plan participation— 3 years 
service and attainment of age 30, unless within 
5 years of retirement (slight deviation for 
owner employees)
Lump-sum distribution from a qualified retire­
ment plan not taxable to employee if reinvested 
in either a qualified employer plan or a 
qualified individual retirement account 
within 60 days after the close of the employee's 
taxable year
An exise tax of 5% (200$ after 90 days) levied 
on the amount involved in a prohibited trans­
action (e.g., illegal or less-than-arms-length 
transaction), payable by persons involved in 
that transaction
To be enforced by amending the Internal Revenue 
Code to require the above for qualification for 
favorable tax treatment
APPENDIX D--Continued
Title: Employee Benefit Protection Act
Bill Number: H.R. 6900
Sponsors: Rep. Erlenborn, Dent, Quie and Others
Bill Origination: White House Pension Task Force and the
Departments of Labor and the Treasury 
Bill Status: Referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor
Senate Counterpart: S. 1557 (Referred to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare)
Major Provisions:
1. Amendment of the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act to provide increased disclosure 
and fiduciary responsibility standards
2. To be administered by the Secretary of Labor
275
APPENDIX E




Committee Reference! House Committee on Ways and Means 
Major Provisions: To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
195^ and the Social Security Act to assist in providing 
means for portability of credits under certain private 
pension plans, and for other purposes.
Bill! H.R. 186 
Sponsor: Rep. Edwards
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Minimum eligibility requirements
2. Vesting— Rule of 50
3. Allowing deductions for individuals for personal 
savings for retirement
4. Increasing Keogh ceiling
Bill: H.R. 27^
Sponsor: Rep. Annunzio
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions: To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
195^ to permit an exemption, in an amount not exceeding 
the maximum social security benefit payable in the 
taxable year involved, for retirement income received 
by a taxpayer under a public retirement system or 
under any other system if the taxpayer is at least 
65 years of age.
Bill: H.R. 29^
Sponsor: Rep. Bennett




3. Insurance of unfunded vested liabilities
4. Administered by the Department of the Treasury





Committee Reference s Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code to 
allow exemption from income tax the first $5»000 of 
pension income.
Bills H.R. 266 
Sponsors Rep. Carney 
Committee References Ways and Means 
Major Provisions:
1. Vesting-10^ after 5 years service plus 10% each 
year thereafter
2. 40 year amortization of all unfunded liabilities;
30 year amortization of liabilities created after 
enactment
3. Insurance of the unfunded
4. Voluntary portability of vested rights between; plans
Bills H.R. 402
Sponsors Rep. Collier
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code
to allow exemption from income tax the first $3»000 
of pension income from any federal retirement plan
Bills H.R. 404 
Sponsor: Rep. Collier
Committee References Ways and Means 
Major Provisions: Similar to S. 374
Bills H.R. 406 
Sponsors Rep. Conte
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisions: Similar to S. 4
Bills H.R. 419
Sponsors Rep. Conte
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To repeal the provisions of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 which limits the capital gains 
treatment of pension fund distributions
Bills H.R. 452
Sponsors Rep. Delany
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code to 




Bills H.R. 723 
Sponsors Rep. Long (Md.)
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss
1. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure standards
2. Vesting— deferred graded full vesting— 1% after
6 months service plus Vfo each year thereafter, but 
100^ vesting must occur after 20 years service
3. Funding— 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
4. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5» Portability— mandatory
6. Central pension agency established
Bills H.R. 932
Sponsors Rep. Railsback
Committee References Ways and Means




Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
allow individuals to establish their own pension plans 
with tax deductions for contributions
Bills H.R. 935 
Sponsors Rep. Railsback 
Committee References Ways and Means 
Major Provisionss
1. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
2. Vesting--10$ per year starting with 6th year service
3. Funding— 40 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
for plans in existence; 30 years for all pro­
spective unfunded liabilities
4. Reinsurance
5. Portability study to be undertaken
6. Central pension agency established
Bills H.R. 976 
Sponsors Rep. Rondino
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss Similar to S. 4
Bills H.R. 996 
Sponsors Rep. Roe
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisions To improve education by increasing the 
freedom of the Nation's teachers to change employment 
across state lines without substantial loss of retirement 
benefits through establishment of a Federal-State program
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Bills H.R. 1001 
Sponsors Rep. Roe
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss Similar to S. ^
Bills H.R. 1273
Sponsors Rep. Whitehurst
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 
195^ to allow deductions for personal savings for 
retirement
Bills H.R. 1̂ -3̂
Sponsors Rep. Talcott
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisionss
1. Minimum eligibility requirements
2. Vesting
3. Allowing deductions for individuals for personal 
savings for retirement
Increasing Keogh ceiling
Bills H.R. 1552 
Sponsors Rep. Helstoski 






5. Establishment of a central pension agency
6, Increased fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
Bills H.R. 1682 
Sponsors Rep. Ruppe 
Committee References Ways and Means 
Major Provisionss
1. Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsibility
2. Vesting
3. Funding
4. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5. Portability
6. Central pension agency established
Bills H.R. 1826 
Sponsors Rep. Peyser
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisions To require pension plans to provide op­
tional annuities for surviving spouses and certain 
vesting rights to employees whose employment is in­




Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Similar to S. *1-
Bill: H.R. 2079
Sponsor: Rep. Matsunaga
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions: Similar to H.R. 419
Bill: H.R. 2091
Sponsor: Rep. Minish
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Similar to S. 4
Bill: H.R. 2*1-32
Sponsor: Rep, Smith (R— N.Y.)
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: House version of S. 4
Bill: H.R. 2780
Sponsor: Rep. Biaggi
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Same as H.R. 2
Bill: H.R. 28*1-5
Sponsor: Rep. Harvey
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Vesting
2. Insurance Corporation established within the 
Department of the Treasury




Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Same as H.R. 2
Bill: H.R. 2858
Sponsors: Reps. Perkins, Dent, Annunzio, Ashley, Badillo,
Bingham, Blatnik, Brademas, Brown, Burke, Burton, 
Chisholm, Clark, Clay, Dominick, Daniels, Danielson, 
Dulski, Hays, Hawkins, Holifield, Kyros, Leggett, 
Lehman, McCormack.
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provision: Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 2.
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Bill: H.R. 2919
Sponsors: Reps. Thompson, Dent, Mayne, Meeds, Milford*
Mollohan, Moorhead (penn.), Morgan, Moss, Murphy,
Nix, Pepper, Pike, Preyer, Price (111.), Randall, 
Rosenthal, Roybal, Sarbanes, Seiberling, Stokes,
Tiernan, WonPat, Yatron 
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 2
Bill: H.R. 2935 and H.R. 2936
Sponsor: Rep. Wylie
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provision: Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act: Similar to H.R. 2
Bill: H.R. 2973
Sponsors: Dent, Annunzio, Ashley, Badillo, Bingham,
Brademas, Burton, Clay, Daniels, Danielson, Kyros, 
McCormack, Moorhead (Penn.), Moss, Murphey (N.Y.), Pike, 
Preyer, Randall, Rosenthal, Stokes, Tiernan, Yatron 
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 462
Bill: H.R. 2996
Sponsor: Rep. King
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions: To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 to increase the maximum dollar limitation on the 
amount deductible for pensions for the self-employed 
from $2,500 a year to $7*500 a year
Bill: H.R. 3112
Sponsor: Rep. Dellums
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Required employee pension and profit sharing plans
2. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
3. Vesting
4. Funding
5. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
6. Portability




Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; similar to H.R 2
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Bills H.R. 3306 
Sponsors Rep. Vander Jagt 
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss Revision of the Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act
Bills H.R. 3315 
Sponsors Rep. Vander Jagt 
Committee References Ways and Means 
Ma j or Provi s i ons s
1. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure standards
2. Vesting
3. Insurance corporation established within the 
Department of the Treasury to insure unfunded 
liabilities
4-. Enforced by adding above provisions to rules to 
requirements for qualification in the Internal 
Revenue Code
Bills H.R. 34-50 
Sponsors Rep. Lent
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss Increased fiduciary responsibility and 
disclosure; similar to S. 4-
Bills H.R. 3784- 
Sponsors Rep. Brown (Ohio)
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss Revision of the Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act; similar to H.R. 2
Bills H.R. 3883 and H.R. 3884-
Sponsors Rep, Charles H. Wilson (Calif.)
Committee References Education and Labor 
Major Provisionss Revision of the Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 2
Bills H.R. ^351
Sponsors Rep. Broyhill
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
liberalize the retirement income credit
Bills H.R. 4-357
Sponsors Rep. Byron
Committee References Ways and Means
Major Provisions To amend the Internal Revenue Code to





Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions':
1. Vesting— graduated schedule with 100$ after 10 
years service, to be distributed no later than 
age 65
2. Funding
3. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
Bill: H.R. 4-902
Sponsor: Rep, Bingham
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions: To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
provide a $5»000 exemption from income tax of pension 
benefits
Bill: H.R. 4-924-
Sponsors: Reps. Dent and Perkins
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provision: To improve education by increasing the
freedom of the Nation's teachers to change employment 
across State lines without substantial loss of retire­
ment benefits through establishment of a Federal-State 
program
Bill: H.R. 5117
Sponsor: Rep. Burke (Mass.)
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provision: To amend the Internal Revenud Code to
provide a $5*000 exemption from income tax of pension 
benefits if the taxpayer is 65 or older.
Bill: H.R. 513^
Sponsor: Rep. Hanrahan
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provision: Increased fiduciary responsibility and
disclosure; similar to S. 4-
Bill: H.R. 5260
Sponsor: Rep. Waggonner
Committee Reference: Committee on Education and Labor
Major Provision: To provide that the terms of pension
plans which call for different retirement ages for 





Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:





6. Establish a central pension agency
Bill: H.R. 5386
Sponsor: Rep. Annunzio
Committee Reference: Banking and Currency
Major Provisions: To amend Title III of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act to disallow the garnishment of 
pension or retirement funds
Bill: H.R. 5^37 and H.R. 5^38
Sponsor: Rep. St. Germain
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Acts; similar to H.R. 2
Bill: H.R. 5502
Sponsor: Rep. Forsythe
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions: To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
provide a $5»000 exemption from income tax of pension 
benefits if the taxpayer is 65 or older
Bill: H.R. 6613
Sponsor: Rep. Rooney
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Minimum standards for eligibility
2. Vesting
3. Deductions for personal savings
4. Raising Keogh ceilings
Bill: H.R. 67^2
Sponsor: Rep, Roe
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: To strengthen and improve the protections
and interests of participants and beneficiaries of 





Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Reference: A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 to permit an exemption of the first $5*000 
of retirement income received by a taxpayer under a 
public retirement system or any other system if the 
taxpayer is at least 65 years of age.
Bill: H.R. 7346
Sponsor: Rep. Rinaldo
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: A bill to improve education by increasing
the freedom of the Nation's teachers to change em­
ployment across state lines without substantial 




Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions: Same as H.R. 7325
Bill: H.R. 7672
Sponsor: Talcott
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Minimum standards for participation
2. Vesting
3. Deductions to individuals for personal savings for 
retirement plans
4. Increased contribution limitations for self-employed 




Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions: A bill to strengthen and improve the
protections and interests of participants and bene­




Committee Reference: Labor and Public Welfare and Finance
Major Provisions:
1. 10 year vesting; retrospective
2. Insurance of all unfunded liabilities (employer
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responsibility established if termination voluntary)
3. Covers all plans with 15 or more participants 
b , Amendment of bankruptcy laws to give pensions same 
priority status as wages
5. Disclosure and fiduciary responsibility
6. Funding
7. Enforcement by employees bringing suit in federal 
courts




Major Provision: Extension of Keogh plan tax benefits to
any individual (except self-employed persons or members 
of an employer plan)
Bill: S. 37b
Sponsors: Curtis, Fannin, hansen, Bennett, Dominick
Committee Reference: Finance
Major Provisions: (Same as S. 3012 and H.R. 12272 in
92d Congress)
1. Rule of 50 vesting
2. Individuals allowed to deduct contributions to 
their own qualified individual retirement accounts




Major Provisions: To amend the Internal Revenue Code to





1. Vesting— 25% after 5 years plus 5% per year 
thereafter (100^ after 20 years)
2. Funding— amortization of unfunded over 30 years
3. Insurance of unfunded liabilities by a non­
profit chartered corporation
Eligibility— later of age 30 or 1 year service
5. Voluntary portability
6. Individuals to receive a tax credit for their 
contributions to own or employer plan (lesser of 
$375 or 25% of contributions reduced by employer 
contributions)
7. Enforced by adding above requirements to Internal 
Revenue Code for favorable tax treatment
APPENDIX E— Continued
Bill: S. 1423
Sponsors: Sens. Williams and Javits
Committee Reference: Labor and Public Welfare
Major Provision: To amend the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947» to permit employer contributions to jointly 
administered trust funds established by labor organi­




Accrued Benefit Cost Method (Also called Unit Credit)--An 
actuarial cost method under which the pension costs 
are based directly upon benefits accrued to the date 
of cost determination. This cost method is charac­
terized by increasing annual costs due to the employee's 
advancing age.
Accrued Future Service— Service from the later of the 
effective date and the employee's date of entry to 
the present.
Accrued Liability— Actuarial accumulation of a plan's past 
normal cost under a given actuarial cost method.
Actuarial Accumulation— As distinguished from a simple
accumulation of past normal cost and interest earnings, 
for it includes other positive as well as negative 
yearly adjustments, the values of which depend on 
the particular cost method being used and mortality, 
turnover and salary experience.
Actuarially Sound— >A pension program in which future as 
well as current costs are recognized and where pro­
vision has been made to meet these costs over a 
reasonable period of time, as determined in the 
actuarial valuation.
Actuarial Assumptions— Mortality, interest, retirement 
rate, disability rate, withdrawal rate, new entrant 
rate, salary scales, marital status, expense loading.
Actuarial Cost Method— A particular technique for estab­
lishing the amount and incidence of the cost of pension 
plan benefits and the related accrued liability.
Actuarial Equivalent— An alternate benefit in which what is 
gained is equal to what is given up.
Actuarial Gain (Loss)— Where the actual experience under 
the plan is more (less) favorable than the actuary's 
estimate.
GLOSSARY— Continued
Actuarial Present Value (Present Value)— Current worth
of payments payable or receivable in the future; where 
each such amount is discounted at an assumed rate of 
interest and adjusted for the probability of its 
payment or receipt.
Advance Funding— Any arrangement under which sums intended 
for the payment of retirement benefits are set aside 
under proper legal safeguards prior to the date of 
the actual retirement.
Aggregate Level Cost Method— See projected Benefit Cost 
Methods.
Allocated Funding Instrument-1Contributions are allocated 
to provide the benefits of specific employees.
Benefit Security Ratio (BSR)— Assets divided by cost of 
accrued benefits.
Career Average Plan— Benefit designated as a certain
percentage of annual salary: for each year of service;
e.g., 2% of annual salary for each year of service.
The actual level of salary earned is thus reflected 
in the retirement benefit.
Clearinghouse— A federal, private, or quasi-private
agency which would act as a depository for the assets 
supporting the pension credits of a terminating employee 
The assets may be transferred to a succeeding employer 
or remain on deposit at the clearinghouse until the 
employee's retirement. In the latter case, the 
clearinghouse could serve as a private pension plan 
by administering retirement benefits of employees 
whose assets were never transferred out.
Conditional Vesting— Vested rights allowed to be exercised 
only under certain circumstances; e.g., withdrawal.
Consideration— Payment made into the unallocated fund.
Constructive Receipt— When pension funds are transferred 
from one fund to another, the funds may pass through 
the hands of the employee (e.g., if there is a delay in 
transfer while the terminated employee seeks succeeding 
employment). Since the funds are said to be con­
structively received, the funds are taxed as income.




Conventional Plan— A plan which provides benefits that 
vary both with years of service and with rates of 
compensation and which is not one of the pattern 
type. Practically all of the plans adopted prior 
to 1950 were of the conventional type.
Deferred Annuity— An annuity which becomes payable at a 
specified age; usually the normal retirement age.
Deferred Full Vesting— Rights to pension credits deferred
until all requirements are met (e.g., 10 years service).
Deferred Graded Vesting— A given percentage of the accrued 
benefit to be vested after a required period of 
service, that percentage to be increased for each 
additional year of service. The usual goal is full 
vesting after a period of service, but interim service 
assures only partial or graded vesting.
Deferred Wage Theory— Pension contributions viewed as a 
form of wages earned by the employee. Benefit 
from this form of compensation is deferred until the 
employee retires.
Defined Benefit Formula— Annuity determined by formula with 
benefit cost variable.
Defined Contribution Formula— See Money Purchase.
Disclosure (As a Pension Reform Issue)— Adequately in­
forming employees about pension benefits as well as 
the circumstances under which employees would be dis­
qualified for coverage; may also refer to increased 
reporting to the Labor Department or the Treasury 
Department of fund assets, investment, funding 
schedules, etc.
Economic Growth, Participation in (Referring to pension 
Plans)— Pension assets credited with more than .just 
the minimal interest guaranteed in the actuarial 
assumptions used to calculate the transfer values.
Effective Date—  Date on which a pension plan takes effect; 
i.e., plan begins.
Eligibility— Provision which determines the earliest 
entry date of an employee in a plan. Several 
conventional and most pattern plans cover an employee 
automatically from his employment date, and such 
plans are said to have no eligibility requirements.
In plans that have eligibility requirements the date
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is important since it usually marks the time from 
which an employee (a) starts accruing benefits, (b) 
starts accumulating credited service to be applied 
for vesting, early retirement and other provisions, 
and (c) commencss contributions, if the plan is 
contributory.
Entry Age Normal Funding Method— See Projected Benefit 
Cost Method.
Fiduciary Responsibility— Setting of standards for persons 
having control over the disposition of pension funds 
including investment practices, rules of conduct, 
degree of personal liability and regularity of 
outside audits.
Final Agerage Salary Plan— Benefit designated as a certain 
percentage of final average salary, which is the average 
of salary earned the last few years of service;e.g.,
50rfo of the average of the last five year*s salary 
earned.
Flat Benefit Formula— Benefit designated as a fixed amount 
per month or year beginning at normal retirement age.
Flat Unit Benefit Formula— Benefit formula which adds 
a flat unit of pension benefit for each year of 
credited service.
Full funding— If plan is terminated, all benefits for
credited service (including past service) to date of 
termination could be provided; i.e., accrued liabilities 
could be liquidated in full without further contributions.
Funded Ratio— Assets divided by supplemental cost.
Funding— Completed when the value of the assets is equal 
to the amount of the liabilities.
Funding Forgiveness— Occurs in nonvested plans when turn­
over is anticipated actuarially to reduce costs in 
the fundipg of benefits.
Future Service— Service subsequent to the inception of 
the pension plan.
Grandfather Rights— Any plan which is in existence when
the bill is enacted may retain any eligibility require­
ments for vesting which it may already have. Liberal­
ization of the plan to meet specifications may be re­
quired as late as e.g., 10 years from bill inception.
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Guaranty Fund— Some type of cooperative arrangement that 
would assure the fulfillment of legitimate benefit 
expectations under private pension plans irrespective 
of the financial status of the plans or their 
sponsors.
H.R. 10 Plans— See Keogh Plans.
Immediate Full Vesting— 100% vesting of benefits as they 
are accrued by the plan participant.
Incentive Legislation— Regulation of pension reform by 
adding additional standards to the requirements for 
qualification for favorable tax treatment.
Individual Level Cost Method— See Projected Benefit Cost 
Method.
Initial Past Service Liability— (Also Called the Supple- 
mental Liability)— Amount which would be required 
to pay for all past service credits at the inception 
of the plan.
Insured Deferred Annuity— Current purchase from an insur­
ance company of guaranteed periodic, usually monthly, 
income payments beginning at retirement, continuing 
until annuitant's death.
Insured Plans— Annual premiums are paid to an insurance 
company under an agreement, policy or contract which 
prescribes the rights under the plan, especially eligi 
bility for benefits, benefit amounts, plan termination 
and premiums and other charges. In the event of 
termination, the employer has no obligation to the 
insurer to make additional payments. Annuities are 
purchased on behalf of concerned eligible participants 
The insurer, then, has the legal obligation to pay 
specified benefits as they fall due.
Integration— A plan is said to integrate, by the Treasury 
Department's standards, if the combined benefits under 
Social Security and the private plan for higher com­
pensated employees do not constitute a higher percen­
tage of compensation than for those bf the lower 
compensated employees.
Keogh Plans (or H.R. 10 Plans)— Pension plans established 
by self-employed persons for themselves and employees 
(who have been employed at least three years). Con­
tributions for self-employed person's benefit are 
deductible for federal income tax purposes up to
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less of 10^ of earned income or $2,500
Liability— Benefit obligation determined under the benefit 
formula applicable based usually on the amount of 
service rendered by participants up to the date of 
valuation of the assets.
Locking-in— Requirement that vested benefits be barred 
from being cashed in by a withdrawing employee. The 
benefit would be obtainable only in the form of a 
retirement pension except in the case of death or 
permanent disability.
Modified Cash Refund Annuity Benefit— Life annuity with 
a preretirement death benefit of employee contribu­
tions with interest and a post retirement death 
benefit of employee contributions less any annuity 
payments.
Money Purchase— Amount of annuity is calculated, given 
a certain amount of premium; defined contribution 
plan. In such a plan, the fixed commitment is usually 
expressed as a specified percentage of the compen­
sation of covered employees.
Multiemployer Plan— Two or more employers (often financially 
unrelated) act as one employer for pension plan 
purposes; i.e., one master pension plan serves several 
employers.
Noncontributorv— Premium paid or consideration made by 
employer only.
Noninsured Plans— Trusteed plans dedicated to providing 
employee retirement benefits. Typically, banks serve 
as the trust agent, but other outside trustees may 
administer the plan.
Normal Costs— Annual premium or consideration; yearly cost 
assigned to a pension plan.
Normal Retirement Age (NRA)— Contractual age on the date 
the employee is expected to retire from active service 
and receive a full accrued pension.
One-in-Nine-Theory— Under this theory, only one employee 
m  nine who comes under pension plan will ever have a 
benefit. Statements to a similar effect were recently 
made by Senators Williams and Javits in connection 
with the preliminary survey results released by 
their Committee.
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Past Service— Credited service prior to effective date 
of plan; i.e., the inception of the plan.
Pattern Plan— Developed as a result of the establishment 
of the principle in 19^9 that pensions are subject to 
bargaining. The pattern plan refers to a form of 
plan which has been adopted by certain of the inter­
national unions and which has been negotiated with 
minor variations, with individual companies or 
groups of companies.
Pay-as-You-Go Funding— Retirement benefits are treated 
as payroll costs and are paid directly to retirees 
by employer as the benefits fall due.
Penalty Legislation— Regulation by the Labor Department 
(or any agency other than the Department of the 
Treasury) which is enforced through the federal 
judicial system.
Pension Preservation— Maintenance of vested pension 
benefits or as the prevention of loss of accrued 
benefits? may or may not involve a fund transfer 
upon employee termination. Where the benefits are 
preserved is considered to be irrelevant by proponents 
of this concept.
Portability— The right of a terminating employee to trans­
fer the assets supporting his pension credits to a 
succeeding pension plan.
Postretirement Death Benefit— Payments to a beneficiary 
upon the death of a pensioner, at least amounting 
to the excess of the decedent’s contributions with 
interest over the aggregate pension payments he 
had received.
Preretirement Death Benefit— Death benefit payable to 
beneficiary if employee dies in the preretirement 
period, at least amounting to employee contributions 
with interest.
Projected Benefit Cost Method— An actuarial cost method 
under which the pension costs are based upon total 
prospective benefits at the employee's entry age into 
the plan. Costs are usually spread evenly over the 
working career of the employee, so that annual costs 
are level, unless the benefit formula changes. If 
the cost is calculated for each individual employee 
(or similarly estimated by some group method) and the 
normal cost is the sum of the individual costs, then
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the projected benefit method is said to be an indivi­
dual level cost (or entry age normal) method. If, 
however, there is no individual calculation, but 
rather normal cost accruals are calculated for the 
plan as a whole, then the projected cost method is 
said to be an aggregate level cost method.
Promissory Estoppel, Theory of (As related to Private
Pensions)— The concept that justifiable expectations 
cannot be denied if the employee under question acted 
upon those expectations.
Prudent Man Rule— Trustee or any person involved with the 
investment of pension funds, investing with such care 
and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would in 
dealing with his own property.
Qualified Pension Plan— A pension plan is accorded a
"qualified" status when certain standards of contract 
formality, permanence, nondiscrimination and benefit 
determination are met. The purpose of "qualification" 
is to allow an employer to deduct pension contributions 
within specified limits as ordinary business expenses 
for federal income tax purposes.
Qualified Individual Retirement Account (QIRA)— The
accounts designated:'m the Nixon Administration bill, 
to which individual or employer contributions are 
deductible.
Reciprocal Agreement (Reciprocity)— An arrangement between 
nonuhiform plans by which employees are allowed to 
move from one plan to another without losing pension 
credits. The contractual arrangement determines 
whether or not funds actually are transferred. Alter­
natively, the transfer may be delayed. The benefit 
formula for the pension credit transfer is also 
subject to the terms of the reciprocal agreement.
Self-Administered Plan— Pension plan funded and administered 
by the employer; these plans are generally of the trust 
form, often using employed or consulting actuaries to 
ensure financial soundness.
Split-Funding— At the time of employee retirement, trustees 
purchase an insured annuity for the employee.
Supplemental Cost— See Initial Past Service Liability.
Tapered Benefit Formula— Reduced benefits allowed for 
earlier retirement; the earlier the retirement, the 
lower the benefit level.
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Terminal Funding— Benefits payable to retired employees are 
funded in full, while no provision is made for benefits 
standing to the credit of the active employees. Such 
funding can be accomplished through the purchase of an 
immediate annuity in the appropriate amount for each 
employee as he reaches retirement or by the transfer to 
a trust company of a principal sum actuarially esti­
mated to be sufficient to provide the promised bene­
fits. Under this procedure, the past service liability 
is never liquidated and active employees are completely 
dependent on the willingness and financial ability of 
the employer to provide the benefits credited under 
the plan.
Trust— Contributions are normally turned over to a trust 
company which invests the funds and pays benefits in 
accordance with the pension plan which is made a part 
of the trust indenture. The trust company assumes 
no obligation under the plan other than that of investing 
the funds in a reasonable and prudent manner. It 
provides no guarantees with respect to preservation 
of principal or rate of investment earnings. If the 
sums in the trust fund should prove inadequate to meet 
the commitments under the plan, the deficiency would 
have to be made up by the employer, if at all. Actuarial 
services are normally provided by an independent 
actuary.
Unallocated Funding Instrument— Contributions made to a 
pooled fund with no funds earmarked for any parti­
cular employees.
Unfunded— No assets exist to support the liabilities
created by the benefit promise. An unfunded liability 
usually is created when a plan is initiated or when 
the existing plan is expanded to allow for past 
service benefits or improvement in those benefits. To 
maintain a qualified status for federal income tax 
purposes, the interest on the unfunded must be paid 
annually.
Vested Benefit Security Ratio (VBSR)— Assets divided by 
cost of vested benefits.
Vesting— The right of an employee to the pension benefit 
attributable to his employer's contributions under a 
pension plan in the event of his termination of 
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